

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

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TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By the Rev. WILLIAM HUNT, M.A., D.Litt.

Delivered February 15, 1906

BEFORE I enter on subjects which will be more interesting to you than my own feelings, please allow me to say that I am deeply conscious of the honour which the Council conferred upon me last year in electing me, and you in confirming their election of me, as your President, and of the fact that I both succeed and preside over men far more worthy than I am to occupy that place. My earnest hope is that the Society may so prosper during my term of office that your choice may prove capable of defence. To secure such prosperity no effort shall be wanting on my part. Yet the fortunes of our Society, happily, depend more upon its Director, its Honorary Secretary, and its Honorary Treasurer than upon its President; and no Society could have more efficient or more zealous officers, and no President more genial allies or wiser counsellors than the gentlemen who fill these important posts. Relying on them and on the Council generally, who devote much earnest attention to our affairs, the Society may reasonably look forward to the future without misgiving.

We have good grounds for encouragement. We are fulfilling at least one of our principal duties, as set forth in our Charter—the publication of historical documents, more thoroughly than in past times. Before the Camden Society joined it in 1897, the Royal Historical Society was not in a position to do much in that respect. By the terms of union, however, it pledged itself to produce one volume of some hitherto unpublished historical authority in each year. Since then we have each year supplied our Fellows with two such volumes, besides the volume of our 'Transactions' containing Papers which, as a rule, are such as all students of history may read with profit. Your Council hope to continue this rate of publication. But it entails a heavy expenditure, which can only be met by keeping up and, if possible, increasing the number of our Fellows. Your Council, however, look that a candidate shall have some other qualification for election than mere willingness to pay a subscription. We want not merely more Fellows but more of the best sort. In this respect, too, we have been successful during the past year. Thirty-eight new Fellows have been elected, many of whom are writers and teachers of history, some of them eminent scholars and authors of deservedly high repute. On the other hand, we have lost ten of our Fellows by death, eleven by resignation, and thirteen names have been erased from our list for non-payment of subscription. This last is, I am happy to say, an abnormal number. Our Honorary Treasurer found, on taking office, that arrears had been accumulating for some time, and that a special effort on his part to collect them —in which he has met with considerable success, greatly to the benefit of our funds—and a thorough revision of the list of Fellows were urgently needed. While, then, our net increase is slight, our real advance has been satisfactory.

To the initiative and exertions of our Treasurer is due a far greater accession of strength in another direction. Himself a Librarian of well-known learning and experience, he has gained for us an addition of thirty—making in the year a net increase of twenty-eight—subscribing libraries: British,

Colonial, and American, including State and Legislative Libraries. Further, as you will see by the Report of the Council, he has given much thought to the work of putting the affairs of the Society on a better basis as regards finance and account ; he has reason to believe that his efforts in this matter will be entirely successful, and he has asked me to suggest to our Fellows that his work will be facilitated in no small degree if subscriptions are paid regularly at the beginning of each year.

Of our losses by death, we have specially to deplore the deaths of two of our Hon. Vice-Presidents, Sir Richard Jebb and Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff. Sir Richard Jebb adorned the University of Cambridge, which he worthily represented in parliament, alike by his eminence as a classical scholar, and by his exquisite literary taste and style. Take, for example, his paper on the Classical Renaissance, which, even if it stood alone, would be enough to make the first volume of the 'Cambridge Modern History' precious to all lovers of history and literature. Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff, long a conspicuous figure in literary society, did good service to the State, both in and out of office, and was for five years Governor of the Presidency of Madras. He was President of our Society from 1892 to 1899, and his presidential addresses, which exhibit the keen intelligence, wide reading, and philosophic thought of their author, his invariable urbanity, and his readiness to use his experience of affairs for the benefit of our Society deserve our grateful remembrance.

Among the causes for satisfaction as regards the progress of our Society, not the least is derived from the many proofs it receives of the esteem in which it is held by kindred Societies in other countries. With a large number of the most learned of these societies we exchange 'Transactions,' and thus we are enabled to collect many series of valuable historical publications rarely to be met with outside the doors of the British Museum.

This, however, brings me to a subject of deep anxiety to your Council. With the exception of the serial publications of which I have spoken, our library is deplorably deficient ;

and it will necessarily remain so until our Society has a permanent and suitable habitation. Our present abode is too small for any sufficient store of books for the use of our Fellows. Worse than that, it is certain that before long it will be taken from us, and we are actually holding our chambers in Old Serjeants' Inn subject to a three months' notice. That we should quickly gather a good collection both of books of reference and of standard historical works, such as would be of inestimable value to our Fellows, if we had room for them and an assurance that our library would remain undisturbed, seems to me to be beyond a doubt. And it is, I think, equally certain that neither in this, nor in some other important respects, will our Society hold the place to which it is entitled by its work, until it has a permanent and suitable home. Your Council have not been inactive in this matter during the past year ; but as yet their efforts have had no result. Some learned societies have, as you are aware, been granted quarters by Government. Our own Society has a claim not less strong to some similar assistance, for historical study has a close connection with politics. This is illustrated by the fact that our list of Hon. Vice-Presidents includes three members of His Majesty's present Government. Let us hope that they will be mindful of their duty towards us !

I now leave comments on the private affairs of our Society for a larger topic. A recent attack upon the study of History by one of our most distinguished men of science has suggested to me that it might be profitable to use the present occasion as an opportunity for briefly discussing the nature of our study and the claims which it has upon us. In the Romanes Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on June 14 of last year, Dr. Ray Lankester described the votaries of historical learning as obstinately turning their faces towards the past, 'still believing that the teachings and sayings of antiquity, and the contemplation, not to say the detailed enumeration, of the blunders and crimes of its ancestors, can furnish mankind with the knowledge necessary for its future progress.' Would it be

more grossly unjust to describe the scientific explorer as seeking for a knowledge which would promote the highest interests of mankind, by obstinately rejecting the study of the past for speculations on a disease among the sandhoppers of the French coast? But misrepresentation on one side cannot profitably be met by counter-misrepresentation. If through his observation of any diseased organism, a scientist should lessen the sum of human suffering, his name and work should gratefully be recorded by historians, and be held in everlasting remembrance. Nothing is gained by the votaries of one science belittling the science pursued by others; for Philosophy has need of all knowledge and, in its perfection, is the crown not exclusively of this science, nor of that, but of all. For Wisdom is justified of all her children. To know anything, even (if I may borrow a quotation from Dr. Ray Lankester's Lecture) 'the flower in the crannied wall, root and all, and all in all,' in all its relations, would indeed, if such knowledge were possible, be to know what God and man is. And is this true of the flower, and not true of human action?

None of us will deny that it is a pursuit worthy of man, to search into man's origin and the course of his victories over the lower creation, by speculations founded on physical phenomena; to trace his descent from a damp, unpleasant morsel of matter, from a tadpole-like organism, from a tall and weedy ape, with an unusual supply of brain for a mere simian; to imagine how this creature became man, and slowly acquired the power of speech, which enabled his mental capacity to develop; to show how he gained and is gaining dominion over the rest of nature, so that, though in his origin a long way lower than angels, he is crowned with glory and honour, and to anticipate the day when all things shall be under his feet. They who rightly use such knowledge, strive to contribute, each according to his ability, to the material progress of mankind. We, as students of History, seek to examine man's past, not indeed by speculation as to the process by which he became man, but from the earliest records of him as a social and intellectual being, and to trace—not

primarily, at least—his strife with the lower creation, but his relations with the higher, with his fellow-men, and to learn from our study lessons of character and conduct. And those of us who use aright the knowledge that may be gained from history will, each according to his ability, seek to contribute something which will promote man's moral progress, to fulfil their duties towards society, whatever their position in it may be. While, then, we praise all good work in every branch of science, we refuse to admit that man's material victories over nature are more worthy of study than his social progress as a moral and intellectual being, that Natural Science has a higher claim upon his regard than History.

Leaving this question, let us attempt to define the nature of our pursuit—what History is. In the widest sense of the word, it may be said to embrace all past events; for the history of nature as a whole is not entirely separate from the history of man: it is connected with it relatively. The character and fortunes of a people are strongly affected by physical conditions: by the geographical position, climate, and conformation of its land, by mountain boundaries and water-ways, by a productive or sterile soil, by the soft beauty or sternness of scenery. These and such like conditions, however, are secondary, rather than primary subjects of our study; they help us to understand History.

Various attempts have been made to define History. The Encyclopædists confine it to 'the record of things worthy to be remembered,' which seems to exclude all but so-called great events; though the dinner of the labourer may at least be as worthy of the investigation of the historian as the fall of a dynasty. Arnold pronounced it to be 'the biography of a Society,' a far better definition, though unsatisfactory, because it seems to regard History as a species of biography. Freeman's dictum that 'History is past politics, and politics are present history,' though it so delighted the students of a famous American university that they inscribed it on the walls of their library, is utterly insufficient; for it tells us nothing save that its author held, as indeed may be inferred

from his books, that political affairs were the sole subject-matter of History. For my own part, I would venture to suggest that History is the record of the life of man in societies, of everything that he has done, or thought, or suffered, so far as it can be proved, or reasonably inferred, to have affected a society. The fortunes of individuals do not concern the historian, except so far as they may have influenced the character or fortunes of a society ; of a nation, a Church, or other section of mankind. They are the subjects of biography, not of History ; though if we knew all, it may be that we should find that there is little that touches the life of any individual which does not affect the life of a society, in however small a degree, for we are all members one of the other.

A bare statement of facts, however, is not History. It tells us nothing of the life of man. It is a collection of materials from which history may be made, not history itself. Nothing is gained historically by the knowledge of a fact, so long as it stands alone. It is possible to teach a child that Rome was taken by the Goths in 410, and he may remain as ignorant of history as he was before. The student of history seeks not merely to learn and remember facts, but to understand what each means, to investigate its causes and effects, and its bearing on the life of mankind as existing in societies. Investigation of this sort must not be merely speculative : it must be based on records. All history must proceed from a like source. Without the record we have no foundation on which to build. Philosophical speculations on the causes of past events and their relation to the progress of mankind may be ingenious, but unless they rest on ascertained facts, they have no value.

Historical records are not confined to written words. An historian contemporary, or nearly contemporary, with the facts he relates, such as were Thucydides and, as regards part of his work, William of Malmesbury, finds his records in his own memory or in the oral narration of others. So, too, the memorials that ancient peoples have left of themselves,

a Roman wall, a sepulchral stone, a coin of a Visigothic king, are all records which may be used for the purposes of history. Be our records what they may, it is in them that we have to discover history, from them that the historiographer must write it. And this has to be done, as the painter declared he mixed his colours—with brains. In other words, the past must be treated subjectively : we must arrive at the significance of our materials by thought. This treatment of events is impossible in an early stage of culture ; for in proportion as the intellect is untrained, it is slow to reason. The child-like simplicity of the savage is content to find the causes of past, as well as of present phenomena in rudimentary myths ; his imagination, not his reason, supplies him with a satisfactory explanation of them. Passing to a more advanced state of culture, we find the earliest conscious efforts to preserve the memory of events in genealogies, boastful inscriptions such as those of Assyrian and other Eastern monarchs, and heroic poems. These last—as Dr. Lamprecht observes in his *Moderne Geschichtswissenchaft*, five Lectures lately translated under the title 'What is History?'—represent the idealistic element in historical writing as opposed to what he calls the naturalistic element represented by the genealogy. They depend on the imagination and art of the poet, but equally with the genealogy they are independent of reason, and they are concerned with individuals rather than with societies.

An advance is made in annals and chronicles, for in these the individual gives place to the society ; the chronicler writes of events which concern his nation, his Church, his monastic house ; his record of them being governed by chronology. A higher stage is reached when the historian grasps that events do not stand alone, and attempts to deal with them in their relation to one another. Historiography then becomes constructive and scientific, the writer's treatment of events depends on his intellect, on his perception of their inter-relation, and he endeavours to classify and control his materials. Among such historians in our own literature

Bede deserves a place, and then, after a long interval, comes William of Malmesbury, who consciously imitated him.

With the exception possibly of Francis Bacon, it was not until the eighteenth century was well advanced that our historians began to treat their materials in a philosophic spirit to endeavour to understand their bearing on ideas concerning the course of human progress. In this spirit wrote Hume and Robertson, and more distinctly Gibbon, the prince of historians.

For a short period histories of civilisation, as they were called, such as those of Freytag, Buckle, and Guizot, illustrated the strength of this tendency. With us, however, the philosophic treatment of history was more or less supplanted by an insistence on facts as though valuable in themselves, or by efforts to attract readers by picturesque language and ornate description. It has been restored in a fruitful form in Lecky's 'History of England in the Eighteenth Century,' which presents an exposition of facts both in their relation to one another and to a central idea.

The philosophic treatment of history does not imply an attempt to construct a philosophy of History, to invent a master-key to the past and future of humanity. Neither the romanticism of Herder, nor the transcendentalism of Hegel, nor Auguste Comte's conception of the three stages of human development, with their correlatives in the evolution of practical life, affords a law which the historian will recognise. These, and others who have expounded a necessary law of human progress, great though some of them were as philosophers, were not historians. Comte, indeed, candidly recorded that after he had read as much history as he wanted for the construction of his system he read no more ; further study might have revealed that his imposing edifice was founded upon sand.

Man's will, and in a lesser degree unforeseen or, as they are called, accidental occurrences have perpetually deflected the course of events from the direction which they naturally tended to take. Yet, while we discard philosophies of

History, we must study History in a philosophic spirit, seeking to understand not only the factors which have decided the fortunes of nations, but the full meaning of each historical phenomenon, its relations to its various and complex causes and effects, and the lessons it has to teach as to man's success or failure in making progress in morals, politics, economics, literature, and art; for as History is concerned with human progress, its field is wide, and we must not be content with a partial survey of it.

Again, the fact that the course of events is liable to be influenced by forces for which we cannot completely account, does not exempt us from the necessity of scientific study, nor remove History from the order of Sciences. If we would understand its significance, we must examine its phenomena, collect, classify, and consider our materials with not less diligence and thought than the biologist employs in the pursuit of his science. Yet not with an expectation of a like result, for we have to reckon with forces which lie beyond the scope of our observation. Impressed by this element of uncertainty, some thinkers, as Mr. Goldwin Smith, have contended that History is not a science, that it is not causal. Surely this is a mistake. While I beg to be allowed to avow my belief that God orders the course of this world, it seems to me that to be content to account for historical events by referring them to His providence is intellectually on a level with a belief that things happen by chance. Every historical event is strictly the effect of preceding causes; some of them we can trace, others we cannot.

Our search after them leads us to accept certain general laws of cause and effect. They are not, indeed, uniform in fulfilment, inasmuch as they are liable to modification by the action of human will, but they are nevertheless generally to be accepted. We may, for example, safely say that excessive centralization will in time destroy the ability of a people to govern itself; that the forcible overthrow of a settled constitution will probably lead to the establishment of an autocracy, and that usually of a military kind; that a policy

of repression, whether religious, political, or economic, will tend to become increasingly severe, and so on. By laws, if we may so call them, or, as I should prefer to say, by consequent tendencies, such as these, the course of events is generally regulated. Man's will more or less influences their course, but does not completely change its direction. For a man must in a large measure be the child of his age; he is born into special surroundings: he enters into an inheritance prepared for him. He may divert, or help to divert, the course of events, but he will lead them into a line fairly parallel to that which they would otherwise have taken; he may accelerate or retard the action of historical laws: he will not altogether defeat it.

For example, while the Western Empire was overthrown by the barbarians in the fifth century, a highly organised system of administration and the barrier afforded by the Balkans tended to preserve the seat of Empire in the East. At the same time geographical conditions, racial differences, the growing discord between national forms of religion and the Orthodox Church—the ally and almost mistress of the Imperial court—the rapid decrease of the higher classes in the provinces consequent on the public burdens imposed upon them, and the vigour of the barbarians, all pointed to the ruin of the outlying countries, and their severance from the Empire. This tendency was checked by the immediate predecessors of Justinian, and specially by Anastasius. The army was remodelled; the treasury filled; the fiscal system improved, and the curial order relieved. The empire seemed instinct with new energy. But despotism remained; there was no independent life in the provinces, no popular control. Justinian entered on an established despotism. His reign, though in many respects magnificent, put an end to the period of revival. His avarice and prodigality ruined the free cities, reduced the agricultural class to predial servitude, and encouraged official venality. He weakened the military power of the empire, and disbanded the local militia. The provinces lay open before the Arabs and the Avars. By

allying the Court more strictly with the Orthodox Church, he arrayed against the empire the powerful influences of the Churches of Egypt, Syria, and Armenia, and prepared the way for the conquests of the Persians and Mahometans. He accelerated the natural course of events—the ruin of the Greek provinces and the conquest of the dependencies of the empire.

An example of another kind is afforded by the work of Cromwell. I need not remind you of the tendencies of his time, nor of the extent to which he was inbued with its sentiments, especially as regards theocratic government; but I may, perhaps, point out how, partly led by forces external to himself, and partly acting in accordance with his own will, he modified the course of events; how under his leadership political power passed from the parliament to the army, how in consequence independency and religious tolerance triumphed over presbyterianism, and how he preserved the principle of an established religion against voluntaryism. Much else that seemed doomed he saved, and his conservative spirit would have led him farther along the path of restoration and conservation had not the tendencies of the age been too strong for him. A man of his time, he at once completed and deflected the course of the Puritan revolution.

Again, in examining the work of Frederick the Great, we see that his father, Frederick William, prepared the way for the rise of Prussia by prudent and vigorous administration, though his dullness and his political conservatism kept him in the old bonds of adherence to Hapsburg imperialism, and caused him to be outwitted by Austria and France. His son, entering on an inheritance prepared for him, led Prussia forward in the path of aggrandisement already dimly marked out for her. By his political and military genius he accelerated the course of events and turned them into a new channel, that of the establishment of a German power in rivalry with, and primarily at the expense of Austria. And so it was that German nationality was no longer represented by an effete medieval institution, but by a new

and vigorous national state. Other instances, such as especially the work of the first Napoleon, might be quoted as illustrating the character and limits of the influence of human will on the action of historical laws. In each of such cases man's will working under definite conditions has affected the evolution of pre-existing forces.

History, then, is a science in which the causes of events can only partially be discerned ; we cannot find out all the motives which have determined men's actions. And in seeking for them we must remember that though kings and others in high places have most obviously influenced the course of events, the will of a people, of a vast number of private persons, an aggregate in which each one has some importance, however small, is not less to be taken into account as exercising a controlling influence on progress. Yet, though we cannot discover all the causes or effects of historical events, we are continually getting nearer to the truth ; records before unknown become for the first time accessible, and thought and study are ever suggesting sounder interpretations of the past. One student makes some advance upwards towards the truth ; another thankfully takes his stand on the ground prepared for him, and advances a step further, and so on, each winning some ground in turn. More and more the causes of events are gradually opened up to us ; the motives of human action and its effects in modifying the course of history become plainer ; and as we follow on ever seeking to learn more, we shall get closer and closer to the truth, though, even so, our knowledge will remain imperfect : we must be content to know in part.

And what is to be gained by this study ? For what reward do they look who give themselves to it ? To us who are of their fellowship the question why we study history is as though one should ask a lover why he wooed his mistress. History fills our time and thoughts chiefly because we love it for its own sake ; we pursue the study of it not so much because we will as because we must. History is many-sided, and students can contribute to its development by working

each on that side of it that delights him most, or that he knows that he is best fitted to examine and expound. Some are specially attracted by what it has to tell of the means by which empires have been built up or the causes that have brought them to ruin ; others by the evolution of political or juridical institutions ; others by its record of industrial and economic progress, and others, again, by the personal element in history, the work for good or evil done by men and women, and the motives which decided their actions. To each History offers the special attraction that best suits the taste of each.

And if we must give an account to others outside our number of the claims which this study has upon us, may we not say that it appeals to our allegiance because it leads us to a knowledge of what man is, and has been, as a rational and responsible being, and of his power to influence the society of which he forms a part ; because it exhibits for our instruction the laws of historical causation, and the effect which the human will can exercise on their fulfilment, and because it enables us to draw from the past lessons of life and conduct ? It has, indeed, been asserted by Hegel as well as (with a modification) by Dr. Ray Lankester, by the philosopher as well as by the biologist, that neither an individual nor a people has ever decided on a course of action by a reference to history, and never will do so, because conditions are never exactly reproduced. Was, then, the career of Cola di Rienzi not swayed by history ? Nor the proceedings of the Long Parliament, which, as a matter of fact, spent an inordinate amount of labour on searching for precedents ? Were the Whigs of the eighteenth century not influenced by what history taught them concerning the position taken up the Whigs of the Revolution, nor the Girondins by the history of the Roman Republic ? The assertion that History has not been, and cannot be a guide of political conduct is, as every student of history will admit, utterly indefensible.

Lastly, apart from the direct lessons which History has to teach us, it has a claim upon us because it deserves in a higher degree than any exact or physical science to be reckoned as

a liberal study. To an outsider, it seems—so Dr. Ray Lankester tells us—a tedious enumeration of the crimes and follies of mankind. Is it not true that to those who have a fuller acquaintance with it, it is a singularly efficient means of strengthening the understanding, of widening the sympathy with which man should regard the struggles, the sufferings, and the triumphs of his fellows, of enabling the mind to judge of the public affairs of the day from a higher point of view than those of immediate expediency, prejudice, or passion, and of furnishing the soul with an abiding and elevating source of pleasure? It is surely no small thing to have constantly with us the memory of the words and deeds of the best and ablest of mankind in the past, a memory which is specially inspiriting when they are the words and deeds of men of our own nation, who have made England what she is, and by leaving to us that glorious heritage, have bound us to serve her, each according to his ability, even as they did. It is surely no small thing that history can add so splendid and necessary an adornment to the palace in which the cultured soul delights to dwell as the glorious order of the Great and Wise.

A CHAPTER IN ROMAN FRONTIER HISTORY

By Professor H. F. PELHAM, M.A., LL.D., F.S.A., *Vice-President*,
President of Trinity College, Oxford

Read March 15, 1906

In no quarter of the empire was Augustus' warning against further expansion[1] more carefully heeded than on the Rhine, until with the death of Nero the 'progeny of the Cæsars'[2] ended, and nowhere else was a scheme of frontier defence based on this policy more rapidly and completely developed. The territory lying along the left bank of the river was treated as a military district and placed under the control of the legates who commanded the two army corps of Upper and Lower Germany.[3] Within this area there were, until the foundation of Cologne in 50 A.D., besides the legionary camps and the smaller forts garrisoned by auxiliaries, only the native settlements of the subject German tribes,[4] themselves liable to be called upon to assist the Imperial forces[5] in repelling or punishing raids by their kinsmen beyond the river. The two armies were of imposing strength, consisting of four legions each and of at least an equal number of auxiliaries. The head-quarters of the lower army were at Xanten (Vetera), facing the valley of the Lippe, and the route that led up it into the heart of Germany. Here two legions were stationed, the others being at Neuss

[1] Tac. *Ann.* i. 11, 'addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii.'

[2] Suet. *Galba*, 1.

[3] 'Legatus exercitus qui est in Germania superiore' was the official title.

[4] Ubii and Sugambri, in Lower Germany; Nemetes, Vangiones, and Triboci in Upper Germany.

[5] Tac. *Ann.* i. 56, 'tumultuarias catervas Germanorum cis Rhenum colentium.' Comp. id. *Ann.* xii. 27.

(Novæsium) and at Bonn (Bonna).[1] The upper army had its head-quarters at Mainz (Mogontiacum), commanding the lowlands of the Main, and the road to the country of the Chatti. At Mainz, as at Xanten, were two legions, while Strassburg (Argentoratum) and Windisch (Vindonissa) had one each. With the tribes on the further side, 'among whom,' as Seneca says, 'our peace ceases,' Rome only concerned herself so far as the safety of the frontier required. They were not allowed to cross the Rhine except under an escort,[2] nor to settle within a certain distance from the right bank.[3] Opposite Mainz,[4] and down to the time of Claudius opposite Xanten,[5] fortified posts were established on the main routes into the Hinterland, which at once served to check raiders and provided bases of operations for punitive expeditions.

It was by the Flavian emperors that the first departure from the Augustan policy was made. When Tacitus wrote the 'Germania' in 98 A.D. a stretch of territory beyond the Upper Rhine had, as he tells us, been annexed by Rome and made a part of the province.[6] Of this annexation, of the motives which prompted it, of its extent and history, even of its precise date, ancient writers tell us extremely little; the proverbial half-sheet of note paper would easily contain all that they have to say. The literary record opens with the passage just referred to in the 'Germania;' it closes with the brief statement in an anonymous document[7] that all the

[1] The foundation of Cologne necessitated the removal of the two legions hitherto stationed 'in finibus Ubiorum,' and the formation of two camps, one above and one below the new colony.

[2] Tac. *Germ.* 41.

[3] Under Nero the Frisii attempted to settle on the forbidden territory, but were evicted. *Ann.* xiii. 54.

[4] See below, p. 27.

[5] In 47 A.D. Claudius ordered the withdrawal of all garrisons beyond the Lower Rhine (Tac. *Ann.* xi. 19). There seems to be evidence that the early Roman fort recently excavated at Haltern, on the Lippe, was abandoned at this time.

[6] *Germ.* 29. The 'province' must be Upper Germany; see below, p. 31.

[7] The 'laterculus Veronensis,' Seeck. *Notit. Dign.* p. 253. It gives the names of 5 'civitates' beyond the Rhine and adds, 'trans castellum Mogontiacense lxxx leugas trans Renum Romani possederunt. Istae omnes civitates sub Gallieno imperatore (253–268 A.D.) a barbaris occupatae.'

territory beyond the Rhine was lost when Gallienus was emperor; save for a few paragraphs of great value in Frontinus,[1] and a few lines in such later writers as Eutropius and Aurelius Victor, the intervening space is a blank.

But though, so far as literature is concerned, the history of this annexation is a lost chapter, one striking witness to its reality has fortunately survived the flood of barbaric invasion: the great 'barrier' which, starting from Hienheim, on the Danube, runs for some 300 miles till it reaches the Rhine opposite the mouth of the Vinxtbach. For the first 100 miles, from Hienheim to Lorch, it consists of a stone wall, locally known as the Teufelsmauer; for the remaining 200 miles it is an earth bank and ditch, in popular phrase the 'Pfahlgraben,' or Pale. This barrier has long been recognised as Roman, and as marking the line of a Roman frontier. At intervals during the last three centuries sporadic efforts have been made to determine its exact course, and to fix the positions of the Roman forts in its neighbourhood. It was not, however, until towards the close of the last century that any attempt was made to deal systematically and comprehensively with the barrier and with its problems. Von Cohausen, the Dr. Bruce of the German barrier, published his account of it in 1884.[2] His book, like that of Bruce on the English Wall, was a remarkable achievement of almost single-handed labour. It materially added to our knowledge of the subject, and it rendered the still greater service of compelling the attention not only of German scholars but of the German people to this unique monument of Roman rule.

While the investigation of our own Roman remains is still left to the energy of single scholars or local societies the Germans set themselves to the study of theirs in a characteristically thorough fashion. In 1892 an 'Imperial Frontier Commission' (Reichslimes-Kommission) was appointed;

[1] *Strategemata*, I, 3, 10; 2, 3, 23; 11,

[2] *Der Römische Grenzwall in Deutschland* (Wiesbaden, 1884). In the late summer of 1884 two Oxford men, Mr. Mowat, Fellow of Pembroke, and Mr. Crowder, Fellow of Corpus, walked the whole length of the barrier. A brief account of the walk was printed by Mr. Mowat (Oxford, 1885).

the Reichstag voted supplies, and an efficient body of district commissioners, superintended by a military and an archæological director,[1] were set to work. Twelve years of continuous labour followed; the exact course of the barrier has been determined; more than seventy forts have been excavated, exclusive of smaller posts and watch towers; roads have been traced, the pottery classified, and the inscriptions edited.[2] No better object lesson in the value of organised and well-directed research could be found, and no more important contribution has ever been made to our knowledge of Roman frontier methods. One result of the commission's work deserves notice at once, as it is not without its bearing on our own Romano-British problems. The primary duty assigned to the commissioners was no doubt the examination of the barrier itself, on which naturally enough public attention was mainly concentrated. It was not long, however, before it became certain that the 'barrier' represented only the last and by no means the most interesting stage in a long process, and belongs not to the prime but to the decadence of the empire. It is conceivable that such may be the fate of our own Roman wall, if ever the frontier district southward as far as the Humber and the Mersey should be thoroughly and systematically examined.

The territory annexed by Rome beyond the Upper Rhine may, for clearness sake, be roughly divided into three sections (1) a northern section, including the Taunus, the lowlands traversed by the Main, with its tributaries, and the district south of the Main as far as the Neckar (this we may conveniently call the Taunus section); (2) the region traversed by

[1] Major-General von Sarwey and the late Professor Hettner.

[2] In addition to the report published annually in the *Archäologischer Anzeiger* details of the work of the commission are given in the official *Limes-Blatt* (Trier, 1892–1903) and in the *Ober-Germanisches-Rätisches Limes*, of which 25 parts have now been published. The pottery has been treated by Koenen, *Gefässkunde in d. Rheinlanden* (1895) and by Dragendorff in the *Bonner Jahrbuch* (1895 and following vols.) The inscriptions are given in *Corp. Inscr. Lat.* xiii. part 2, fasc. 1 (1905). Excellent summaries will be found in Koepp, *Die Römer in Deutschland* (Leipzig, 1905), pp. 56–86, and in Fabricius, *Die Besitznahme Badens durch die Römer* (Heidelberg, 1905).

the Neckar, including the Black Forest (this will be referred to as the Neckar section); (3) the strip of country between the Danube and the barrier, which we may call the Rætian section. Each of these sections has, as will be seen, something of a separate history of its own.

It is with the second section, the Neckar district, that our story begins, for it can hardly be to any district but this that the famous passage in the 'Germania' refers.[1] It lies in an angle formed by the Rhine and the Danube, by the frontiers, that is, of Upper Germany and Rætia, and could therefore be correctly described as a bay or inlet of the empire, 'sinus imperii.' Not less appropriate to the Neckar district is Tacitus' description of the territory in question as 'dubiae possessionis solum,'[2] a phrase which Dr. Fabricius misunderstands, but which must surely indicate the condition of the country prior to its annexation by Rome. It was in reality a 'debateable land,' and had been so for more than 150 years. In the second century B.C. Celtic tribes occupied it, Helvetii, Boii, possibly also Santones and Cubii, and a fairly high Celtic civilisation was diffused over the district.[3] Towards the close of that century the Celts moved away, the Helvetii southward, the Boii eastward, the Santones and Cubii westward to new homes between the Loire and the Garonne. They left behind them traces of their presence in place names such as Lopodunum, Sumelocenna, Tarodunum,[4] in the ring walls of their deserted settlements,[5] in the graves

[1] *Germ.* 29. 'Non numeraverim inter Germaniae populos, quamquam trans Rhenum Danubiumque consederint, eos qui decumates agros exercent. levissimus quisque Gallorum . . . dubiae possessionis solum occupavere, mox limite acto promotisque praesidiis sinus imperii et pars provinciae habentur.'

[2] Fabricius, *Baden*, pp. 55, 58, takes Tacitus to refer to the whole area, 'which projected like a peninsula into the sea of barbarism,' a very doubtful interpretation of 'sinus imperii.' He also takes 'dubiae possessionis' as referring to the tenure on which the 'coloni' held their lands from the Roman government after the annexation.

[3] Tac. *Germ.* 28. A dedication 'deo Santio' was found at Miltenberg. *C.I.L.* 13, 6607. Domaszewski, *W.D.Z.* 1902, connects the 'Cubii' of Frontinus, *Strateg.* 2, 11, 7, with the Bituriges Cubi in Gaul.

[4] Ladenburg, Rottenburg, and Zarten.

[5] As at Zarten and probably at Rottweil. Fabr. *Baden*, pp. 16, fg.

of their burying grounds, and here and there in isolated Celtic worships.[1] Probably too some remnants of the Celtic population itself clung tenaciously to their ancient seats. Boii, for instance, seem to have been dwelling on the Middle Neckar in the second century A.D.[2] On the heels of the Celts came the Germans, first of all at the end of the second century B.C. the Cimbri and Teutons, fifty years later Ariovistus with his hordes of Sueves. But the Germans, though they destroyed nearly all that remained of Celtic civilisation, put nothing in its place. They swept over the country and in their turn passed away: even the Marcomanni, who were still in the Neckar country in the time of the elder Drusus, departed eastward to found a new German kingdom in Bohemia. Only a few traces of these German invaders are discoverable. A remnant of Sueves on the Lower Neckar,[3] of Teutons on the Upper Main,[4] a worship of Cimbrian Mars,[5] and a few graves, such is practically all that is left. During the first seventy years of the Christian era the country lay desolate, save for a few scattered remnants of Celts and Germans, while beyond it to the eastward lay the territory of the friendly Hermunduri. The silence that fell upon the land was unbroken, and so little anxiety did it cause to the Roman commanders on the Rhine that in 43 A.D. the legion which garrisoned Strassburg[6] was taken away and the legionary camp there stood empty until the year 70.

Such, then, we may assume, was the district to which the passage in the 'Germania' refers; when was it annexed and, as Tacitus tells us, a frontier line drawn, and the garrisons moved forward?[7] That it happened before 98 is obvious;

[1] *E.g.* the 'deus Santius' already referred to.

[2] *C.I.L.* 13, 6448 (at Benningen), 'deanæ explorator(es) Triboci et Boii.'

[3] At Ladenburg, the 'civitas Ulpia Sueborum Nicretium.' *Ibid.* 13, 6404, 6420, 6421.

[4] Near Miltenberg. *Ibid.* 13, 6610, 'inter Teutones.'

[5] *Ibid.* 13, 6604, also at Miltenberg.

[6] Legio II. Augusta was sent to Britain. See Fabricius, *d. Besitznahme Badens durch d. Römer*, pp. 30, 34.

[7] *Germ.* 29, 'limite acto promotisque praesidiis.'

beyond this all was until recently matter of conjecture. We are now able to say with some approach to certainty that this forward movement took place in 73 and 74, under the rule of Vespasian, and that it was the result of a campaign, possibly of two campaigns, of which the literary record knows nothing.[1] Inscriptions tell us that during those two years Vespasian was three times saluted 'imperator' for successes presumably gained by one of his legates;[2] further, that these successes were gained on the Upper Rhine, since Cornelius Clemens, legate of Upper Germany at the time, was awarded the triumphal insignia 'for successes in Germany;'[3] and, lastly, that two brothers in 73–4 held in turn the command of 'all the auxiliary troops against the Germans,'[4] and were decorated by Vespasian and Titus for their services. It may have been in preparation for this expedition that a legion, the 8th Augusta, was once more stationed at Strassburg.[5] The motives for the campaign can only be conjectured. Possibly Germans, excited by the events of 70, and aided by the Celts and Germans who yet lingered in the country, had threatened to oust the new settlers, and the latter as Roman subjects had appealed for Roman protection. Or it may be that Vespasian had for other reasons determined on the annexation and repopulation of this waste land, and that his preparations aroused resistance. In any case it is clear that his object was not to provide an effective barrier against the advance of a formidable foe, or to oust dangerous neighbours, but rather to establish the Roman peace and Roman authority in a thinly populated district.

The annexation was effected in characteristic Roman fashion. Two main roads were constructed, starting from

[1] Zangemeister, *N. Heideldb. Jahrb.* 1893.

[2] In 72 Vespasian was Imperator X. (*Ephem. epig.* 4, no. 807); in a diploma of May 21, 74, he is Imp. XIII., and before the end of that year Imp. XIV. See Zangemeister, *l.c.*

[3] *C.I.L.* xi. 5271.

[4] *Ibid.* xi. 5201, 5211. Cn. Domitius Tullus and Cn. Domitius Lucanus, the adopted sons of the orator Domitius Afer. Each is described as 'præfectus auxiliorum omnium adversus Germanos.'

[5] Fabricius, *Baden*, p. 34.

the two natural bases, the legionary camps at Strassburg and Windisch, and following the two natural routes into the heart of the country. A milestone found at Offenburg[1] tells us that in the year 74 a road was made by Clemens the legate from Strassburg 'in R.,' either, to take one suggestion, 'in Rætiam' or 'in ripam Danuvii.' In any case the course of this road is now certain; it ran up the Kinzig valley and across the watershed to Rottweil on the Neckar; here it was joined by a second road from Windisch; the line of the latter is given in the Peutinger table;[2] but that its original construction, at least as far as Rottweil, dates back to Vespasian is rendered almost certain by the pottery, tiles, and other remains found along the route. Both roads were guarded by earthen forts, such as that at Waldmössingen,[3] and on the Windisch road the traces of the legion then stationed at Windisch, leg. XI. Claudia, are numerous. Rottweil,[4] where the roads met, had also its earthen fort, but more significant of its place in the scheme of annexation is its Roman name, preserved for us both by Ptolemy and the Peutinger table. This name, 'Aræ Flaviæ,'[5] can hardly be explained except by supposing that Rottweil was selected as a centre for the official Cæsar-worship of the new territory, and that altars of Vespasian first and then of Titus stood there (Domitian's would have been removed after the 'damnatio memoriæ') as symbols of the Roman rule, now established within the ancient realm of Dea Abnoba, the tutelary goddess of the Black Forest. If Rottweil was already, as seems probable, an important native

[1] Zangemeister, *l.c.*, 'iter derectum ab Argentorate in R(ætiam),' or, as Domaszewski suggests, 'in r(ipam Danuvii).'

[2] The stations are as follows, Juliomagus = Schleitheim. Brigobanna = Hüfingen. Aræ Flaviæ. At the two former places remains of Roman buildings, tiles of leg. XI., and early Flavian pottery have been found.

[3] Waldmössingen, on the watershed between Kinzig and Neckar, was originally an earth fort, but was rebuilt in stone. Fabr. *Baden*, p. 40.

[4] The large irregularly shaped enclosure found at Rottweil was at first taken to be the Roman fort (*W.D.Z.* 20, 178). It is now regarded as belonging to a pre-Roman Celtic settlement. Traces of the Roman fort have been found within it. Fabr. *Baden*, pp. 16, 37.

[5] We may possibly connnect Aræ Flaviæ with the formation of a province of Germania Superior by Domitian (*Beitr. z. Alt. Gesch.* i. p. 133).

centre its selection as the seat of the imperial cult was quite in accordance with Roman practice. Very possibly too the Roman roads which met at Rottweil followed the line of older routes, and Rottweil may have been a road centre in pre-Roman times. It is suggested by some authorities that Vespasian may have had in view another object besides that of protecting and encouraging the settlement of the debateable land, and that he realised, as Trajan unquestionably did, the opportunity offered by its annexation for establishing more direct communication between the garrisons on the Rhine and those on the Danube. It seems certain that the road from Strassburg to Rottweil was at some period continued in a S.E. direction to the banks of the Danube near Tuttlingen. But there is no positive evidence that this continuation, though Roman, dates back to Vespasian, and though the 'in R.' of the Offenburg milestone may be rightly read as 'in ripam Danuvii' the reading is, of course, conjectural. On general grounds it seems doubtful whether this strategic consideration carried much weight so early as 74 A.D.

So far we have the ordinary accompaniments of Roman annexation, the roads or 'limites' penetrating the district, the protecting forts and garrisons; finally at a central point, in this case, at a meeting-place of roads which was also a native centre, the accepted symbol of Roman rule, the altar or altars of Augustus. But the district annexed by Vespasian was a waste country, save for a few remnants of the former population and the farms and villages of the new-comers from Gaul. It was a no man's land, and as such Vespasian seems not only to have annexed it politically, but to have declared a great part of it to be 'imperial domain land,' like so much of the more thinly populated parts of the African provinces.[1] Rottenburg (Sumelocenna) in the time of Domitian appears to have been the seat of a Roman official who is described

[1] For a general survey of our knowledge respecting the extent and organisation of the 'saltus Cæsaris' see Hirschfeld, *d. kaiserlichen Verwaltungs-Beamten* (Berlin, 1905), p. 125, and *Beitr. z. Alt. Gesch.* 2, p. 284.

as 'procurator of the tract of Sumelocenna and of that beyond the limes.'[1] 'Tractus' (or 'regio') is the technical term for a group of imperial domains or 'saltus,'[2] and this procurator was clearly in charge of the imperial domains lying around Rottenburg and on both sides of the road, one of which, as we know, took its name from Rottenburg itself, and was called the 'Saltus Sumelocennensis.'[3] The settlers must have become tenants of Cæsar, 'coloni Cæsaris,' paying certain dues for their land, and hence possibly the origin of the phrase 'agri decumates,'[4] in the 'Germania.'

At this point we must leave Vespasian and the Neckar district and pass to the principate of Domitian and to the northern or Taunus region. The situation here was completely different. There was no question of simply annexing, opening up, and settling with crown tenants an almost deserted territory. From the legionary camp at Mainz the warders looked across the Rhine to a fertile and well populated territory, watered by the Main and by its tributaries the Wetter and Nidda. In this territory Rome had already gained a footing. The hot springs of Wiesbaden and the silver mines in the Taunus had long been in Roman hands.[5] But the peace and prosperity of this district were constantly menaced by an enemy far more formidable than any which had to be faced in the south, the powerful tribe of the Chatti, who, though they no longer ruled up to the bank of the Rhine,[6] might at any moment pour down from their fastnesses beyond the Wetterau and harry the rich lowlands with fire

[1] *Inscrr. Græc. ad R. hist. pert.* iii. 1, 70. ἐπίτροπον Σεβαστοῦ χώρας Συμελοκεννησίας καὶ ὑπερλιμιτανῆς (cf. Mommsen in *W.D.Z.* 1886, p. 260).

[2] χώρα = 'tractus' or 'regio' rather than 'saltus.' Each 'saltus' had also its own procurator.

[3] *C.I.L.* 13, 6365, 'ex decreto ordinis saltus Sumelocennensis.'

[4] It has been suggested that 'decumates' is a Celtic form of the orthodox Latin 'decumani.' Fabr. *Baden*, p. 58.

[5] Plin. *N. H.* xxxi. 30, mentions the Wiesbaden springs ('aquæ Mattiacæ') 'fontes calidi trans Rhenum'; for the silver in the Taunus see Tac. *Ann.* xi. 20. The pottery, &c., found at Wiesbaden point to its having been in Roman occupation during the principate of Augustus. *Mittheil. d. Nassauer Alterthumsvereins*, 1904–5, pp. 4, 36, 43.

[6] As in the time of the elder Drusus. Dio. 54, 33.

and sword. As recently as 70 A.D. they had actually crossed the Rhine and attacked the fortress of Mainz itself.[1] Writing as late as 98 Tacitus contrasts their disciplined valour and military skill with the savage courage and rude tactics of their neighbours.[2] The Roman settlements had not indeed been left wholly unprotected. Mainz was already connected with the right bank by a permanent bridge,[3] the further end of which was guarded by a fort, now Kastel, originally built by Drusus,[4] while further up the Main, probably at Höchst,[5] was a second and larger fort, the 'præsidium in monte Tauno,' also built by Drusus and repaired by Germanicus.[6] A small earth fort protected the hot springs at Wiesbaden.[7]

These precautions appear, however, to have proved insufficient, and early in his principate, in 83 A.D., Domitian resolved on more effective measures for securing the observance of the Roman peace. Concentrating a formidable force at Mainz[8] he suddenly threw it across the Rhine.[9] Though there was some fighting it is not likely that any serious resistance was offered, and the Chatti no doubt retreated to their own impregnable wilds. Thither it was no part of Domitian's plan to follow them. What that plan actually was we learn from the contemporary soldier Frontinus.[10] Domitian's object was to isolate the Taunus district and the tribes within it from the powerful neighbours whose raids they

[1] Tac. *Hist.* iv. 37.

[2] Tac. *Germ.* 30, 'alios ad prœlium ire videas, Chattos ad bellum.'

[3] A permanent bridge was erected at least as early as 56 A.D. *C.I.L.* 13, 6820.

[4] 'Castellum Mattiacorum,' orig. built by Drusus, ἐν Χάττοις παρ' αὐτῷ τῷ Ῥήνῳ. Dio. 54, 33. Koepp (p. 38) wrongly indentifies it with the 'præsidium in monte Tauno.'

[5] The remains at Höchst indicate its occupation in the Augustan age, while those at Hofheim belong to the time of Gaius or Claudius. *Bericht über d. Fortschritte d. röm.-german. Forschung* (Frankfort, 1905) p. 29.

[6] Tac. *Ann.* i. 56.

[7] *Limes-Blatt*, p. 525. It was at a later time replaced by a stone fort of the normal size (157 m. × 144 m.)

[8] He had at least four legions—8th Augusta, 14th Gemina, 21st Rapax, and the 11th Claudia.

[9] Frontinus, *Strat.* i. 1, 8, 'bellum inopi ratum.'

[10] *Ibid.* i. 3, 10.

aided, and with whom, when the hour of punishment came, they found a safe refuge from Roman resentment. With this object, says Frontinus, he 'drew a frontier line or road for 120 Roman miles, and thus brought under Roman authority the tribes whom he had cut off from their refuges.'[1] Both the object and the method anticipated the action of Antoninus Pius in Britain. Recent researches have made it possible to trace this frontier line, and to understand Domitian's scheme for the pacification of the Taunus district.[2] From Kesselstadt, on the Main, the new frontier ran to Oberflorstadt, and round the rich lands of the Wetterau to the N.E. end of the Taunus, whence it passed along the north slope of the Taunus to the Lahn and so to the Rhine. Along the frontier small earth forts, measuring on an average 85 × 85 m.,[3] were erected at intervals, usually where some old trackway crossed the line, and between the forts were wooden watch towers ('burgi').[4] To support those outlying posts Domitian concentrated a considerable force of auxiliary troops in the lowland. On the road leading from Mainz into the Wetterau he built a series of larger stone forts, each capable of holding at least a cohort of 500 men. Höchst, Heddernheim,[5] Okarben,

[1] Frontinus, *Strat.* i. 3, 10, 'limitibus per cxx m.p. actis, subjecit ditioni suæ hostes quorum refugia nudaverat.'

[2] Excellent summaries of the results obtained by the Reichslimes-Kommission on the Taunus are given by Prof. Koepp, *D. Römer in Deutschland*, p. 60 foll.; Fabricius, *Baden*, pp. 47–55; and *W.D.Z.* 1901, p. 177 foll. For the formation of this earliest 'limes' see also *Arch. Anz.* 1900, 2, pp. 94, 95.

[3] *E.g.* at Saalburg, Capersburg, Feldburg, Zugmantel. The earth fort at the Saalburg measures 83 m. × 78 m., the later stone fort 147 × 221; at Capersburg the earth fort is 89 × 89, the stone fort 122 × 134.

[4] For a description of these towers and of the frontier line see *Limes-Blatt*, pp. 617–647. The wooden towers rested on stone foundations and were surrounded by palisades. They must have closely resembled those represented on the Trajan column as guarding the Danube frontier. For the evidence that the so-called 'Begleithügeln' marked the site of wooden towers see *Arch. Anz.* 1899, 2, 84. In some cases in the Taunus and on the Odenwald line the towers were built in the Gallic fashion (Cæs. *B. G.* 7, 23) 'alternis trabibus et saxis.' Between the towers in some cases there was a light fence. *Arch. Anz.* 1900, 2, 95, 96.

[5] *Arch. Anz.* 1904, p. 152. The stone fort measured 282 m. × 185 m. Okarben measured 295 × 192, Friedberg 245 × 154, Kesselstadt 375 × 375. The legionary camp recently excavated at Neuss is 571 × 432.

Friedberg, Kesselstadt formed a chain of base forts, connected by roads with the small posts on the frontier. From these base forts the garrisons of the latter were supplied, and on them the outlying detachments would fall back in the event of a serious attack. The system is significantly different both from that followed by Vespasian in the south and from that adopted at a later period even in the Taunus district. It assumes the imminence of serious hostilities, and the consequent necessity for concentrating rather than distributing the Roman forces.[1]

In the winter of 88–9 the two legions at Mainz, the 14th and 21st, revolted and saluted their commander, L. Antonius Saturninus, as emperor.[2] The revolt was speedily suppressed, possibly by the army of Lower Germany,[3] but it left one interesting trace of itself in the Taunus. Several of the earth forts and wooden towers along the frontier, and at least one of the stone base forts, Okarben,[4] show evident marks of having been destroyed wholly or partially by fire and of having been almost immediately rebuilt. It is certainly tempting to connect this fact with the movement made by the Germans to assist the revolted legions. We are told that they reached the Rhine and were only prevented from crossing by the sudden break-up of the ice.[5] A further consequence of the revolt was the final removal from Upper Germany of

[1] Fabricius, *Baden*, p. 51, notes that the frontier line from the Rhine at Rheinbrohl to the junction of the Main and Kinzig measures roughly 120 Roman miles. The '80 leugæ' of the Verona list must be derived from the 120 Roman miles of Frontinus.

[2] The date is fixed by the *Acta Fr. Arval.* (ed. Henzen), p. cxxi. Suet. *Dom.* 7, 'aput duarum legionum hiberna.' The place was certainly Mainz, not, as Mommsen thought, Windisch.

[3] See the ingenious arguments of Ritterling, *W.D.Z.* 1893; cf. Koepp, *d. R. in Deutschl.* p. 63.

[4] *O.R.L.* 16. The apparent destruction of Okarben, in the Wetterau, and also of the small frontier forts and towers between the Aar and the Lahn, suggests the inference that the Chatti moved down both the Main and Lahn valleys to the Rhine. *Arch. Anz.* 1900, 2, 81. 'Die Holzthürme auf der Rheinischen Strecke südlich der Lahn bald nach ihrer Erbauung niedergebrannt und an den gleichen Plätzen erneuert worden sind.'

[5] Suet. *Dom.* 6: 'ipsa dimicationis hora resolutus repente Rhenus.'

the two mutinous legions, the 14th and 21st.[1] They were replaced by leg. 22 Primigenia, thenceforward the permanent garrison of Mainz.[2] The history of the next thirty years is one of gradual and, so far as we know, peaceful development. The Taunus tribes, the Mattiaci, and north of them in the Lahn valley the Usipi, settled down quietly as subject allies of Rome. The Mattiaci, according to Tacitus, paid no tribute, but supplied soldiers,[3] and at least two auxiliary regiments must have been raised from among them about this time.[4] A regiment levied among the Usipi before 85 was despatched to Britain, and Tacitus has made famous its adventurous attempt to return to the old home by the Rhine.[5]

The annexation of the Taunus district led naturally and inevitably to the establishment of a frontier line of forts connecting this northern territory with that annexed by Vespasian in the south. The new line followed the course of the Main from Kesselstadt up to Worth;[6] here it left the river and kept along the ridge between the Mümling and the Main to Schlossau. This section is commonly known as the Odenwald line. From Schlossau it ran directly to Wimpfen, at the junction of the Neckar and the Jagst, and thence along the Neckar till it joined Vespasian's lines at Kongen[7] or Rottenburg. One significant difference may be noticed between the Odenwald section (Worth-Schlossau) and the continuation southward. Along the Odenwald line we get small

[1] Both were sent to the Danube; the fate of the 21st legion is uncertain, but possibly it was the legion which was cut to pieces in the Suebo-Sarmatian war, 89–93 A.D. Suet. *Dom.* 6.

[2] For this legion see Weichert, *W.D.Z.* 1902, p. 124. [3] *Germ.* 29.

[4] A 'cohors II. Mattiacorum' was in Lower Mœsia in 99 A.D. *C.I.L.* 3, Suppl. diploma xxxi.

[5] Tac. *Agric.* 28. Cohors Usipiorum per Germanias conscripta.

[6] It is possibly to the forts built on this section of the frontier that Frontinus (2, 11, 7) refers when he says that Domitian paid a price for the ground he took 'quum in finibus Cubiorum castella poneret,' and thus won the confidence of the natives. See Domaszewski, *W.D.Z.* 1902; Fabr. *Baden*, pp. 19, 52.

[7] The fort at Kongen is not later than the end of the first century, but very probably belongs to the time of Domitian rather than of Vespasian. *Arch. Anz.* 1896, p. 190. Fabricius thinks that the earth fort at Sülz marked the northern limit of Vespasian's annexation.

earth forts and wooden watch towers closely resembling those already described in the Taunus,[1] and possibly further investigation may reveal the site of the supporting base fort or forts. On the other hand below Schlossau from Oberscheidenthal southwards we find larger stone forts placed on the frontier itself.[2] The protection afforded by the river, and the absence in the south of any foe so dangerous as the Chatti may explain the difference. This same period of thirty years must also have witnessed the development of civil life and settlement in the new territory. An important factor was the road leading southward from Mainz through the rich strip of lowland between the Rhine and the hills of the Black Forest. Before the year 90 this road must have been carried at least as far as the Neckar, for the stations at Gross Gerau and at Neuenheim (opposite Heidelberg) must have been erected between 83 and 90, since they were built by the 14th and 21st legions.[3] At Baden-Baden the 1st adjutrix and the 11th Claudia dedicate a building to Trajan,[4] and a little further south a milestone proves that by 100 the road had been completed as far as Bühl, 120 Roman miles from Mainz.[5]

Another significant fact is the creation before the death of Domitian in 96 of a province of Upper Germany. Hitherto the strip of territory along the left bank of the Rhine had been treated as a frontier district under military control. The legate in command, a sort of Warden of the March, was styled 'legate of the army which is in Upper Germany,'[6] and his authority extended not only over the legions and auxiliaries but over the German tribes dwelling within the district—Nemetes, Vangiones, and Triboci. The new territory

[1] Fabricius, *W.D.Z.* 1901, p. 183; *Limes-Blatt*, pp. 444, 464, 497, 527. The fort at Hesselbach measures 82 × 72 m., that at Würzberg 79 × 71.

[2] Oberscheidenthal is the first of these larger 'cohort forts.'

[3] For Gross Gerau see *Limes-Bl.* p. 848 and *C.I.L.* 13, 2, 1, p. 234, and for Neuenheim *ibid.* p. 224. Both were cohort forts of the normal size.

[4] *C.I.L.* 13, 6298.

[5] Fabricius, *Baden*, p. 70.

[6] *C.I.L.* 11, 5271. Cornelius Clemens is 'legatus pro. pr. exercitus qu(i est in Germania Sup.)'

beyond the Rhine, when first annexed, must also have been placed under him. But the famous jurist Javolenus Priscus, who commanded here in 90 A.D.,[1] is styled legate (not of the army) but of the province of Upper Germany. This transformation of the military warden of the Upper German March into a provincial governor of the orthodox type unquestionably implies a considerable development of civil life on both sides of the river. We may morever take it for granted that in this case, as in others, the creation of a province involved a further step. Everywhere the basis of Roman provincial government was the 'civitas,' the community recognised by Rome as the political unit. And one of the first things to be done in the organisation of a province was to settle the number, status, territorial limits, and local government of the 'civitates.' In form and character these varied widely even within the limits of a single province. They might be towns of the regular Greek or Italian type, or tribal clans, as in Northern Gaul, or rural districts dotted over with villages and farms. In Upper Germany beyond the Rhine in the first century A.D. the urban 'civitas' was out of the question, for there were no fully developed towns. Nor, it would seem, were there more than two clans or tribes of sufficient size and coherence to deserve recognition. These two were the Mattiaci, in the Western Taunus, and the remnant of the Suevi on the Lower Neckar. It may be safely assumed that the 'civitas Mattiacorum,'[2] of which Wiesbaden was a subordinate township or 'vicus,'[3] dates as such from the creation of the province, while the 'civitas Ulpia Sueborum Nicretium,' the centre of which was at Ladenburg, is clearly at least as old as the time of Trajan.[4] The other 'civitates'

[1] *C.I.L.* 3, 2864. Possibly the selection of a distinguished jurist to be the first governor of the province is significant.

[2] *Ibid.* 13, 2, 1, p. 426 ; Fabr. *Baden*, p. 63.

[3] *Ibid.* 13, 7566. 'Vicani Aquenses' Kastel (= castellum Mattiacorum), or rather the 'vici' outside the fort, would seem also to have belonged to the 'civitas Mattiacorum.'

[4] *Ibid.* 13, 6404, 6421. The statement of Eutropius, 8, 2, 'urbes trans Rhenum in Germania restituit' (Trajan), may refer to his organisation of such 'civitates.'

within this area appear to bear territorial, not tribal names, and no doubt represented rural districts with a somewhat mixed population. Such were the 'civitas Taunensium,'[1] of which Heddernheim was probably the centre,[2] the 'civitas Alisinensis,' near Wimpfen,[3] the name of which must be connected with that of the river Elsenz, and the 'civitas Aquensium,' which took its name from the springs of Baden-Baden.[4]

But we meet with two other elements in the provincial organisation which are eminently characteristic of a newly settled frontier district, the most important being the imperial domains, the 'saltus Cæsaris,' with their 'coloni.' These were not included in the territory of any 'civitas,' but were separately administered by imperial 'procuratores.' Even on these domains, however, the 'coloni' developed some kind of communal self-government and arrived at the dignity of being recognised as a 'civitas' with a local constitution of their own. Such was the good fortune, as the inscriptions prove, of the crown tenants on the 'saltus Sumelocennensis,' of which Rottenburg was the centre and Kongen a subordinate 'vicus.'[5] The second element is no less characteristic. Not only the permanent legionary camps but the forts garrisoned by auxiliaries had their own 'territory,' where their cattle could graze and crops be grown, where retired soldiers settled down near their old corps, and where at a later period even soldiers still on service could rent and cultivate plots of land.[6]

[1] *C.I.L.* 13, 7265, 7352, 7370.

[2] Heddernheim after the removal of the troops developed into a large 'vicus,' with walls 2,700 m. in circuit. *Ibid.* 13, 2, 1, p. 426. Much the same happened at Wimpfen. *Arch. Anz.* 1899, 2, p. 90.

[3] *C.I.L.* 13, 6482, 'genio civitatis Alisin(ensium).'

[4] *Ibid.* 13, 6339.

[5] In *ibid.* 13, 6365, we have still the 'saltus Sumelocennensis,' but with an 'ordo,' a local council of elders. A later stage is marked by 6384, 'decurio civitatis Sumel.;' cf. 6358. That Kongen (Grinario) was a 'vicus' within the domain of Sumelocenna is proved by an inscription found there a few years ago. *W.D.Z.* 1900, Korr.-Bl. p. 16.

[6] Hirschfeld, *d. kaiserl. Verwalt-Beamten*, p. 143. Premerstein in *Beitr. z. Alt. Gesch.* 3, p. 28; cf. an inscription found near the site of the legionary fort at Regensburg, *Archäol. Anz.* 1900, p. 25, 'Aurelius Artissius ædilis territorii contrarii (*i.e.* across the Danube) et K(astrorum) R(eginorum).'

Within these camp territories grew up the 'camp villages,' or 'civil settlements,' the importance of which for the history of Roman frontier life is now fully realised, though it cannot be illustrated here. These territories with their villages were under the authority of the commanding officer of the camp, as the imperial 'saltus' were under that of the imperial procurator; and in their case, as in that of the saltus, a quasi-independent communal organisation gradually developed. A good illustration in Germany beyond the Rhine is supplied by the 'vicus Aurelii' or 'Aurelianensis,' near the camp at Öhringen.[1]

The facilities which the annexation afforded for establishing more direct communication between the garrisons on the Rhine and those on the Danube have been already alluded to; and, whatever may have been the case with Vespasian in 74, there can be no doubt that this object must have been constantly present to the minds of Domitian and Trajan. From the commencement of Domitian's Dacian war in 85 or 86 down to Trajan's decisive campaigns (101–107) there was serious and increasing trouble on the Danube frontier from the Dobrudscha westward to the borders of Rætia.[2] To meet it additional camps had been formed on the frontiers of Pannonia and Mœsia,[3] and four legions, the 14th and 21st in 89, the 1st adjutrix and 11th Claudia before 101, had been transferred from Upper Germany. Vindonissa was abandoned,[4] and only two legions, the 22nd at Mainz and the 8th at Strassburg, remained on the Upper Rhine. With this necessity for strengthening the Danube frontier we may connect the construction of the roads from Mainz and Strassburg to Cannstatt,[5] whence two routes led to the

[1] *C.I.L.* 13, 6541; *O.R.L.* pt. 5.

[2] Tac. *Agric.* 41: 'tot exercitus in Mœsia Daciaque . . . et Pannonia . . . amissi.' Cf. *Hist.* i. 2, 'coortæ in nos Sarmatarum ac Sueborum gentes.'

[3] Vespasian enlarged the camp at Carnuntum. The camps at Vindobona, Ratiaria, and Œscus were apparently established under the Flavian emperors.

[4] *C.I.L.* 13, 2, 1, p. 37.

[5] Fabricius, *Baden*, p. 41 *sqq.* Cannstatt was clearly an important station. The fort is one of the larger ones (217 × 178 m.). That it was a road centre is

Danube, one, that now partly followed by the Orient Express, up the Filsthal and over the watershed by Urspring [1] to Faimingen ; the other up the Remsthal to Aalen,[2] and so eastward along the northern slope of the Jura to Eining. The former was almost certainly the older route of the two and seems to have remained in use until about 100 A.D. ; the latter must have been at least begun and carried some way under Trajan, for excavations show that both the road and several of the forts guarding it were already in existence when Hadrian carried his palisade in front of them. It is to this direct through communication with the Danube that Aurelius Victor evidently refers when he states that Trajan made a road from the Black Sea to Gaul.[3] The date of the section along the middle Danube is fixed to the year 101 by the famous inscription cut in the rock at Orsova.[4] Lastly, with the removal of the legion from Vindonissa and the increasing security of the Black Forest district we may connect the abandonment of Vespasian's forts at Rottweil, Waldmössingen, and Sülz.[5]

In Germany beyond the Rhine, as elsewhere, the principate of Hadrian left indelible marks.[6] Renouncing all thoughts of aggression, he turned to the more prosaic task of perfecting the frontier defences of the empire. But the methods which he employed certainly involved in some cases, and notably in the one before us, the adoption of a rather mechanical system, and of a dangerous dispersion of

implied by the dedication 'biviis triviis' (*C.I.L.* 13, 6437) and the presence of transport officers, 'beneficiarii' (*ibid.* 6442).

[1] Apparently the fort here dates from Domitian, and it seems to have been abandoned about 150 A.D. See *O.R.L.* pt. 24.

[2] The fort at Aalen, a large one (288 m. × 214 m.), was probably built early in the second century. It commands not only the route westward down the Rems valley, but routes northward down the Kocher to the Neckar, and southward up the Kocher and then down the Brenz to the Danube. See *O.R.L.* pt. 23.

[3] Aur. Victor, *De Cæs.* 13: 'iter conditum per feras gentes quo facile abusque Pontico mari in Galliam permeatur.'

[4] *C.I.L.* 3, Suppl. 8267: 'Montibus excisis anco(ni)bus sublatis via(m) f(ecit).'

[5] *O.R.L.* pts. 6 and 9.

[6] Hadrian visited Germany in 121 A.D.

the imperial forces in small bodies along the frontier lines. The result was seen in the third century, when it became necessary to support these scattered and immobile frontier garrisons by a mobile field army, a task finally accomplished by Diocletian and Constantine. In the Taunus district Domitian's plan of small outposts resting on larger base forts in the rear was given up. The small earth forts on the frontier line were replaced by stone ones,[1] capable of accommodating an entire cohort ; and the wooden watch towers by towers of stone.[2] At the same time the old base forts Heddernheim, Okarben, and Friedberg were depleted of troops and survived, if at all, only as civil settlements. Another change followed ; for the success of Hadrian's system it was clearly essential to have the most direct communication between the new frontier forts, which had to depend on each other and not on any base forts for assistance. It was probably on this account that for the old frontier line traced by Domitian, with its curves and windings, was substituted, wherever feasible, a new line, running as straight as possible from point to point,[3] a tendency which under Hadrian's successor produced the mathematically rigid frontier line from Walldürn to Welzheim.[4]

Of greater interest is the unexpected verification of the well-known statement made by Hadrian's biographer, Spartianus, 'that where the barbarians were divided from the empire, not by rivers, but by "limites" [*i.e.* frontier roads], he barred them out by great stakes planted deep in the ground

[1] *Arch. Anz.* 1902. A good instance is the Saalburg.

[2] The stone towers are clearly older than the earthen barrier, behind which they stand at varying distances (7 yds. to 33 yds.) *Limes-Bl.* p. 721. They are on an average about 5 yards square.

[3] The evidence is summed up in *Arch. Anz.* 1896, p. 177. The stone towers seem clearly to belong to the new line, the wooden ones to the old. The interval between the old and new line is in some places as much as 700 m. (*ibid.* 1900, 2, p. 82), and the former is often traceable only by the positions of the wooden towers. No certain traces of such towers have been found either on the new line in the Taunus and Wetterau, or on Pius' new frontier from Walldürn to Haghof (*Arch. Anz.* 1900, 2, p. 93).

[4] Fabricius, *W.D.Z.* 1901, p. 185.

and joined together so as to form a wall-like hedge.'[1] The researches of the Limes-Kommission have placed it beyond doubt not only that a palisade was erected along those sections of the frontier, where neither the Neckar nor the Main formed the boundary, but that Spartianus' description of it is extraordinarily accurate. The ditch in which the stakes were implanted, and the remains of the stakes themselves, were first identified by District Commissioner W. Kohl on the Rætian section, near Gunzenhausen, in 1894.[2] Since then the palisade ditch[3] and traces of the palisade have been found along the Odenwald[4] line, from the Neckar to the Main, and from Gross Krotzenburg on the Main round the Taunus to the Rhine.[5] The palisade is demonstrably later than the earth forts of Domitian, through some of which it passes, and older than the so-called 'limes' itself, which in Rætia at any rate occasionally crosses and recrosses the line of the palisade. These facts, taken together with Spartianus' statement, justify us in assigning this elaborate mechanical barrier to Hadrian. It is nevertheless inconceivable that the palisade was ever intended as an effective defence in time of war. Its erection implies a comparatively peaceful

[1] *Vit. Hadriani*, 12, 'in plurimis locis in quibus barbari non fluminibus sed limitibus dividuntur, stipitibus magnis in modum muralis sæpis funditus jactis atque conexis barbaros separavit.'

[2] *Limes-Blatt*, p. 483 *sqq*. The palisade was a very substantial obstacle. It stood nine feet high. For the upright stakes, as Spartianus calls them, the trunks of oak trees have been split in two, and set up with the flat face towards the 'outland.' Their average thickness is 23–29 centimetres and breadth 37–54 cm. They were, as Spartianus says, 'funditus jactis' in a ditch $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep, and 'conexis' (bound together) on the inside by strong cross beams.

[3] The theory that this ditch merely represented the original line of demarcation drawn by the surveyors, and then filled in, has now been abandoned. See Kohl, *Limes-Bl.* p. 487.

[4] Along the Odenwald line the palisade runs in front of the line of forts at an average distance of about 30 yards. *Ibid.* p. 465.

[5] In this section the later 'barrier,' the 'Pfahlgraben,' runs as a rule in front of the forts, but behind the palisade (see *O.R.L.* pt. 20, 'Gross Krotzenburg,' p. 3), which it may have been intended to supplement, not to supersede (*Limes-Bl.* p. 720). For an exception to this rule see *Arch. Anz.* 1893, p. 3. For an earlier view see *ibid.* 1899, p. 78, but Hettner (*ibid.* p. 79) regards the palisade as 'allezeit ein unentbehrlicher Theil d. Grenzwehr.'

and settled state of affairs, when the dangers to be guarded against on the frontier were those of smuggling or of petty raids. From this point of view India furnishes us with an interesting analogy. The following account has been kindly supplied to me of the 'Customs Hedge' in India:—'For the purpose of realising the duty on salt produced in Native States and in British districts subject to a lower rate of duty, when imported into Upper India, a customs line was commenced in 1843. In 1870 it stretched across the whole of India, from a point north of Attock, on the Indus, to the Mahanadi, on the border of Madras, a distance of 2,500 miles. It consisted of an impenetrable hedge of thorny bushes and trees, supplemented in places by a stone wall or a ditch and earth mound. It was guarded and patrolled, night and day, by a force of 14,000 officers and men.' Hadrian's palisade must also have been intended mainly to ensure the control of all traffic crossing the frontier. Of the regulations imposed on such traffic we get some idea from ancient writers.[1] Persons coming from outside could only cross at certain points, usually guarded by a fort or watch tower. No one might cross carrying arms, and duties were levied on imported goods. At the points of ingress markets seem to have been frequently established, the place and time being no doubt fixed, as they were in the second century on the Danube, by the Roman government.[2] It is at least possible that the markets known to have existed in the early Middle Ages at various points on the frontier may go back to Roman times.[3]

Antoninus Pius was, like Hadrian, a constructor of barriers both in Britain and in Transrenane Germany; and between the building of his barrier from Clyde to Forth and his work in Germany the evidence suggests an interesting connection. During his principate we meet for the first time with detachments of Brittones in the Odenwald and along

[1] Tac. (*Germ.* 41), speaking of the exceptional privileges granted to the Hermunduri: 'non in ripa commercium sed penitus passim et sine custode transeunt.'

[2] Dio. 73. 2. The Germans were to meet only once a month, at a fixed place and under the supervision of a Roman centurion.

[3] *E.g.* at Marköbel, *O.R.L.* 3, pp. 16, 17; Arnsburg, *ibid.* 17, p. 18.

the line of the Middle Neckar from Neckarburken to Benningen.[1] These detachments, or 'numeri,' a somewhat new type[2] of auxiliary troops, are recorded as building the stone towers which on the Odenwald line now replaced the older wooden ones,[3] and also small stone forts near the larger cohort forts on the Neckar.[4] They are distinguished by local names, Triputienses, Elantienses, Murrenses, Grinarionenses (?), indicating the district in which they were originally raised, which was, no doubt, usually at first that in which they were stationed.[5] Of these facts Dr. Fabricius gives an explanation which is singularly attractive.[6] He supposes that Antoninus, in regular Roman fashion, evicted large numbers of Britons from the territory between his new barrier and the older one erected by Hadrian further south between Tyne and Solway. These Britons he transplanted to Germany beyond the Rhine, and settled them as 'coloni' on the crown domains along the Neckar, and probably also on those beyond the frontier. Among the conditions imposed would naturally be that of assisting in the defence of the frontier.[7] For this purpose recruits were levied from among these settlers, *e.g.* in the valleys of the Elz and the Mürr, formed into 'numeri' on the new plan, and used to supplement the regular 'cohortes' and 'alæ.' But this settlement of Brittones in the 'saltus translimitaneos' had a further result. Inscriptions show that these British

[1] Fabricius, *Baden*, pp. 78–82. [2] Mommsen, *Hermes*, 19, 219.

[3] Now also, if not earlier, the small earth forts on the Odenwald were replaced by stone ones, which, however, are also small forts with only three gates. *Limes-Blatt*, pp. 474, 550, 772. The inscriptions give the dates 145 and 146 A.D. *C.I.L.* 13, 6501, 6502.

[4] *E.g.* near the fort of coh. III. Aquitanorum at Neckarburken was a small ort (79 m. × 79 m.) garrisoned by a 'numerus Brittonum Elantiensium.' *O.R.L.* pt. 9.

[5] The 'Brittones Triputienses' are found along the Odenwald line, *C.I.L.* 13, 6502, 11; the Elantienses (? from the river Elz) near Neckarburken, *ibid.* 13, 6490, 8; the Murrenses (from the river Murr) near Benningen, *ibid.* 13, 6471; cf. 'Vicani Murrenses' 6454; for Gr(inarionenses) (Kongen) and L(inenses) (? Lyn), see *C.I.L.* 2, 1, p. 254, *Limes-Bl.* p. 824.

[6] *Baden*, p. 80.

[7] 'Ad tutelam limitis;' cf. the inscr. *Archäol.-epig. Mittheil.* 17, p. 103.

detachments were already in Germany in 145 A.D.[1] A dedication to Pius at Jagsthausen [2] indicates that before his death, in 161 A.D., a new and advanced frontier line had been drawn, running from Miltenberg to Welzheim. Dr. Fabricius suggests that one motive at any rate for this forward move may have been Pius' desire to protect his new settlers from Britain. Throughout the greater part of its length, from Walldürn to Welzheim, a distance of about forty-eight miles, the new frontier was carried in an absolutely straight line. Seven forts, all but one of the normal cohort size,[3] were built at intervals along it, and in front of them, at distances varying from about 200 yards to a mile, Pius, following in the steps of Hadrian, erected a palisade with stone watch towers.[4] Finally the garrisons from the old forts on the Neckar were moved forward to the new ones. The 'ala I. Flavia,' apparently stationed with the eleventh legion at Vindonissa before Vepasian's advance in 73, then for some time at Rottweil,[5] later probably at Cannstatt, was now transferred to Welzheim.[6] Cohors III. Aquitanorum was moved from Neckarburken to Osterburken,[7] coh. I. Helvetiorum from Böckingen to Ohringen.[8] The old frontier seems to have been left in charge of the newly formed 'numeri,' whose small forts have been found here and there, as at Neckarburken, in the neighbourhood of the deserted cohort stations. If this advance of the frontier was prompted by a desire to protect the British settlers the precise line which it followed was evidently determined by another consideration.

[1] *C.I.L.* 13, 6501. [2] *Ibid.* 13, 6561.

[3] Walldürn is the exception, being only 96 m. × 84 m.

[4] See the official reports on Osterburken (*O.R.L.* pt. 2), Öhringen (*ibid.* pt. 5), Murrhardt (*ibid.* pt. 1), Welzheim (*ibid.* p. 21). Whether there were at first wooden towers along this line is still a matter of dispute (*Arch. Anz.* 1898, p. 5), but that Pius' line consisted of forts, watch towers, and palisade seems certain (*ibid.* 1901, 2, p. 83). The towers on this frontier are at intervals of from 250 to 400 m.

[5] Brambach, *C.I.R.* 1643.

[6] *O.R.L.* pt. 21. The 'ala I.' whose tiles were found at Welzheim is almost certainly the 'ala I. Flavia,' which is given as stationed in Upper Germany in the diplomata of 74, 82, 90, and 116.

[7] *C.I.L.* 13, 6077. [8] *Ibid.* 6542–3.

A glance at the map will show that the frontier line is so drawn as to connect two already existing termini. From the point at which it leaves the Main its objective clearly is the western end of the Rætian frontier, which must therefore have been already carried to the neighbourhood of Lorch. But the history of the Roman advance beyond the Upper Danube is obscure and much needs further investigation. The following suggestions may, however, be made: An early stage of the advance may be indicated by the road up the Filsthal to Urspring and Faimingen, at both of which places earth forts of the Flavian period have been found.[1] To the same period belongs the large Flavian fort at Heidenheim,[2] indicating an advance up the Brenz valley. Before the time of Hadrian several at least of the forts to the north of the Jura must have been built. Aalen[3] replaced Heidenheim as a large fort for a cavalry regiment a thousand strong, and with the occupation of Aalen we must connect the road and forts along the Rems valley to the Neckar.[4] If the river Rems were the frontier here it is easy to understand why no traces of Hadrian's palisade are found west of Aalen. It would have stopped at the point where the river became the boundary. When Pius planted his Britons beyond the Neckar his new frontier line was naturally drawn from near the Rems opposite Lorch to the Main.[5]

The settled peace which Transrenane Germany had enjoyed since 90 was rudely broken under Marcus Aurelius

[1] For Urspring see Fabricius' report in the *Bericht über d. Fortschritte d. Röm. Germ. Forschung*, 1904, p. 31; for Faimingen, *Limes-Blatt*, p. 918.

[2] *O.R.L.* pt. 13. It measures 271 m. × 195 m., is nearly as large as Aalen, and was an important road centre. *Arch. Anz.* 1896, p. 188.

[3] *O.R.L.* pt. 23. It was garrisoned by 'ala II. Flavia miliaria.' For the importance of its position see above, p. 35, note 2.

[4] This route is probably as early as Hadrian. *Arch. Anz.* 1900, 2, p. 95. Hadrian repaired the road from Rottenburg to Kongen. *W.D.Z.* 1900, Korr.-Bl. p. 16.

[5] Possibly an early (Trajan) frontier line existed from a point N. of Lorch to Haghof and thence to Benningen. *Arch. Anz.* 1900, 2, 94. The frontier line from Lorch to Haghof has not the rigid straightness of that from Haghof to Walldürn and is, therefore, probably older. *Arch. Anz.* 1903, p. 115.

by the first of the great storms which swept over the Roman frontier in the latter half of the second and in the third century. The storm centre during the Marcomannic war was on the Middle Danube, but the area of disturbance extended to the Upper Danube and to the frontiers of Transrenane Germany. Both the old and favoured friends of Rome, the Hermunduri,[1] and her ancient foes, the Chatti,[2] joined in the attack, the former possibly resenting the Roman advance across the Jura into their territories. Both were driven back, and the only traces of the invasion discoverable are the efforts made here and there to strengthen the frontier defences. The enlargement of the fort at Pfünz in 183[3] and the building of a new fort at Böhming[4] under Commodus were probably due to the recent troubles on the Rætian frontier. We know also that Marcus placed Rætia under a legate and formed a legionary camp at Regensburg.[5] That the new frontier line of Pius was strengthened is indicated by the enlargement of the fort at Osterburken,[6] and by the moving forward to this line of some at least of the detachments of Brittones from the Neckar.[7] Finally at Niederbieber, near the Rhine end of the frontier, a large new fort was built, no doubt to check any advance of the Chatti down the Lahn valley.[8] But Marcus and Commodus secured only a temporary respite for the menaced territory. Early in the third century, in August 213, the Arval Brethren in Rome pray for the safety of Caracalla, who was marching across the Rætian frontier into 'barbaricum' to extirpate the enemy.[9] In October

[1] *Vit. Marci*, 21, 22. [2] *Ibid.* 8; *Vit. Did. Jul.* 1.

[3] *O.R.L.* part 14; *C.I.L.* 3, Suppl. 11933, a dedication to Commodus by coh. I. Breucorum, the garrison of Pfünz.

[4] *Limes-Blatt*, p. 884, 'vexillarii leg. III. Italicæ vallum fecerunt . . . item portas cum turribus IIII' (181 A.D.)

[5] Castra Regina. *C.I.L.* 3, Suppl. 11965. Leg. III. Italica was stationed there.

[6] *Ibid.* 13, 2, 1, p. 276, and nos. 6578, 6582.

[7] To Welzheim, Öhringen, Walldürn, Miltenberg. See *C.I.L.* 13, 2, 1, p. 264.

[8] *Ibid.* 13, 2, 1, p. 499; *Limes-Blatt*, p. 890.

[9] *Act. Fr. Arv.* (ed. Henzen), p. 81, 'per limitem Rætiæ ad hostes extirpandos.'

they give thanks for his German victory.[1] The enemy in this case were the Alemanni,[2] who now make their first appearance in history. Where Caracalla defeated them is uncertain ; our only clue is the statement of Aurelius Victor that it was 'near the Main.'

It is to the time of Severus and Caracalla that the best German authorities assign the building of the great barrier. If so, it was built only some thirty or forty years before the rising flood of barbarism swept over Transrenane Germany in the reign of Gallienus. The Rætian section of the barrier starts from Hienheim, on the Danube, and runs to a point N.W. of Lorch, where it joins the Pfahlgraben. It consists of a well-built stone wall, originally at least 8 feet high and $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet thick, strengthened on the inside by buttresses at intervals of from 8 to 17 yards. Over swampy ground it is carried on a platform of piles driven deeply into the earth.[3] It runs as a rule at a considerable distance in front of the forts, which are clearly older, as are the wooden watch towers and the palisade ; for the wall occasionally cuts through the towers and crosses and recrosses the line of the palisade, which in some places has actually been grubbed up to make room for the wall.[4] It is probably later even than the stone towers, some of which stand free of the wall, while in other cases the wall has been welded on to the towers. As regards the earthen bank and ditch which form the barrier from Lorch to a point on the Rhine opposite the mouth of the Vinxtbach, the most interesting fact established is their relation to the palisade. The earthen barrier was erected behind the palisade, and the latter was retained as an indispensable part of the frontier defences.[5] This fact may explain the apparent omission to render the earth bank and

[1] *Act. Fr. Arv.* (ed. Henzen), p. 81.

[2] *Vit. Carac.* 10 ; Aur. Vict. *De Cæs.* 21, 'Alamannos prope Mœnum devicit.'

[3] At Gilsland, in Cumberland, the 'vallum' is carried across a piece of boggy ground on 'a layer, averaging 12 feet wide, of large freestones, cobble, and gravel.' Haverfield, *Rep. on Wall of Pius*, append. iii. p. 171.

[4] *Arch. Anz.* 1899, p. 80.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 79.

ditch more difficult of passage by any breastwork or hedge on the top of the bank.

The conclusion arrived at after the most careful study is that Caracalla's victory in 213 A.D. and the construction of the barrier only delayed the final catastrophe for a time. Some twenty years later Severus Alexander was summoned to Mainz by a 'German war,'[1] and it would seem that the Germans had not only swept over the Transrenane territory but had crossed the Rhine and were ravaging Gaul. Severus was murdered at Mainz in 235, but his successor, Maximinus the Thracian, the first really barbarian emperor, once more drove back the German hordes to the wilds beyond the barrier, and did something to repair the havoc wrought.[2] The bridge over the Rhine at Mainz was rebuilt and the road along the Main valley repaired.[3] The end, however, was fast approaching. After 235 A.D. throughout Transrenane Germany, except in places such as Wiesbaden, which were protected by their nearness to a legionary camp, the evidences of Roman occupation become fainter and fainter. The accuracy of the anonymous statement that the territory was finally lost under Gallienus is curiously borne out by the epigraphic evidence. No dated inscription yet found is later than 250 A.D. On the line from Miltenberg to Welzheim the latest inscriptions are one at Jagsthausen of 248 A.D.[4] and one at Osterburken of 249 A.D.[5] In the Taunus district, the latest recorded date at the Saalburg is 238 A.D.,[6] at Heddernheim 240 A.D.,[7] at Altenstadt 242,[8] at Niederbieber 246 A.D.[9] Latest of all is an inscription of 250 A.D. at Capersburg.[10]

A few words may be added as to the military force employed in the occupation and defence of this territory; and first of all, as to the legions; after 100 A.D., the permanent

[1] *Vit. Alex.* 59, 'Germanorum vastationibus Gallia diripiebatur.'
[2] *Vit. Maximini*, 10, 11.
[3] Brambach, *C.I.R.* 1963.
[4] *C.I.L.* 13, 6552.
[5] *Ibid.* 6566.
[6] *Ibid.* 7467.
[7] *Ibid.* 7352.
[8] *Ibid.* 7424.
[9] *Ibid.* 7754.
[10] *Ibid.* 7440.

legionary garrison consisted of two legions, the 8th Augusta and the 22nd Primigenia, which, as was the case with those in Britain, were stationed at a considerable distance behind the frontier at Strassburg and Mainz. From these headquarters detachments were no doubt frequently sent across the Rhine on various kinds of special duty, *e.g.* the building of forts or bridges, or baths. The 22nd legion had a large tile factory at Nied, near Höchst, from which tiles were supplied to the frontier forts.[1] Centurions of both legions are found in command of auxiliary regiments, or of the 'numeri' raised in the district,[2] and serving as transport officers on the lines of communication.[3] But it was upon the auxiliaries that the burden of the garrison work fell. Excluding for a moment the Rætian section of the territory, we know the names of thirty-two auxiliary regiments which formed part of the army of Upper Germany between 70 and 250 A.D.[4] The great majority of these were certainly stationed in the Transrenane district, and it is probable that most of the auxiliary garrisons formerly on the left bank of the Rhine were gradually transferred to the new territory beyond the river. The auxiliary 'alæ' and 'cohortes' are drawn mainly from the western half of the empire. Gaul supplies nine regiments, Spain 4, Rætia 3, and Dalmatia 2. One regiment came from Cyrene,[5] and another, consisting of archers, probably raised by Vespasian or Titus at the time of the Jewish war, from Damascus.[6] It is noticeable that only three regiments were levied in the annexed territory, all in the

[1] *W.D.Z.* 1903, p. 137.

[2] A centurion of the 8th legion commanded the 1st Helvetian cohort at Böckingen in 148 A.D., *C.I.L.* 13, 6472. A centurion of the 22nd commanded the 1st Sequanian cohort in the Odenwald, *ibid.* 6509. A centurion of the 8th commanded a detachment of Britons at Welzheim, *ibid.* 6526.

[3] On these 'beneficiarii' and their stations see Domaszewski in *W.D.Z.* 1902, p. 158.

[4] Our chief source of information is, of course, the series of military diplomata for the years 74, 82, 90, 116 and 134. They are printed in *C.I.L.* 3, 2, and Suppl.

[5] Cohors II. Augusta Cyrenaica.

[6] Cohors I. Flavia Damascenorum sagittariorum.

LIMES GERMANIAE SUPERIORIS
RAETIAE
GERMANIA
Taunus
Vosges
Black Forest
Rauher Alb
Rheinbrohl
Niedarbieber
Coblenz
Augst
Ems
Holzhausen
Zugmantel
Feldberg
HEDDERNHEIM
Langenschwalbach
WIESBADEN
Kothheim
MAINZ
Grossen
Butzbach
Langgaben
Capellenberg
Arnsburg
Alten Burg
Marburg
Wetzlar
Neckarelz
Wimpfen
Böckingen
Wahlheim
Pfrizheim
CANNSTADT
Welzheim
Munzernausen
Theilhofen
Weissenburg
Gnotzheim
Kipfenberg
Regensburg
Kelheim
Eichstadt
Pfunz
Jensing
Erning
Pforing
Kosching
STRASSBURG
Offenburg
ROTTENBURG
ROTTWEIL
WINDISCH
0 to 500 feet
500 " 1000 "
1000 " 1500 "
SCALE OF MILES
10 5 0 10 20 30

MR. CANNING'S RHYMING 'DESPATCH' TO SIR CHARLES BAGOT.

By Sir HARRY POLAND, K.C., Inner Temple, F.R.Hist.S.

Read November 16, 1905.

Writers on Canning have published from time to time various versions of this so-called 'rhyming despatch,' all of them incorrect; and it may therefore be desirable that the Royal Historical Society should record the true version and also the circumstances in which it came to be written.

This can now be done, as Colonel Josceline Bagot[1] has kindly entrusted me with the original cypher despatch and some other papers for the purpose of being submitted to the Society.

These were recently found by him amongst his valuable collection of papers which belonged to Sir Charles Bagot.

In 1825 and 1826 negotiations were going on between the British Government and other Governments as to the duties to be charged on ships and goods. On January 26, 1826, Canning, who was then Foreign Secretary, and Huskisson, who was President of the Board of Trade, and the Prince de Polignac representing the French Government, signed a convention[2] with regard to this matter on a fair and equitable footing of reciprocity.

On January 27 Canning sent a despatch to Sir Charles

[1] Of Levens Hall, Westmorland, M.P. for the Kendal Division of Westmorland, J.P., D.L. Westmorland, and C.C., and grandson of Sir Charles Bagot. For an account of Sir Charles Bagot see *Dict. Nat. Biog.* (Supplement), vol. i. p. 98.

[2] See the *Annual Register* for 1826, 'Public Documents' 82, and *State Papers*, vol. xiii.

Bagot, who was then our Ambassador at the Hague, informing him of this convention. The despatch[1] is as follows:—

Foreign Office, January 27, 1826.

Sir C. Bagot.

Sir,—I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Excellency that I, conjointly with Mr. Huskisson (as H.M. plenipotentiaries) yesterday signed with the Prince de Polignac (as plenipotentiary of his Most Christian Majesty) a convention of commerce and navigation by which all discriminating duties affecting ships or goods in the intercourse between France and England are done away, and a foundation is laid for opening hereafter the colonies of each country to the shipping and trade of the other.

Your Excellency may communicate this intelligence to the Netherlands Government.

We hope to exchange the ratifications of the convention before the opening of the Session. I am &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

Canning and Huskisson were, however, unable to come to any agreement with the Netherlands Government, and accordingly the British Government determined to avail itself of the powers conferred by certain statutes[2] to issue two 'Orders in Council[3] imposing an *additional* duty of 20 per cent. upon Netherlands vessels and merchandise.'

These Orders recite the statutes under which they were respectively made.

Canning then sent a formal official despatch (not in cypher) to Sir Charles Bagot, which I will now read, and to which I call special attention.

Foreign Office, January 31, 1826.[4]

Sir C. Bagot.

Sir,—I enclose to your Excellency, for your information, copies of two Orders in Council, which were passed yesterday at Windsor,

[1] F.O. Holland, vol. cxlvii.

[2] 5 Geo. IV. cap. 1 (1824) relates to vessels and 6 Geo. IV. cap. 111 (1825) relates to goods. These have since been repealed.

[3] See the Orders in Council in the *London Gazette* of January 31, 1826.

[4] This despatch has never been published or directly referred to before by any writer on Canning. For permission to search for and to copy this and the other despatches printed in this Paper from the Archives, the writer is indebted to the courtesy of the authorities of the Foreign Office who kindly gave him special permission for this purpose.

imposing an *additional* duty of 20 per cent. upon Netherlands vessels and merchandise.

M. de Verstolk will hear this from Your Excellency without surprise, the Netherlands Government having been so frequently warned by your Excellency, and M. Falck by myself, that his Majesty's Government would be obliged to have recourse to this measure on the failure of the negotiation to place the commerce and navigation of Great Britain and the Netherlands on a fair and equitable footing of reciprocity.

It is almost unnecessary to add that this measure being purely of a commercial nature and grounded on considerations of interest and policy, which either Government is at perfect liberty to adopt or to reject without offence to the other, the exercise of the power confided to his Majesty by Parliament is not intended, and we trust will not be understood by the Netherlands Government, as implying the smallest diminution of political friendship and goodwill.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

M. de Verstolk was the acting Foreign Minister for the Netherlands Government at the Hague, and M. Falck was the Minister to that Government in London.

Canning appears at this time to have determined to play off his joke upon Bagot by sending him with the official despatch the cypher despatch, which is also dated January 31. For the joke to succeed, it was of course necessary that this should appear on the face of it to be an important despatch of a most confidential character. It has a formal heading and conclusion, and is signed by Canning himself.

I have this 'despatch' now before me, but it will be desirable to continue the narrative before reading it.

On the receipt of this 'despatch' Bagot at once endeavoured to decypher it, but he was not able to do so, as he had not in his possession the proper cypher. He then at once wrote to Canning the following despatch, which speaks for itself:—

[*2nd. Secret*] The Hague, Feb. 3, 1826.

Sir,—I sincerely hope that the circumstance will not be productive of any public inconvenience, but I am concerned to state that I do not possess any cypher by which I am enabled to decypher

your despatch of the 31st of last month, which I received this morning. The only cypher belonging to this Embassy is letter S.

I take the liberty of suggesting that it might be convenient at the present moment that I should be furnished with the cypher given to his Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, or at least with that of which his Majesty's Minister at Berlin may be in possession.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
(Signed) CHARLES BAGOT

The Rt. Hon. George Canning.

Canning continued the joke by sending to Bagot the following 'despatch' which I will now read from the original.

[*3rd. Secret and Separate*] Foreign Office, Febry. 6, 1826.

Sir,—In consequence of your despatch marked *Secret* of the 3rd instant, I send your Excellency the cyphers and the decyphers T and U, both of which are in the possession of his Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg and His Majesty's Minister at Berlin.

I regret the circumstance of your Excellency's not having been furnished with the proper cyphers, as I was anxious that your Excellency should receive with as little delay as possible the impression which has been made upon His Majesty's Government by the very opposite feelings and conduct which have been demonstrated by the Governments of the Netherlands and France in the late commercial negotiations with Great Britain.

I am &c.
(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

His Excellency the Rt. Hon^ble^ Sir C. Bagot, K.B.

This despatch was not in cypher, and was also unofficial; but Canning did send the cyphers which were wanted by Bagot, as the following *official* despatch of February 7 clearly shows :—

[*Secret*] February 7, 1826.

Sir Charles Bagot.

Sir,—For the greater security of your Excellency's correspondence with H.M.'s several missions abroad, and with this department upon occasions when it may not be necessary to send a special messenger, I furnish Your Excellency herewith with the cyphers and decypher T and U.

These cyphers, together with that marked S, are in the possession of H.M. missions at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Petersburg, and Constantinople. Those marked S and T are in the possession of H.M.'s missions at Frankfort, Dresden, Copenhagen, and Stockholm.

I have to signify to your Excellency the King's commands that you strictly attend to the instructions and precautions as to the use of these cyphers pointed out in the accompanying secret paper.

I am &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

What happened on the receipt of the cyphers the following charming private letter from Bagot to Canning clearly explains, and it also shows the intimate terms[1] on which they were, and how well Canning knew that Bagot would enjoy the joke.

[*Private*] The Hague, Febry. 13, 1826.

My dear Canning,—You have fretted me to fiddlestrings, and I have a great mind not to give you the satisfaction of ever knowing how completely your mystification of me has succeeded. It was more than you had a right to expect when you drew from me that solemn and official lamentation which I sent you of my inability to decypher His Majesty's commands ; but, as the Devil would have it, your success did not end here. The post which brought me the decyphers arrived at eleven o'clock at night, when I had only time before I sent off the other messenger to read your grave regret at what had occurred and to acknowledge the receipt of the mail. The next morning Tierney[2] and I were up by cock-crow to make out 'la maudite dépêche,' and it was not till after an hour of most indescribable anxiety that we were put 'out of our fear' by finding what it really was, and that 'you Pyramus' were not Pyramus, but only 'Bottom the weaver.'

I could have slain you ! ; but I got some fun myself, for I afterwards put the fair de-cypher into Douglas's hands, who read it twice without moving a muscle, or to this hour discovering that it was not prose, and returned it to me, declaring that it was

[1] I have examined a very large number of Canning's letters to Bagot from 1808 to the time of his death in 1827, and they show that great warmth of friendship existed between them.

[2] Tierney referred to was George Tierney, the second secretary at the Hague. He was promoted as secretary to Munich in 1828. Douglas was Andrew Snape Douglas, the secretary of the Embassy at the Hague, who resigned December 13, 1828.

'oddly worded; but he had always had a feeling that the despatch must relate to discriminating duties.'

C. BAGOT.

The Right Hon. the Foreign Secretary.

I will now read the cypher 'despatch' from the decypher in Sir Charles Bagot's own handwriting.

Decypher.

[*Separate, Secret, and Confidential.*]

Foreign Office, January 31, 1826.

Sir,

In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch
Is offering too little and asking too much.
The French are with equal advantage content,
So we clap on Dutch bottoms just 20 per cent.
(Chorus)—20 per cent., 20 [per] cent.

(Chorus of English Custom House officers and French Douaniers):

(English)—We clap on Dutch bottoms just 20 per cent.
(French)—Vous frapperez Falck avec 20 per cent.

I have no other commands from His Majesty to convey to your Excellency to-day.

I am, with great truth and respect, Sir,
Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

His Excellency the Rt. Hon^ble^ Sir Charles Bagot, K.B.

It is singular that no writer on Canning, as far as I have been able to ascertain, has hitherto given the correct version of what has been regarded as the most famous and most often quoted of *jeux d'esprit.*

Take, for instance, the last writer on Canning, Mr. Temperley. He states that Canning 'never demanded exclusive rights for England in the matter of trade, but was prepared to retaliate against unfair and exceptional treatment,' and his note upon this is as follows:—

'The famous rhyming despatch is an instance of Retaliation—Canning to Sir Charles Bagot, 1826:

In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch
Is giving too little and asking too much.
With equal protection the French are content,
So we'll lay on Dutch bottoms just twenty per cent.

Chorus of officers: We'll lay on etc.
Chorus of Douaniers: Nous frapperons Falck avec twenty per cent.

The actual form and existence of this famous and unhappily unique despatch were questioned a few years ago. Fortunately the true and proper version has been discovered at the Foreign Office, a copy of which is placed at the Record Office, Holland, F.O. 147. The date is between January 31 and February 20, 1826, and is probably the earlier date. The circumstances explain themselves, but it may be noted that Falck was the Dutch Foreign Minister.'[1]

I am in a position to state positively that no recent discovery has been made in the Foreign Office as stated.

The version quoted by Mr. Temperley is taken from the Greville Memoirs,[2] April 13, 1830. Greville gives the following account of it:—

April 13, 1830.

'Breakfasted with Bunsen at the Capitol. . . . Haddington[3] told the story of Canning's sending to Bagot a despatch in cipher containing these lines:—

[In matters of commerce &c. as quoted by Mr. Temperley.]

He received the despatch at dinner, and sent it to be deciphered. After some hours they brought him word they did not know what to make of it, for it seemed to be in verse, when he at once saw there was a joke.'

Mr. Temperley, I think, may have been misled by a memorandum inserted in 1903 in the volume at the Record Office containing Canning's despatches of January 1826.

I have no doubt that Mr. Temperley will take the opportunity of correcting this version in the second edition of his very valuable work.

A moment's consideration will show how inferior the

[1] *Life of Canning*, by H. W. V. Temperley, 1905, pp. 192, 193, and 264.

[2] *The Greville Memoirs*, a journal of the Reigns of King George IV. and William IV., p. 326 (1874).

[3] Lord Haddington, ninth Earl, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Privy Seal, &c.

Greville version is to the true version; for instance, take the second line :—

Is giving too little and asking too much.

'Offering' is better than 'giving,' as people negotiating do not give and ask, but offer and ask.

Take the third line :—

With equal *protection* the French are content.

There was no protection in the matter, as the convention shows.

Take the chorus : '*Chorus of officers.*' What officers ?

Take the chorus of the Douaniers : 'Nous frapperons Falck avec twenty per cent.' This is nonsense, because the Douaniers did not strike any blow at Falck, as they had nothing to do with the 'Orders in Council.'

There is another version given by Mr. Bell (1846), Mr. F. H. Hill (1887), and Mr. W. Alison Phillips (1903), which is as follows :—

In matters of commerce the fault of the Dutch
Is giving too little and asking too much ;
With equal advantage the French are content,
So we'll clap on Dutch bottoms a 20 per cent.
Twenty per cent.,
Twenty per cent.,
Nous frapperons Falck with twenty per cent.

GEORGE CANNING.

Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer (Lord Dalling) in his 'Historical Characters' (Canning) has yet another version, which is as follows :—

Dear Bagot, in commerce the fault of the Dutch
Is giving too little and asking too much,
So since on this policy Mynheer seems bent,
We'll clap on his vessels just 20 per cent.

Not one single line of this is correct, and, moreover, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer says with regard to Canning : 'But though always ready for business, he would not

scruple to introduce a piece of drollery into the most serious affairs. . .

. . . . . .

The important paper—and it *was* important—contained something like the following doggerel' [as quoted by me above].

This is really moonshine, as the formal official despatch of January 31, 1826, from the Foreign Secretary to the Ambassador, announcing the decision of the British Government, shows. It is therefore futile to say that the cypher *was important.*

Mr. J. A. R. Marriott in his interesting work ('George Canning and His Times,' 1903, p. 5) has also done Canning injustice in this matter. He says that—

'Diplomacy is a game, but it has to be played with an attempt at seriousness. Canning, however, was from first to last incorrigible. His despatch to Sir Charles Bagot, our Ambassador at the Hague, has often been quoted as an instance in point. The crisis was an acute one, and the despatch was in cipher. With infinite pains the attachés unravelled it thus.'

He then quotes the absurd version given by Bulwer. It certainly is remarkable that anyone could have seriously supposed that Canning when Foreign Secretary was so frivolous as to send a State paper of importance to the British Ambassador at the Hague in the form of humorous and witty verses. Mr. Marriott has, however, sinned with Mr. Bell,[1] Mr. Hill,[2] Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer,[3] Mr. Alison Phillips,[4] and Mr. Temperley. None of the other writers upon Canning, so far as I am aware, refer to this subject.

[1] *The Life of the Rt. Hon. George Canning*, by Robert Bell. Chapman and Hall, 1846, p. 345.

[2] *English Worthies.* Edited by Andrew Lang. *George Canning*, by Frank H. Hill. Longmans, 1887, p. 190.

[3] *Historical Characters*, by Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, 1868; *Canning the Brilliant Man*, vol. ii. pp. 421, 422.

[4] *George Canning*, by W. Alison Phillips, 1903. 12 Illustrations. Methuen and Co., 36 Essex Street, W.C., pp. 169, 170.

I may add that the correspondence between Canning and Bagot is set out in that learned, useful, and instructive publication 'Notes and Queries' (1868), which no writer ought to neglect, as it is really a mine of information.

The origin of the apocryphal versions of the 'rhyming despatch' above referred to can be easily conjectured. We have seen that in Greville's time a certain version was current about town; but the Greville 'Memoirs' referred to were not published until the year 1874, although the version referred to was preserved therein in 1830. Two years later another version, that used by Bell and his followers, seems to have received currency through an article in the 'Foreign Quarterly Review' of May 1832, entitled 'The Reciprocity System.' The writer states that the copy printed by him was 'a literal copy of this important communication made by the command of His Britannic Majesty to his Minister at the Hague.'[1] This version seems to have been known to Dutch writers, who naturally have taken much interest in the subject.

In 1868 an interesting controversy took place in the Dutch 'Notes and Queries' about the rhyming 'despatch,' and Mr. van Lennep, the Dutch poet, published what he believed was the correct text, which was in substance the same as that given by Bell. The fourth line, however, was: 'So we'll clap on Dutch *cottons* with twenty per cent.' And there was also another slight variation.

Professor Tideman of Amsterdam then applied to 'Notes and Queries' here, to settle the question. In answer one correspondent said that the first line was, 'In making of treaties the fault of the Dutch' &c., and the French were not specially referred to. Then came the reply from 'M. R.,'

[1] This is referred to by N. G. van Kampen in his *Geschiedenis van den Vijftienjarigen Vrede in Europa* (1832), p. 272. I am indebted for this reference to the Third Secretary of the British Legation at the Hague, Mr. G. A. Mounsey, and to Dr. T. van Riemsdyk, the Dutch archivist, who observes that during his recent visit to London Dr. Colenbrander, the learned editor of the despatches relating to the Netherlands in the English archives, searched in vain for this rhyming despatch.

who states that 'Some years ago I received from a friend, who had seen the original despatches, the following copies of Mr. Canning's diplomatic *jeu d'esprit* and the correspondence to which it gave rise. I enclose them, as the naïveté of our minister at the Hague greatly enhances the humorous success of the Foreign Secretary's whim.'

I am indebted to 'Notes and Queries'[1] for the communications from Bagot to Canning printed above.

The cypher despatch again appears in 'Notes and Queries,' 9th Series, p. 270.

The cypher despatch also appears in the 'Spectator' of May 16, 1903, having been communicated by me in reply to the request of a correspondent for the true version. This correspondent signs himself 'An Old Dip,'[2] and states that he was attached to the Legation at the Hague 'before the middle of the last century,' and that 'he had in vain searched the archives of the Legation for a trace of the precious document.' He then quotes another version, which he says his 'chief, who had himself been employed under Canning,' gave him and which he 'declared to be the correct text,' but this is obviously incorrect.[3] 'An Old Dip' says that 'it would be interesting to know the authority for any of the variations of Canning's oft-quoted rhyming despatch.' We know now that the reason why no trace of the 'precious document' was to be found in the archives of the Legation is that it, being a private and not an official document, was taken away by Sir Charles Bagot, and doubtless no entry was made in the books of the Embassy relating to it.

The present production to the Society of the original cypher despatch with this brief narrative will, I trust, prevent in future any further mistakes on the subject.[4]

[1] *Notes and Queries*, 4th Series, pp. 267–303, 427–438.

[2] See letter signed 'An Old Dip' in *Spectator* for April 18, 1903, p. 609.

[3] This is another version, and it makes the English Custom House officers speak in French.

[4] In addition to the more important texts and commentaries cited above, it could be shown that incorrect versions of the 'rhyming despatch' occur in

It has been suggested to me by the Director of this Society, Mr. Hubert Hall, to whom I am indebted for much assistance in the preparation of this Paper, that the present communication would be of interest. It may possibly be considered that I have overlaboured this matter, but I may perhaps say, with Pericles in the play, that—

> 'truth can never be confirm'd enough,
> Though doubts did ever sleep.'

several other works, some of which are in frequent use. As instances in point, I may refer to the following: *New English Dictionary*, article 'Dutch,' quoting *Lyra Elegantiarum* (ed. Locker-Lampson); *Stories of the Streets of London* by H. Barton Baker.

CANNING AND THE SECRET INTELLIGENCE FROM TILSIT. (July 16–23, 1807.)

Résumé of a paper read by J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D., *on November* 16, 1905.

In order to understand the true import of the news which arrived at the Foreign Office from various quarters on July 16–23, 1807, it is necessary briefly to review the general situation. The coalition against France formed by the Powers, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, and Sweden, entered upon a new phase when Russia and Prussia signed the Convention of Bartenstein, April 26, 1807. Its aims were to strengthen the alliance between those two Powers, and to bring Great Britain and Sweden into more active co-operation in the Continental War, to put an end to the vacillation of Austria and bring her into the field once more, and, lastly, if possible to secure the adhesion of Denmark. This last clause was worded as follows:—The allies proposed 'à se concerter avec l'Autriche, l'Angleterre, et la Suède pour faire accéder le Danemark à cette convention.' These words clearly left it open to the allies to use force in bringing Denmark to their side. It should further be noticed, as bearing on one part of our inquiry, that the Courts of Russia and Prussia bound themselves never to dissociate their fortunes but to act in the closest accord.[1] The terms of the Convention of Bartenstein were forwarded to Downing Street by Mr. George Jackson, British *chargé d'affaires* at the Court of Prussia, and received a hearty welcome from Canning.

The hopes aroused by this Convention were soon dis-

[1] Garden, *Traités*, x. p. 407.

pelled. Napoleon's victory at Friedland on June 14, 1807, wrecked the new coalition and put an end to all expectation that Austria would join the allies. On June 22, the Czar Alexander signed the terms of an armistice with Napoleon, without the participation of Prussia. This in itself was an infraction of the compact of Bartenstein.

On June 24 the Czar sent Prince Lobànoff to the French headquarters; and in the secret instructions to the envoy there occur the following sentences: 'The alliance of France and Russia has always been the object of my desires, and I am convinced that it alone can guarantee the welfare and repose of the world. . . . An entirely new system ought to take the place of that which has hitherto existed here, and I flatter myself that we shall easily come to an understanding with the Emperor Napoleon provided that we treat without intermediaries.'[1]

It is worth noting that even on the day before the famous interview on the raft at Tilsit, the Czar had penned a document which portended a complete change of front; and it is possible that this document became known to some friend of England at Tilsit. It is also now known that on, or shortly before, that day a draft proposal had been drawn up in the Russian Foreign Office by some partisan of the French alliance, setting forth the desirability of a naval combination against England.

The public avowal of a change of policy was made on the morrow, when the Czar met Napoleon on the raft at Tilsit, amidst circumstances which evinced the utmost friendliness. The two Emperors were accompanied by their suites. That of the Czar comprised his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, Prince Lobànoff, and Generals Bennigsen and Uvaroff. That of Napoleon comprised Murat, Duroc and others. The Emperors at first conversed alone, on a corner of the raft, until a heavy rain-storm caused them to retire into a tasteful little pavilion which the French engineers had erected. The chief personages of their suites finally came in;

[1] Tatischeff, *Nouvelle Revue*, June 1, 1890.

and (says Sir R. Wilson in his Diary [1]) the conversation became general; when the sovereigns embraced and amicably parted.

As to the details of the conversation between the two Emperors on the raft we know next to nothing, apart from one or two anecdotes of doubtful worth. With regard to the raft itself, we may notice a few details recorded by the French officer Lejeune in his Memoirs. He states that the raft was specially prepared for the occasion by the French general Lariboisière, who had fitted up a fine pavilion on it. At the time of the interview the pavilion was surrounded by sentries, both Russian and French. It is therefore not easy to see how a spy could have secreted himself in, or near, or underneath, the tent where the interview took place. Judging from the care which was bestowed on all the preparations for that momentous interview, we may dismiss the stories respecting the presence of some English spy on the raft, as being highly improbable.[2]

As regards the actual details of the interview we know, from the information which a British agent, Mackenzie, gave to Sir Robert Wilson at Memel, that the Emperors, after conversing for some time, allowed the Grand Duke Constantine and General Bennigsen, as well as Duroc and Kalkreuth, to enter 'into the apartment; and the conversation continued an hour, when the sovereigns *embraced* and amicably parted.' It is probable that some important hints were dropped at this time and they may have been passed on to Wilson's informant. At any rate we know from two sources, viz. Wilson's Diary and Mackenzie's Despatch to Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, the British Ambassador then at Memel, that Mackenzie left Tilsit late on that day and reached Memel on the 26th. From him it was that Wilson heard of the words uttered by Bennigsen during dinner on the 25th—'The two Emperors have shaken hands; Europe has cause to tremble.'—And

[1] *Life of Sir R. Wilson*, vol. ii. p. 282.

[2] See a note in the *English Historical Review* for January 1902; and *Ola Days in Diplomacy*, edited by Miss C. A. A. Disbrowe, p. 89.

shortly afterwards the Russian Commander-in-Chief said: 'Louis XVIII. has a merry prospect'—implying of course, that he would soon be expelled from Russia, owing to the Czar's newly formed friendship with Napoleon. The Diaries of Mr. George Jackson (who was also at Memel then) give substantially the same account as those of Wilson, but in rather less detail.[1] Evidently a good deal of information had come through from Tilsit to Memel by the 26th; and some of it was forwarded to Canning as soon as possible by one of the group of British officials and officers there present. The letter dated June 26, 1807, was landed at Elsinore from the ship which conveyed it (H.M. cutter, *Princess of Wales*), and was handed to Mr. Garlike, British Ambassador at Copenhagen, on July 4. It reached Canning along with Garlike's other despatches on July 16. Unfortunately, as it stands in our archives, it is only an 'extract,' and is not signed. After referring briefly to the disaster at Friedland, it proceeds as follows: 'After the army had passed the Memel [river], General Bennigsen sent Prince Lobànoff to Bonaparte to propose an armistice, which has been agreed to; and yesterday an interview took place at Tilsit on a *pont volant* in the middle of the river between Bonaparte, the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. They separated in the most amicable manner.'

Evidently this is the first report of the interview; it is incorrect, as regards the presence of the King of Prussia; and it concludes in a way very similar to the reports of the interview given in Wilson's Diary from information supplied by Mackenzie and by Wilson's unknown correspondent. The despatch must therefore have emanated from some one who was in close touch with the group of British officers then at Memel—Lord Hutchinson, Sir Robert Wilson and others. The informant may have been a Russian, or he may have been a British agent. Mackenzie was not the only Englishman at Tilsit at this time. In Mackenzie's letter of June 23, 1807, dated Thuload, to Lord Leveson-Gower, he states that

[1] *Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson*, vol. ii. pp. 157–8.

he was introduced to General Bennigsen by Prince Troubetzkoi and Dr. Wylie.[1] Here, then, we have two British subjects in close touch with Russians high in the service of the Emperor at the very time when the great change came over Russian policy, viz. June 24–25. Having published Mackenzie's letter of June 23 in the 'English Historical Review' for October 1901, I need not refer to it further, except to observe that it reached Canning on July 16.

Our archives supply abundant evidence as to the deep impression produced at Downing St. and Whitehall by the despatches which arrived from Tilsit or Copenhagen on the 16th of July. On that day Canning drew up secret instructions for Mr. Brooke Taylor, directing him to proceed at once to Copenhagen and take over the embassy from Mr. Garlike, who was to be transferred to Memel. Mr. F. J. Jackson was a little later on ordered to undertake a special mission to the Prince Royal of Denmark with demands still more peremptory. Canning informed Brooke Taylor on the 16th that a British fleet was at once to be sent to the Sound for the following objects:—(1) to co-operate with Sweden for the defence of that country; (2) to protect the reinforcements that might be sent to the Anglo-Swedish expedition then at Rügen and Stralsund; (3) to protect British commerce.

If he were pressed by the Danish Government as to the meaning of the naval preparations which were ordered on the 16th and 17th July, he was to answer that 'the state of preparedness of the Danish fleet, coupled with the avowed designs of Bonaparte had undoubtedly influenced His [Britannic] Majesty in determining upon the extent of the present naval armament.' The concluding part of the instructions to Brooke Taylor is quoted in the article above referred to.

[1] James Wylie, M.D., was a Scotsman in Russian service—physician to Alexander I. when he was in England in 1814, when he (J. W.) was knighted. Sir Robert Wilson also refers (ii. p. 288) to the presence of a Captain Alison, who on July 1, 1807, came from Tilsit, where he had seen Murat and had conversed with several French officers. I have been unable to find out more about this Captain Alison.

Here we need notice merely the reasons which Canning assigned for the projected expedition to Copenhagen. They are two—(1) the state of preparedness of the Danish fleet; (2) the avowed designs of Bonaparte with respect to Denmark. There is no mention of the Franco-Russian *entente* at Tilsit, though we can see that the change in Russian policy greatly aggravated the dangers which Canning believed to be threatening his country on the side of Denmark. He had some grounds for his apprehension. About the date July 9 or 10 he had received information from the Earl of Pembroke, who had to proceed *via* Copenhagen and North Germany in order to make his way to his embassy at Vienna. The Earl appears to have stayed only a short time at Copenhagen, but there he heard news that the Danish fleet was being prepared for sea with all speed. His letter on this topic is not in the Foreign Office despatches for Denmark, or in those for Austria. But from Canning's despatch of July 10 to Garlike, in which he dealt him a very sharp rebuke for failing to send on this important news, we see that our Foreign Minister was deeply impressed by the news. For some time past the attitude of Denmark had been no less unfriendly to Great Britain than complaisant to France; and the tidings as to the preparation of her fleet for sea portended trouble to the English expeditions then at Rügen and Stralsund.

We now know that the Earl of Pembroke was misinformed. Garlike was able finally to clear himself by sending on a report on the state of the Danish fleet made at his request by Captain Beauman of H.M.S. *Procris* on July 25. But the correction came too late. It did not reach Canning until August 10; and by that time the British Expedition was off Elsinore.[1]

Up to the beginning of August, Canning believed that Denmark was about to adopt hostile measures against us. This belief was strengthened by the acrid behaviour of the Danish ambassador at London, Mr. Rist, who seems greatly

[1] F.O. Denmark, No. 52.

to have angered Canning about July 13. On July 14 Canning wrote to Garlike that, if Rist sent in any more notes like his last, a request would be forwarded to Copenhagen for his recall.

Thus, owing to the tactless behaviour of Rist, and the incorrect information forwarded by the Earl of Pembroke, Canning was prepared to give the most sinister interpretation to any news that reached him from the Baltic. He was in this apprehensive state of mind when the news from Tilsit reached him on the 16th. Possibly, if we had the whole of that information instead of a meagre unsigned extract, we should come very near to the heart of the mystery.

Canning also had ground for fearing that Napoleon was about to coerce Denmark and seize her fleet. He had closely watched Napoleon's words and deeds for a long time past, as may be seen from his speeches in the House of Commons on January 21, 1808, and February 3, 1808. He then stated that Napoleon in the bulletin issued after his victory at Friedland had openly declared that 'the blockade of the British isles would cease to be a vain word.'[1]

No such sentence is to be found in Napoleon's bulletins of that time—but in the proclamation of June 22, 1807, to the Grand Army we find the sentence—'It is time to put an end to this war, and that our country should live in peace, sheltered from the malign influence of England.' Evidently Canning took this threat to mean the destruction of England by a Continental League, making use of the Danish fleet for dealing the long projected blow at the heart of England.

The seizure of the Danish fleet by the French was certainly feasible. Bernadotte then held a considerable French force at or near Hamburg; and Canning had for some time past feared that his force would overrun Holstein and compel the Danes to give up their fleet. In the despatch of July 10, 1807, which dealt so sharp a rebuke to Garlike for his supposed heedlessness of the events occurring at Copenhagen, Canning referred to letters received from Altona,

[1] Hansard, 1808, p. 275.

reporting that 'France had obtained permission from the Court of Denmark to take possession of Holstein.'

Garlike in his note of July 4 to Canning also mentioned the rumour of an invasion of Holstein by the French as having been reported to him by Mr. Thornton, formerly British Ambassador to Hamburg, but then resident at Altona. Garlike further stated that the Danish Foreign Minister, Count Bernstorff, did not give the news an official denial when he named it to him; only in a private capacity (*en mon particulier*) would he consent to deny it. But he added, officially, that if such a demand were made by France, the Danish Government would resist it.[1] It is noteworthy that the news of this unsatisfactory reply reached Canning on July 16.

Further light is thrown on these affairs by the as yet unpublished account penned by Mr. F. J. Jackson in October 1807.[2] In it, Jackson, formerly our ambassador at Berlin, describes the urgency of the message sent from the Foreign Office to him to be present at Downing Street at the earliest possible hour on July 18.[3] He found Canning in a state of anxiety and perplexity as to the course of conduct to be adopted towards Denmark. From further intercourse with the Earl of Malmesbury and his son, Lord Fitz Harris (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) he came to see that the real crux of the question was how 'to get possession of the Danish fleet.' Jackson proceeds thus:— 'Various expedients were devised for this purpose, all more or less founded, as was the object itself, upon the information transmitted through various channels of its being the inten-

[1] F.O. Denmark, No. 52. The Bernstorff papers relating to 1807 have not yet been published.

[2] This important document exists amongst the semi-official papers of F. J. Jackson, recently presented to the Foreign Office by Lady Jackson, and transmitted to the Public Record Office. Its existence was communicated to the author by the Council of the Royal Historical Society with a proposal for editing the MS. *in extenso* on a future occasion.

[3] For a similar account see his letter of July 18, Downing Street, in the *Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson*, vol. ii. pp. 187–8 (1872, Lond

tion of Bonaparte to take possession of Holstein and Schleswig for the purpose of closing the ports of those provinces against our flag and of proceeding from thence to the seizure of the Danish navy to assist in the invasion of Great Britain. This information was, and still is, the groundwork of the whole proceeding.' He then states that, in his opinion, the information which aroused the fears of our Government originated with Mr. Thornton. Later on he found reason to discount the importance of the news sent by Mr. Thornton from Altona. His notes are valuable as showing what was the state of mind of our Ministers about July 18. Clearly they assigned almost as much importance to the news coming from Copenhagen and Altona, as to that which arrived at the same date from Tilsit. Mr. Jackson also asserted in his 'Narrative' that corroboration of that news came from Lisbon—a topic which will be referred to presently.

In order to see whether the actions of Ministers corresponded to their apprehensions, I have searched through the orders issued by the Admiralty in the month of July. They are highly significant. There is nothing of importance in the first half of July except that on the 14th an order is issued to include the towns of Altona and Glückstadt among the towns of the North Sea coast and River Elbe to be blockaded by British squadrons. On the 15th July, thirteen warships are put under the command of Sir Samuel Hood; and on the 16th he receives command of five more. But there is nothing betokening any special activity in the dockyards until the 18th, when an order of phenomenal importance was issued. It directed that twenty-two ships commanded by captains, sixteen others navigated by commanders, and thirteen smaller vessels commanded by lieutenants—that is, in all fifty-one warships—should prepare for sea with all possible expedition for 'a particular service' under Admiral Gambier. At the same date thirty-one warships and one cutter already at sea were put under Gambier's command for 'a particular service.'[1] This 'particular service' was the expedition to

[1] Admiralty (Orders and Instructions), No. 152.

Copenhagen. In a companion volume of Admiralty Letters to Public Offices there is an order also dated July 18, directing that four vessels should act as tenders to the bomb ships *Zebra*, *Fury*, *Vesuvius*, and *Thunder*. After that outburst of activity there is no further order of any importance. The days July 21–25 witnessed no further issues of orders. So far as the Admiralty was concerned, July 17–18 were the decisive days. In the papers of Sir Thomas Byam Martin, published by the Navy Records Society (1903), there are two letters,[1] one of Admiral Gambier, the other of Lord Mulgrave, to Byam Martin, which show that the call made on the resources of the fleet on July 17–18 was most urgent. Equally striking is the evidence supplied by Lord Castlereagh, Minister of War, in his speech of January 28, 1808, in moving a vote of thanks to the two services for their duties rendered at Copenhagen. He included in his vote of thanks the transport and supply departments owing to the great and sudden strain to which they had been subjected in the closing weeks of July. He also added the important information that July 19 was the date upon which Ministers 'took His Majesty's pleasure as to the propriety of the expedition.'[2] No news, so far as I can ascertain, came to the Foreign Office from the Baltic, between July 16 and July 21. We may therefore assume that the news which reached Canning on July 16 from Tilsit, Copenhagen and Altona led to the sudden equipment of that great armada and to the decision of Ministers to coerce Denmark.

On July 21 further tidings came from Tilsit, the exact source and purport of which are still unknown. All that we can ascertain at present is from Canning's despatch of July 22 to Brooke Taylor, which states that intelligence reached him 'yesterday directly from Tilsit,' that 'at an interview which took place at Tilsit between the Emperor of Russia and Bonaparte on the 24th or 25th of last month, the latter brought forward a proposal for a maritime league against

[1] Pp. 326, 328.

[2] Hansard, p. 169: 48 George III. vol. x. (1808).

Great Britain, to which the accession of Denmark was represented by Bonaparte to be as certain as it was essential. The Emperor of Russia is described as having neither accepted nor refused this proposal. His silence is attributed to the presence of persons before whom he was not likely to speak with perfect openness.'[1]

The evidence furnished by the Admiralty Orders and F. J. Jackson's 'Narrative' seems to prove that the decision of Ministers was formed by July 18 or 19. Orders would not have been issued on July 18 for the immediate equipment of fifty-one warships merely in order to carry out the instructions issued to Brooke Taylor on the 16th, viz. to defend Cathcart's force at Stralsund and the reinforcements soon to be sent there, still less for the protection of British commerce in the Baltic. Obviously Canning used these as pretexts to screen the real aim, which he did not yet choose to avow—the seizure of the Danish fleet. The Diary of F. J. Jackson, describing the perplexity of Canning on the 18th solves the riddle. It shows that the Foreign Minister was feeling his way towards that drastic and high-handed measure, but could not as yet formulate it. The resolve, however, was actually formed on the 19th, and was then approved by the King. The news that arrived on the 21st merely clinched the determination, and enabled Canning to justify it in diplomatic parlance.

If any doubts remained in the minds of Ministers, they must have been dispelled by the arrival of Mackenzie from Memel on the 23rd with the despatches of Lord Leveson-Gower referring to the complete change of system observable at the Czar's headquarters near Tilsit. It is to be observed, however, that Canning did not receive news as to the provisions of the treaty signed at Tilsit on July 7 until August 8, when it reached London through a French newspaper.[2] Canning was quite in the dark as to the secret clauses and the secret treaty of alliance which contained the stipulations most

[1] For the rest of the despatch see *Napoleonic Studies*, by J. H. Rose, pp. 162–163.

[2] F.O. Russia, No. 76. (Canning to Gower, No. 32.)

threatening to England. The evidence as to his lack of information on this point is conclusive. On August 4 he wrote to Leveson-Gower urging him to obtain a copy of the treaty of Tilsit; and 'in the event of there not appearing any article on the face of the Treaty which affects the Rights and Interests of this Country, Your Excellency should further demand the Communication of any Secret Articles to that effect, or a formal disclaimer of their existence.'

It is impossible to think that Canning would have written these words if he had been in possession of the whole of the treaty, including its secret clauses.

We are now in a position to sum up the results of our inquiry. The evidence, so far as it has yet come to light, shows that the information upon which Canning based his policy of coercing Denmark was far from being logically complete. In one matter, that of the news sent by the Earl of Pembroke respecting the Danish fleet, he had been misinformed; but he could not know that that information was incorrect. The news from Altona sent by Mr. Thornton was also in part mere surmise. That from Tilsit was incomplete even at the time when Admiral Gambier's fleet set sail from Yarmouth Roads for Copenhagen. Further, Brooke Taylor's despatch from Copenhagen to Admiral Gambier of August 2 declared that Bernadotte's corps, then near the borders of Holstein, was not strong enough 'to cause any immediate apprehension.'[1] Nevertheless, if we put ourselves in the place of Canning, and gauge the import of the news which came in on those days July 16, 21, and 23, not as it appears to us now with our fuller knowledge of the facts, but as it appeared to him with his half knowledge, we shall, I think, hesitate to censure him. The crisis was most threatening. It called for exceptional measures; and Canning seems never to have expected any resistance on the part of the Danes to a demand which they had been expecting from Napoleon, and which

[1] War Office, No. 69. (Copenhagen volume.) (Gambier arrived in the Sound with the first contingent, 24 ships, on August 3.)

our Government now made, backed up by a force that promised to overbear all thoughts of resistance.

The evidence here brought forward shows that little reliance can be placed on the version presented by the first Earl of Malmesbury. In his Diaries, vol. iv. pp. 391–399, he asserts that Canning's information as to Napoleon's designs on the Danish fleet came in the first instance from Lisbon; that it reached the ears of the Prince of Wales, who imparted it to the Prime Minister, the Duke of Portland, during an audience at Carlton House in May 1807.

In order to test the accuracy of this statement, I have consulted our Foreign Office archives, Portugal, vols. 54, 55, for the year 1807. I can find no sign that our ambassador at Lisbon, Viscount Strangford, had the least suspicion that any special danger was threatening Portugal, still less Denmark. His despatches are full and detailed on every matter of importance; yet on the date August 2, when, according to the Earl of Malmesbury, the dangers threatening the two little maritime States ought to have been equally acute, Strangford wrote to Canning: 'Matters continue perfectly quiet in Portugal; nor have I any reason to believe that the sort of existence during pleasure, which she has so long enjoyed, has yet been menaced by the Government of France.' It is in his despatch of September 13 that he first sounds the note of alarm for Portugal. It is equally significant that Canning, on August 31, expressed the King's 'entire satisfaction at the proofs, contained in those despatches, of Your Lordship's ability and intelligence, and zeal for H.M.'s service.' Assuredly Canning, who rebuked and superseded Garlike for his supposed remissness, would not have commended Strangford, if any important news had come from Lisbon through a channel other than that of the British Embassy. Some rumour may have come from Lisbon to the Prince of Wales; but it is clear that Canning attached no significance to it. He was doubtless well satisfied that the rumour should gain currency; and Ministers afterwards made extensive use of the case of Portugal, and of her harsh

treatment by Napoleon, to justify their treatment of Denmark. But news from Portugal nowhere enters into Canning's despatches in the months of June, July 1807. In other respects, too, the narrative of the Earl of Malmesbury can be shown to be untrustworthy on this topic.

A widely accepted view respecting Canning's information respecting the Tilsit interview is that which assigns the *rôle* of informer and traitor to Talleyrand. I am not concerned to defend the character of that very dubious personage; but I must point out that on the critical day, June 25, Talleyrand was at Königsberg, fifty-five miles away from Tilsit. Previously he had been at Danzig; and his letters show that he was in almost complete ignorance of the course of events at the French headquarters. On June 25, he wrote from Königsberg to Napoleon at Tilsit congratulating him on the gratifying news of the armistice signed at Tilsit two days before.[1] There are no further letters of Talleyrand that enable us to follow his movements closely. But, as Napoleon wrote to his Foreign Minister on June 25 after the interview on the raft, urging him to come at once to Tilsit,[2] we may assume that he reached Tilsit on the 28th or the 29th. Napoleon, in a letter of June 30 to Fouché,[3] mentions that Talleyrand and the Russian plenipotentiary, Prince Kurakin, were then discussing the terms of peace. But it should be remembered that Canning, even on July 21, seems to have had no news from Tilsit after June 25, the day of the imperial interview. At least, his despatch of July 22 to Brooke Taylor does not refer to anything which happened at Tilsit after June 25. It is therefore highly improbable that Talleyrand could have been the informant. It is true that his nephew, the young Talleyrand, was at Tilsit at the crucial time; but he was far too young, as well as too unpopular owing to his conceit, to probe political secrets very deeply. To suppose that he found out the

[1] *Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon*, ed. by P. Bertrand (Paris, 1889), p. 472.

[2] *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, No. 12826. [3] *Ib.* No. 12837.

news and sent it to his uncle, who then, by some unknown means, forwarded it to Canning, is to carry conjecture to the length of absurdity.

Rumours of the year 1807, in addition to assigning the discovery to the King of Portugal and to Talleyrand, pointed to Baron Jacobi, Prussian ambassador in London, as having betrayed to Canning the news from Tilsit. But, in addition to other reasons which might be assigned, we have the explicit denial of Canning in the great debate of January 21, 1808. I quote it as reported in Hansard :—'Here he [Canning] felt called upon to contradict an insinuation in the *Moniteur*, which charged Baron Jacobi with giving to the Court of London the secret information respecting the proceedings of the French Government in Prussia, when the fact was that this information came from a British Minister.'[1]

Canning does not here say explicitly that the news respecting the French designs on the Danish fleet came from a British Minister ; but, seeing that the whole debate turned on that question, he evidently meant members of the House to draw that conclusion from his words. They are sufficiently precise to constitute an argument in the case. They not only clear Jacobi, but I think that they also invalidate the argument ably put forward by a writer in the *Athenæum* of Sept. 27, 1902, in favour of assigning the responsibility for the decisive news to the Russian ambassador in London, M. Alopeus. It is true that he was on friendly terms with Canning, and I have found evidence that he was in London on that day (at his house in Harley St.) and addressed a letter to Canning on another topic. But it was surely improbable that a Russian ambassador would betray news of such importance to Canning, when he knew that a great change was coming over Russian policy. Besides, Canning's declaration in the House seems to dispose of that theory.

I may also remark that an alternative explanation tentatively put forward in that number of the *Athenæum*, that General Clinton perhaps brought the decisive news,

[1] Hansard, 1808, p. 66.

is negatived by the statement in Garlike's despatch of July 7, 1807, that Clinton left Memel on June 22, *i.e.* three days before the great event at Tilsit.[1] Captain Harvey had left even earlier. Lord Leveson-Gower sent his despatch of July 2 by Mackenzie and stated that Canning would learn from him 'any details he may require as to the state of the Russian army.' Apparently, then, Mackenzie knew more about the military situation at Tilsit than any British officer. Lord Leveson-Gower himself seems to have been ill-informed on many topics.

Who was the British Minister that sent the news of July 21, I will not venture to affirm. Only four personages fulfil the conditions of the case, Lord Leveson-Gower, Lord Hutchinson, Mr. George Jackson, and Mr. Thornton. Canning, before he made that declaration on January 21, 1808, must have come to see the untrustworthiness of the news sent by Thornton. In my judgment, then, the news of the 21st or the still more important news of the 16th July, the details of which are but partly known to us from the extract which I have quoted, must have come through Lord Hutchinson, Mr. George Jackson, or Lord Leveson-Gower. As Jackson was not then our fully accredited envoy to the Prussian Court, and as Lord Hutchinson soon took up the position of a critic of the Ministry, there are objections to our deciding in favour of either of them. Lord Leveson-Gower seems to me to be the only British Minister to whom Canning's words can apply. Those words do not necessarily imply that he, or any British Minister, found out the secret; but merely that he transmitted the information cited above and became in some sense responsible for it. If, as seems reasonable, we accept the explanation here offered, that Lord Leveson-Gower was the British Minister who sent the important news, he may have derived it from one of the British subjects who were at Tilsit on June 25, viz. Mackenzie or Dr. Wylie. Or, on the

[1] F.O. Denmark, 52. Clinton touched at Stralsund, landed at Copenhagen from the *Havock* on Sunday, July 5, and then after an hour proceeded up the Cattegat.

other hand, he may have gained information from some Russian diplomatist who had knowledge of that secret document drawn up by order of the Emperor of Russia on June 24, the day before the interview. Of the Russian diplomatists then at Tilsit, Prince Troubetzkoi seems to me the most likely personage. It was he who introduced Mackenzie to General Bennigsen.

The evidence brought together in this paper seems to warrant the conclusion that the secret intelligence which led to the coercion of Denmark by the British Government was not of a simple and decisive character; it was complex and circumstantial; the items, so far as we can ascertain, were weak when considered separately: they acquired strength only when viewed in regard to a very critical and dangerous situation. In a word, their force was cumulative.

THE NORTHERN POLICY OF GEORGE I. TO 1718

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THE policy pursued by George I. in the north of Europe in the first years of his reign has not received much attention from historians, at least in England. The few paragraphs which authors of such merit as Lord Mahon or J. R. Green allot to the subject show that they did not think it worth while, or were not able, to inform themselves of the facts. They record, rightly enough, that George's own principal purpose was to add the Swedish provinces of Bremen and Verden to his electoral dominions, and they attribute to Charles XII. the design of invading Great Britain in revenge, with the object of placing James III. upon the throne. Though he does not appear to have ever seriously contemplated such a thing, the belief that he held it in view was, after the Jacobite rebellion, genuine and general. But nothing is said of the pressing importance to Great Britain of the Baltic commerce, with which Charles interfered and Peter the Great seemed likely to interfere. This it was solely that gave George I. the services of a British squadron in the Baltic in 1715, and this the principal cause of the estrangement between Great Britain and Russia, which lasted for over twenty years. The object of the present paper is to present a narrative of events up to the death of Charles XII., from which conclusions may be drawn. Details may be avoided, as these have appeared in papers by

the author published in the 'English Historical Review.'[1] The intricate and unscrupulous diplomacy by which George finally deprived Sweden of most of her German possessions in favour of himself and the king of Prussia must be left for a future opportunity.

In a valuable communication made to this Society six years ago Mrs. D'Arcy Collyer, prefacing her larger subject, recounted the relations of Great Britain with Russia in the time of George I. She showed how the hostility begun in 1716 lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, till circumstances rendered a change advisable. Already in 1719 we find English ministers anxious to compass the complete destruction of the new Russian naval power. The only other English writers who, so far as I am aware, have interested themselves in the northern policy of George I. in the lifetime of Charles XII. are Dr. Ward, Mr. Nisbet Bain, Mr. Oscar Browning, and Mr. R. P. Mahaffy, the last-named in a valuable unpublished essay, which he has kindly permitted me to use.

But there are foreign works, and one service of Mr. Bain has been to acquaint me with two valuable monographs, G. G. Carlson's account of Swedish peace negotiations in the years 1709–1718 (in Swedish) and Edward Holm's history of Danish policy from 1716 to 1720 (in Danish). The latter obviated the necessity of consulting the records of Copenhagen; the former, supplemented by correspondence published in Swedish magazines and elsewhere, performed the same office for the archives and libraries of Sweden. Ignorance of the language has barred to me Russian authorities, with the exception of important documents for the year 1716 published and commented upon by Hartmann, and a few in a Dutch work by Uhlenbeck. I must also mention the work of Dr. Felix Stoerck on the treaty of Greifswald and other negotiations of that time. Of general modern works I have drawn most upon the 'Englische Geschichte' of Professor Wolfgang

[1] References in the earlier articles to specific volumes at the Record Office are erroneous, owing to the recent rearrangement of them.

Michael, the great Prussian work of J. G. Droysen, and for French policy on Wiesener's 'Le Régent, l'Abbé Dubois et les Anglais.' What Ranke has to say on the subject is said with his usual conciseness and impartiality. The bulk of my material has been gathered from the inexhaustible store-houses of the Record Office and the British Museum, from the archives of Paris and Hanover, and from contemporary authors or compilers of greater or less value.

In the northern policy of George I. from 1709, the year of Poltava, to 1719 there were three phases: the first, during which he maintained what St. John in one place calls 'the ancient alliance and friendship between the House of Lunenburg and the Crown of Sweden,' and was still reckoned as the principal friend of Charles XII. in Europe; the second, from 1712 to 1714, when the conquest of Stade by the Danes and the threatening writings of Charles XII. from Bender obliged him to reconsider his position; the third, when he took up arms against Sweden and determined through right and wrong to acquire the duchies, as they were commonly called, of Bremen and Verden. The beginning of the third was nearly coincident with his accession to the throne of Great Britain, and with the return of Charles XII. from Turkey. By that time Sweden had lost possession of everything beyond the Baltic excepting Pomerania north of the Peene and the town of Wismar.

Charles demanded from the first that the guarantors of the treaties of Travendal and Altranstädt, of whom Great Britain was the principal, should carry out their obligations; but they were engaged to the utmost of their resources in the war with France, and they objected that his own conduct was responsible for the rupture of those treaties. Nevertheless they did something. On March 31, 1710, Great Britain, Holland, and Austria signed the well-known Neutrality Convention, which provided that the German provinces of Sweden should neither be invaded nor used by the Swedes as bases for attack. Everybody concerned accepted it, excepting Charles. Two of his assailants, the king of Poland

and the tsar, had indeed promoted it, as for their own advantage. But Charles, expecting to return at the head of an irresistible army of Turks and Tartars, declined to deprive himself of the power of attack from Germany. When his protest was received measures were taken to preserve the neutrality by force. On August 4 a supplementary convention was signed, specifying the contingents to be furnished by Great Britain, Holland, Austria, Prussia, Hanover, and minor German States. But the force could never be got together, and the whole scheme fell in consequence to the ground. In the autumn of 1711 Saxons and Danes marched on Swedish Pomerania. The following year saw the fall of Stade, and 1713 the capitulation of the gallant Stenbock.

No doubt the principal object of the Convention was to keep the northern war out of Germany, so that the German levies serving under Marlborough and Eugene might not be withdrawn for the defence of their own States.[1] But its authors can hardly be blamed for that. If a man's house and that of his friend are on fire at the same time he is right to try to save his own first. If he can contrive means to do this and help his friend also he is to be commended. And that was the case of the guarantors of the Swedish treaties. The Convention would have preserved for Charles his German provinces, and Prussia and Hanover, had he accepted it, would have had no cause for making war upon him. We must note that Elector George did his utmost to carry the Convention through, and more than anyone else to get the 'Neutrality Corps' together.

'Affairs are now come to such a pitch of distraction,' St. John wrote in 1711, 'the demands made upon us by both

[1] 'Your Imperial Majesty is no doubt sensible that the intention of Us and of Our Allys, when we entered into the Act of Neutrality, was, by covering from any hostile attempt the countrys therein mentioned, to preserve the Peace of the Empire, and so prevent any divertion of that Force which is employed against France, and We remember with much pleasure, how readily your Imperial Majesty concurred in these views for the Preservation of the Common Cause.' Anne to Peter the Great, July 23, o.s., 1711, Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 214.

sides are so high and so peremptory, every expedient which can be thought of is liable to so many objections, in short, it is so dangerous to the common cause to do anything, and so impossible to do nothing, that her Majesty and all those who have the honour to serve her are at a loss what measure to take.'[1] British public opinion sympathised with Sweden, and the government would have been glad to help her cause, had it been able. A special envoy, Captain Jefferyes, was sent to Bender early in 1711 to persuade Charles to reason, but failed entirely. In 1712 a squadron was promised for the help of Sweden, but nothing resulted. To support her cause by force was to quarrel with the tsar, who held now the eastern Baltic ports. If the Dutch would co-operate, it was thought, the venture might be made; otherwise they would benefit at England's expense. The termination of the French war did not bring relief, for the peace of Utrecht deprived Great Britain of all influence on the Continent, and in particular of the Dutch alliance. Remonstrances and threats addressed to the Powers at war with Sweden were laughed at. Bolingbroke took refuge in denying, repeatedly and angrily, the force of guarantees of treaties, whose provisions were not observed by the parties to them. The defensive treaty of 1700, he said further, could not oblige the queen to engage in an offensive war, or involve her in new developments.

Worse for Charles's relations with Great Britain than his refusal to accept compromise or mediation was his interference with the Baltic commerce. In 1710 he issued a prohibition of trade to the ports taken from him by the tsar. Now this commerce was of vital importance to the maritime nations. Not in consideration of national profit; the economic maxims of the time condemned it as disadvantageous, inasmuch as imports exceeded in value exports. A Board of Trade report of 1697 on British commerce generally places that to the Baltic first among the unprofitable branches. The importance lay in the character of the

[1] To Marlborough, July 20, o.s., 1711, Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 78.

commodities—pine timber, pitch and tar, hemp and flax, essential materials of ship-building, which could not at the time be obtained in sufficient quantity from any other source. The head of King George's first ministry, Lord Townshend, more than once declared emphatically that if the Baltic convoy miscarried it would not be possible to fit out men-of-war or merchantmen for the next year's service.

Swedophil as Queen Anne's government, in theory, was, it was driven at last to make a hostile demonstration against the interference with the Baltic trade. In the summer of 1714 three men-of-war were prepared, and were on the point of sailing, when the Queen died. The expedition was a failure, for the men-of-war dared not pass the Sound, and only by grace of the Swedes were permitted to return. But the fact of its preparation is important, for there could be no suspicion of prompting from Hanover; any proposal thence was certain at the time of rejection on account of its origin. The feeling roused against Charles XII. in Great Britain in consequence of his commercial policy was independent of Hanover.

Meanwhile there had occurred on the Continent an event of the first importance for the development of northern affairs in the accession of Frederick William I. in February 1713 to the throne of Prussia. His trenchant domestic reforms very soon placed him in a position to assert himself abroad. He began by accepting the scheme of Goertz, consented to by Count Vellingk, the Swedish governor of Bremen, for neutralising Holstein, Wismar, and Stettin by a joint occupation of them by his own troops and those of Holstein-Gottorp till peace should be made. This scheme of 'sequestration' failed, in regard to Holstein, because the British government, lavish of approval and encouragement, would give no active help; in regard to Stettin and Wismar, because the commandants of those places would not give them up. Hostilities proceeding the Russians reduced Stettin, the Danes Tönning. By the treaty of Schwedt the former fortress was handed over to Prussia, still in sequestration, but under conditions inimical to Sweden and upon payment of 400,000

thalers to the tsar and the king of Poland, a virtual mortgage. The joint occupancy by troops of Holstein-Gottorp was but a formality.

Charles, when he heard of the sequestration, refused to recognise it, or ever to pay back the money. Frederick William, therefore, turned his thoughts to war. In June 1714 he made a secret treaty with Peter the Great, which guaranteed to Prussia Stettin and its district, to the tsar Ingria, Carelia, and Esthonia, with the ports of Viborg, Narva, and Reval.[1]

The entry of Prussia into the lists against Sweden had decisive consequences beyond the direct results, the reduction of Stralsund and Wismar, and besides the support which she steadily accorded during five years to Peter the Great. It removed all hope of the expulsion of the Danes from Holstein and Bremen by force. At the end of 1713 it was clear that no help would come to Hanover to this end either from Prussia or from the Sea Powers. George was left with the alternative of looking on at the expulsion of the Swedes from Germany, with the insupportable prospect of seeing Bremen and Verden ceded to Denmark, or of joining the despoilers, upon condition of having those duchies for himself. Charles aided the decision, to which he came, by threatening vengeance upon neutral friends as well as upon declared enemies. George adopted the policy long advocated by a strong party at his court and turned against him. He has incurred the censure of posterity, but in criticising his conduct we must not forget that the Sea Powers, also old allies of Sweden, and more strongly bound by treaties and guarantees than he, would do nothing to save her.

He began by negotiation with Prussia. At first it failed, for he made demands which Frederick William would not concede. But when it was known that Charles's return was imminent an agreement was arrived at. A 'punctation for a convention,' as it was called, was signed on November 11.[2]

[1] Droysen, IV. ii. 92–95; Stenzel, iii. 259–61.

[2] At 'Alten-Landsburg' (probably Alt-Landsberg, near Potsdam), Staatsarchiv, Hanover. Droysen gives the date as November 27, perhaps that of the ratification, or of a counterpart.

It alleged the danger threatening the empire, and in particular Hanover and Prussia. George agreed, from the day that Denmark gave up to him the duchy of Bremen, to help to secure for Frederick William possession in perpetuity of Stettin and the country to the Peene, with Demmin, Anclam, Wolgast, and the isles of Wollin and Usedom. The latter undertook to endeavour to obtain for George, also in perpetuity, the duchies of Bremen and Verden, and to cede his electoral fiefs and Church patronage in Brunswick-Lüneburg and his sovereignty over the three Bernstorff villages near Gartow, in Mecklenburg. Military aid was stipulated at 10,000 and 6,000 men respectively.

When this convention was signed Charles had already started on his famous ride from Pitesti to Stralsund. He reached that fortress on the night of November 21/22. Frederick William at once made overtures to him, offering to restore Stettin on certain terms.[1] Acceptance of these was strongly urged upon Charles by the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who came to mediate in person, and by the French envoy, Count Rottembourg, but he refused them. He was thoroughly confident in his ability to win back everything. A blow suddenly and successfully delivered, he thought, might dispose his enemies to peace on his own terms. He began in February 1715 by driving the Prussians out of Wolgast; in April he made himself master of Usedom. Thereupon the non-Prussian portion of the Stettin garrison was disarmed, and the dismissal of the Swedish envoy from Berlin on April 26 marked the formal commencement of hostilities.

Frederick William knew the strength of his position. On February 3 he had concluded a definite treaty for military aid with Augustus of Poland, and he had further the promise of 30,000 or 40,000 Russians.[2] This aid could not, indeed, be effective during the year 1715, owing to the civil war in Poland. But Denmark, whose navy made her help of special value, was ready to join the Prusso-Hanoverian agreement. Here also was seen the influence of Charles's return. Whereas

[1] See Droysen, IV. ii. 106.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 113.

hitherto the Danes had refused to loose their hold on Holstein and on Bremen, straining their relations with Hanover almost to the breaking point, and showing no more regard for George as king than as elector, now they began to entertain the idea of an exchange of Bremen for Stralsund and the island of Rügen. This and Charles's 'Ordinance of Privateers' made possible the triple league of 1715.

The Ordinance was issued in February, and was intended to render the prohibition of trade to the eastern ports effective. To use the words of Jackson, the British minister at Stockholm, it violated in almost every clause the treaties with England and Holland, and made it impossible for a merchant ship to enter the Baltic without being made prize. It was denounced in England as outrageous and piratical; Torcy in France observed that Charles had enemies enough without adding to their number and that if English and Dutch men-of-war came to the Baltic it was not likely that they would act in favour of Sweden.[1] Execution was immediate. English and Dutch ships were seized and carried into Gothenburg or Marstrand; others stayed in different ports for want of the prescribed papers.[2] The edict, Townshend wrote, 'contains several innovations that no treaty, law, or reason can justify. We can look upon such proceedings as piratical only, and commissions founded upon such orders can be calculated for no other purpose but to set the neutral Powers at defiance who are concerned in the commerce of the Baltick.'[3]

The effect was to make parliament willing to yield to the urgent representations of the merchants and grant supplies for a strong squadron to proceed to the Baltic. There was the less difficulty in this in that the Dutch, whose valuable alliance the accession of George I. had restored, were willing to co-operate. Now the service demanded of George by his allies was that a British squadron should assist in the reduction of Stralsund by keeping off the Swedish fleet. He

[1] Paris, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Suède 131, April 18, 1715.

[2] Wich from Hamburg, May 24, Record Office, Hamburg 32. Cp. Jackson, March 19 and 26, o.s., *ibid.* Sweden 21.

[3] To Jefferyes, March 8, o.s., *ibid.*, Foreign Entrybook 155.

could not promise this in writing, and so no such undertaking appears in the treaties made. But he gave the promise verbally. It was represented that, as the admiral would have orders to make reprisals upon any ships of the Swedes that he might meet with, it was only necessary to put him in the way of their men-of-war for him to attack them. Great Britain would thus serve the cause as effectually as though she herself had declared war.[1]

The treaties, Denmark-Prussia, Prussia-Hanover, Denmark-Hanover, were concluded in May and June.[2] They appointed Bremen and Verden to Hanover, Swedish Pomerania in division between Denmark and Prussia. But George did not declare war till October, for not till then did the Danes surrender Stade to him. Nor did he perform the service required from him. Circumstances limited Sir John Norris, commanding the British squadron, to the principal mission confided to him, protection of the traders, in spite of urgent direct appeals from the king of Prussia. The Danish fleet in the sea fight of August saved the situation by itself. George profited by the treaties without doing anything for the cause.

Of course the Prussians and Danes were extremely angry. Vehement expostulations and appeals were made in London as well as to Sir John Norris, and peremptory demands that the fleet should remain in the Baltic after the traders had gone home. As a compromise, and 'in order to support the rights of His people and the just demands He has made in their behalf,' as Townshend phrased it,[3] George sent orders to Norris to leave behind him eight men-of-war to join and act with the Danish fleet. Whether this measure had any influence on the fate of Stralsund is doubtful. But it constituted a distinct act of offence against Sweden on the part of Great Britain, and was advanced as such by Count Gyllenborg in his memorials.

Of the three spoliators Denmark was so far justified in

[1] See fully on this Michael, i. 717–9.

[2] See for their contents the *English Historical Review*, xvii. 443, foll.

[3] Aug. 2, o.s. Brit. Museum, Add. MSS. 28154, f. 248; cp. Michael, pp. 726–7.

that she was the hereditary enemy of Sweden, had a heavy balance of defeat to wipe off from previous wars, and might legitimately look for recovery of lost possessions or for compensation for them. Prussia also might recall the war with Charles XI., the victories of the Great Elector, and the manner in which he had been robbed of their fruits. But George had no excuse of this kind; he had always been the friend of Sweden. The irony of fate, and his own power, gave in the end much to him, a good deal to Prussia, but only the least possible to Denmark.

Whether Townshend and his colleagues were informed of the intended action of the British squadron in the Baltic at first seems doubtful; but they certainly knew of it before long from Norris, who had his private orders, and they consented tacitly, accepting the possibility of Great Britain being embroiled in war. Yet that here, as has often been asserted, was the beginning of a regular system of subordination of British to Hanoverian interests can hardly be maintained. To restore peace in the north and free trade in the Baltic was clearly a British interest, and the readiest means to this end appeared to be to force the intractable Charles to submission. It was thought that the fall of Stralsund must end the war; it was likely that Charles, considering his fondness for the forefront of the battle, would meet his fate. His escape was indeed miraculous. The unlikely course of subsequent events could not be foreseen in 1715.

In the autumn of that year Peter the Great again came to the front. He made treaties with Denmark and Prussia[1] for the supply of troops to assist in the siege of Stralsund, or, if that were ended, in that of Wismar,[2] and on October 28 he concluded with Hanover the treaty of Greifswald, which guaranteed on the one side possession of the duchies of Bremen and Verden and on the other that of Ingria, Carelia,

[1] Bacmeister, ii. 15; Koch and Schoell, xiii. 256; Droysen, p. 139.

[2] Not in an invasion of Scania, as Hö'er and Droysen (p. 152). See Holm, p. 11.

and Esthonia, with the town and district of Reval.[1] It was agreed to use all necessary energy in prosecuting the war, and to institute negotiations at Berlin for including Russia in the confederacy, and for concerting measures in detail for making war and peace. And George agreed for Great Britain, and the tsar agreed reciprocally, to advance their mutual interests in the best manner possible.

Not yet was it realised how formidable a bird of prey was hatched from the Muscovite egg. Not yet did Great Britain fear for her Baltic commerce, nor Hanover a Russian establishment in Mecklenburg or Holstein. Austria regarded the rise of the new Power with indifference, France with a certain contemptuous tolerance, wary of possibilities in the future. Denmark was the ally of Peter against Sweden; to Prussia he was dangerous as an enemy, in view of the isolated situation of Prussia proper, acceptable as a friend, who might support her in her rivalry with other German Powers.

The one Power to whom Sweden might look for help was France. Louis XIV. was willing enough to give it; the danger of intervention by him was provided against in the treaties; but he could no longer give it in arms. The course that he urged upon Charles was to agree with his adversaries quickly; the help he gave was financial, and this was indeed welcome, for money was what Charles most wanted, and France was the only source from which he could obtain it. Count Eric Sparre was sent to Paris to negotiate. He had no success with his projects for raising an army to invade Germany, but he was able to procure subsidies. A treaty signed on April 3 provided for the quarterly payment of 150,000 crowns, and Louis further undertook to use his good offices to recover for Charles his possessions in Germany, and to support the interests of his nephew the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. The undertakings of Charles in return were prevented by events from having any value. To use the words of D'Huxelles in 1717, his obstinacy drew upon

[1] Original in the Staatsarchiv at Hanover. The treaty was ratified by the tsar at St. Petersburg on December 18, o.s.

him fresh enemies and fresh misfortunes, and deprived him of the means of sending the stipulated succour to France, had there been occasion for it. But Louis performed his obligations, paying the money, and sending a special envoy, the count de Croissy, to Berlin and to Stralsund to attempt to arrange terms of peace.

The same stiffneckedness that prevented Charles from accepting the wise advice of France lost his cause at Vienna. Formally invited for the third time in March to send ministers to the shadowy congress of Brunswick,[1] he failed to reply till June 17, and then still refused to the emperor his title of king of Spain. He required as a preliminary to peace a guarantee that his German provinces should be restored to him. This haughty demeanour was the opposite of that of the king of Prussia, whose flattering expressions of submission, backed by the powerful influence of George, gained the day. When, late in July, Charles consented to address the emperor by the required title, and made some other concessions, it was too late. The siege of Stralsund could proceed without interference from Vienna.[2]

In the years 1716 and 1717 a chief point to notice is that the Jacobite rebellion greatly strengthened George's hands against Charles. The belief that the Swedish monarch was preparing to help the cause of James was firm and universal. There were grounds for it, no doubt, apart from the natural consciousness that reprisals would be justified. Charles's invasion of Norway in the early part of 1716 was taken to be preliminary to a descent on Scotland; the Jacobites talked and wrote of it as an assured thing. Fugitives of note took refuge in Sweden, or repaired thither to persuade Charles to

[1] The Congress of Brunswick was intended to settle the affairs of the north under the presidency of the emperor. It had been sitting for some time, and continued to sit till after the peace negotiations of 1719–20. In each case then the preliminary treaties assigned the formal conclusions to the congress. But each Power in the event found much satisfaction in making the final settlements apart from it, leaving to the emperor only the confirmation of such provisions as affected Germany.

[2] On the manifestos of Charles and Frederick William and other papers in connection with this subject see the *English Historical Review*, xvii. 464–5.

action. Then came the negotiations of Goertz with the Jacobites for the purpose of extracting money from them, and their exposure when the British Government, cognisant of them all along, thought exposure fit. All this made it easy for George to procure armaments for the Baltic. The instructions now given to Sir John Norris and Sir George Byng made the protection of trade secondary to precautions against invasion. Their squadrons openly joined in one year the fleets of Denmark and Russia, in the other that of Denmark, and kept the Swedes inactive in their harbours. On one occasion English men-of-war attacked and captured a Swedish frigate. These were acts of war, but Charles nevertheless, with his fantastic ideas of honour, refused to take measures against a nation which had not actually declared war upon him.

What really mattered in these years was the change of relations between Great Britain and France, and the manifestation of Russia as a European Power. The French alliance proceeded from the need of the regent Orleans and King George for mutual support, and the former was willing, to secure his position at home and to strengthen that of France in Europe, to further the other's northern aims. Count de la Marck, the French envoy in Sweden, was ordered to put the king of England's interests in the forefront of his negotiations, and second to them those of Prussia. At the same time he was steadily to maintain the right of France to mediate; mediation must not be left to Austria alone. Whether the count faithfully carried out his instructions on the first head may be doubted, for he made no scruple of expressing to his colleague Châteauneuf at the Hague his strong disapproval of them. But the regent was sincere enough. On the other hand Peter the Great by his intrusion into Germany roused jealousies at Hanover which quickly grew to overt hostility. Instead of combining against Sweden he and George sought each to make terms with her at the other's expense.

It is worth while to note the curious complication of alliances and rivalries existing in Europe in 1717. Austria, Great Britain, and Hanover stood, as of old, together, the

union of the two former renewed by the Treaty of Westminster. That of Great Britain and Holland persisted, and was extended to include France. But France and Austria, both allies of Great Britain, continued their ancient rivalry, and the former encouraged the advancement of Prussia in counterpoise. Hanover and Prussia entertained mutual jealousies which came near to enmity, and Holland was in strife with both Austria and Prussia about her borders. Into this complication Peter the Great had forced himself and his army. He professed to desire the friendship of all, but only maintained that of Prussia, and of France in a nominal degree.

For some months after the treaty of Greifswald Peter and George continued to be friendly. The latter promised another squadron for the Baltic; Prince Kurakin came to London in March 1716, and was assured by both Bernstorff and Townshend of the king's desire to press the war to a successful issue. But shortly a change was manifest, contemporaneous with the arrival of the Russian troops in Mecklenburg. It was feared that Peter intended to establish a foothold there for himself. Kurakin was politely dismissed back to the Hague, furnished with drafts of treaties which corresponded but little with the assurances given, and which he could not possibly accept.

I need not stay to narrate how the Russians were kept out of Wismar, when that place fell, how their army came on and passed into Zealand, how the invasion of Sweden, so laboriously prepared, was abandoned by Peter at the last moment, and how his soldiers came back to take up winter quarters in Mecklenburg. He did his best to allay the violent resentment aroused thereby at Hanover, desired to meet George himself there, and when this was declined sent him a special envoy, Count Tolstoy. But it was of no use; his assurances were not believed, he was now looked on almost as an enemy. And at the same time apprehension of his rising power in the Baltic was growing steadily in England.[1]

[1] Cp. Stanhope's despatch, printed by Coxe and quoted thence by Mahon, i. 229 foll.

The king of Prussia, on the other hand, could not afford to break with one so useful as a friend, so dangerous as an enemy. The Russo-Prussian alliance was confirmed at Havelberg at the end of November 1716, and the end of the year saw the two Powers at open variance with Hanover. The northern league was broken up. Behind Hanover stood Austria and, so far as the sovereign could compass it, Great Britain. Denmark remained more or less neutral, eager to prosecute the war and occupied for the next two years with negotiations for treaties with Great Britain and Hanover, which came to nothing, because she would not definitely take the side of the latter against the tsar and Prussia.

From Havelberg Peter went on to Amsterdam, stayed in Holland three months, and then repaired to Paris, where he was received courteously but cautiously. His stay was made thoroughly enjoyable, but his efforts to conclude treaties were not encouraged. Afterwards he spent three weeks at Spa, returning to Amsterdam at the beginning of August 1717. Now began fresh negotiations with Great Britain, conducted on George's side by Peter's old acquaintances Whitworth and Sir John Norris. Success might have been expected from them, seeing that the chief cause of hostility between George and Peter had lately been removed by the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Mecklenburg. But no agreement was arrived at, for the requirements on either side were incompatible. Peter got his treaty with France signed, but it was formal and colourless. He left for home at the beginning of September.

The fact was that both George and Peter were now negotiating for peace secretly and separately, and the intention on either side at Amsterdam seems to have been less to arrive at an understanding than to determine whether that or an arrangement with Charles was preferable. On the Russian side there had been conferences in the latter months of 1716 with ministers of the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and some kind of intercourse with Goertz. The activities of the latter, however, were transferred to Paris and then suspended

by his imprisonment from February to August 1717. But when Peter was at Spa in July the Polish general Poniatowski, a zealous adherent of Charles lately returned from Sweden, and Preis, the Swedish secretary at the Hague, had interviews with Kurakin and the confidential physician James Erskine, and these were continued in August, always in the utmost secrecy, at Amsterdam. And Goertz, when he was released, saw Peter personally.

George, on his side, after the arrests of Gyllenborg and Goertz in February 1717, opened negotiations for accommodating that affair both through the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and the regent of France. By the mediation of the latter through the count de la Marck a solution of the difficulty was arrived at, one very little to George's satisfaction, but which he was obliged to accept in consequence of pressure from Holland.

Despatches from the landgrave's envoy, General Rank, reached Cassel in July, and made known the terms which Charles was prepared to accept. He offered to pledge parts of Bremen and Verden to Hanover for twenty years, with reservation of his rights of jurisdiction and vote in the Diet, in return for a renewal of the expiring treaty with Great Britain and for energetic measures to drive the tsar from the Baltic. Damages done to trade were to be balanced, and as a preliminary condition Gyllenborg and Goertz were to be released. A private letter to Vellingk put forward the suggestion of an exchange of parts of Bremen and Verden for Bornholm and a strip of Norway, at Danish cost, or in the last resort a mortgage of the whole of the duchies for a term of years, with reservation of the privileges and rights attaching to them and of a portion of the revenues. At the same time Preis was empowered to negotiate with Kurakin on the basis of a complete restoration of the Baltic provinces and a money payment, or of a truce for twenty or thirty years, during which time the tsar should enjoy undisturbed possession of St. Petersburg and communication thence with his proper dominions.

The terms offered to George were not, of course, acceptable, but they opened the way to further discussion. In August—at the time, that is to say, when Whitworth and Norris were at work at Amsterdam—the Holstein minister, Frederick Ernest de Fabrice, was summoned to England. He was a man specially qualified for the work desired of him, possessing on the one hand the confidence of Count Vellingk and Charles himself, in whose company he had spent some years at Bender, and being on the other a son of a trusted privy councillor of King George. He travelled under an assumed name and character, stayed at Hampton Court in strict privacy three days only, and returned with full powers and instructions to his father to treat with Vellingk. Extraordinary precautions were taken to keep the negotiation secret, the elder Fabrice not being allowed to see Vellingk personally, but communicating with him from his country house, near Bremen city, through his son. It was not successful, because George insisted on the complete cession of Bremen and Verden, to which Vellingk was not empowered to agree. The younger Fabrice, therefore, instead of going on to Sweden, as had been arranged, went back to England.

The upshot of the Russian negotiation was that Goertz received Prussian and Russian passports to return to Sweden by way of Berlin and Poland. On his way he held conferences with the Prussian and Saxon ministers, and with the Russians again. In the first case he only succeeded in confirming the bad opinion which Frederick William had formed of him four years before, and, besides, the terms he offered were in no wise acceptable. Augustus and Peter, however, were not so particular. Escaping the British ships which lay in wait for him Goertz arrived in Sweden, the bearer of conditions which it was confidently believed would be accepted. The result was seen in the conferences at the Åland Isles, which kept Peter quiet during the year 1718.

Fabrice stayed in England to the end of the year, and then set out for Sweden, the bearer of proposals from George.[1]

[1] See fully on Fabrice's mission *English Historical Review*, xxi. 57.

But he could not get to Lund till the last day of February. So much importance was attached to his mission that, when nothing was heard from him, a second emissary, Schrader, was despatched on a man-of-war to Gothenburg. All George's proposals were rejected; only by the insistence and prayers of Goertz, anxious to carry on negotiations with England and Russia at the same time, was Charles prevailed upon to allow a counter-proposal, of which Goertz himself said that the king of England would have to bethink himself before accepting it.

Charles made a renewal of the alliance of 1700 with Great Britain a preliminary condition to any treaty with Hanover. He asked for arrears of subsidy, 600,000 crowns a year, as from the peace of Utrecht, and that for three successive years a British squadron of twelve men-of-war with frigates and yachts should be sent to the Baltic to act under his orders as he should think fit. In return he would conclude a mutually advantageous treaty of commerce, would give due satisfaction for damages done to British trade during the war, balancing against them that suffered by Swedish shipping during the wars with France, and trusting that trade to the ports usurped by the tsar would be as far as possible forbidden. He would accept the mediation of Great Britain with his other enemies, particularly Denmark, and would join with the king of England in the measures necessary to be taken towards a general peace. In regard to the duchies he would conclude a treaty with him, as elector, on the basis of 'rétrovendition.' De la Marck tells us that this meant that he would mortgage them for twenty years as security for a loan of a million crowns and the cost of the naval aid, which he estimated at 600,000 crowns a year, the mortgage to renew itself without further treaty in twenty-year terms until the debt was paid off. Also that Charles was to retain his directorship of the Circle of Lower Saxony, his seats and vote in the Diet, the episcopal rights attaching to the cathedrals of Bremen and Hamburg, and the revenues of certain bailiwicks for the support of the officials whom he should keep in the duchies.

George, then, and Charles started from different standpoints. The former required the promise of a cession of the duchies, or part of them, before he would give any definition of help to be given in return. Charles not only refused a cession, but demanded of Great Britain undertakings to which it was certain that parliament would never agree. Fabrice, therefore, when he appeared, was told flatly by Bernstorff that if he brought with him nothing better than what had been brought from Gothenburg (Schrader having arrived in England first) he would not be very welcome. He replied that he had no orders but to say that the king of Sweden sincerely desired a reasonable accommodation, and that what he brought was an ultimatum, and only two months allowed for its acceptance. Told that the king of Sweden seemed to regard the duchies as still in his own hands, he replied that that was so, for the hands that they were in were good, and change of circumstances might restore them to him, perhaps with interest. He flattered himself that this firm attitude had its effect, and relates with complacency his reception by and a supper with the king, and his favourable expectations. But he was completely deceived. After being continually put off he was at length told that a plenipotentiary could not be sent to Sweden, as desired, since his proceedings would only be made use of by Goertz to promote his treaty with the tsar, and that if a serious negotiation were intended full powers might be sent by the king of Sweden to him.

It was the strong position of George now at home and abroad that enabled him to make up his mind to disregard the danger of an adverse coalition between Sweden, Russia, and Prussia. In the early part of the year the case had been different. There was great discontent at home on various grounds, particularly in commercial circles; this in consequence of the injury suffered from the prohibition of trade with Sweden, which had followed closely upon the arrests of Gyllenborg and Goertz. As the Dutch declined to issue a simular prohibition British merchants saw themselves cut off from this trade for the benefit of their principal

rivals. Abroad the alliance with France had appeared to be in danger, domestic discontents reacting upon feeling in Paris, and the great majority of Frenchmen detesting the policy of the regent and Dubois. The uneasiness on this head is reflected in Lord Stair's despatches of March and April. Then, at Vienna, protracted delays and difficulties had been encountered in persuading the emperor to come into the plan of settlement of affairs of Southern Europe—the plan, that is, of the Quadruple Alliance. But by June the main part of these difficulties had been got over. A scheme acceptable to the emperor had been arranged, the king's measures had been carried in parliament, a fleet had been granted for the Baltic and was already in Danish waters, and, lastly, peace was assured between Austria and Turkey.[1] By the middle of July Stanhope was successful in carrying the southern scheme through at Paris in the teeth of determined opposition. The signature there of a preliminary convention for imposing terms on Spain was nearly coincident with that of the treaties of Passarowitz. The 'Tractatus ad pacem publicam stabiliendam,' commonly known as the Quadruple Alliance, was completed in London, as between Great Britain, France, and Austria, fifteen days later.

In August, after receiving a letter from Goertz stating that he was returning to the Åland Isles with full powers to conclude and the intention of concluding peace with the Russians, Fabrice, who had hitherto worked only through the German ministers, laid the whole matter officially before the English Secretary of State, James Craggs. He writes that the latter came immediately to see him, and agreed to the preparation of a formal memorial setting forth the danger of a peace between Sweden and Russia, and the advisability of removing the prohibition of trade with the former country. But nothing seems to have resulted. George was content to rest quiet in his strong position and await events.

The British squadron arrived in Danish waters this year

[1] 'Die Grundlage von Allem bildete der Friede zwischen dem Kaiser und den Türken zu Passarowitz' (Ranke, *Preussische Geschichte*, v. 29).

towards the end of May. The principal task prescribed to Norris was to prevent the Swedish fleet from passing the Sound, for it was believed that a descent upon the British coasts in favour of the Pretender was imminent. A notable recrudescence of Jacobite activity gave ground for this belief The stay of the duke of Ormonde in Courland in communication with St. Petersburg, the journeys of Sir John Stewart and others to Sweden, the arming of Spain, appeared to confirm the Jacobite assertions that a great combined undertaking against England was in preparation. Lord Stair was warned in this sense, and the regent was urged to expel the Jacobites from France, the asylum whence they could supply themselves with men, arms, ships, and money, and similar representations were made at St. Petersburg and Vienna.

The immediate effect of Norris's arrival was to drive the Swedish fleet back into Carlskrona. There he blockaded it, cruising off Bornholm in conjunction with a Danish squadron from July to October, while Dutch and other British ships convoyed the traders up the Baltic. When there was appearance that the Åland conferences might produce a peace, and that the Russian fleet might come to help the Swedish—and Stair's information and intercepted reports from the Jacobite 'Hooker' at St. Petersburg put this forward as a thing assured—Norris was instructed to act against it, in that case, in the same manner as against the Swedes themselves. These orders were repeated and emphasised, privately, when the news came that Peter the Great had sailed from Cronslot with twenty of the line and three frigates, and reports followed that 20,000 men were to be put on board at Reval and Abo. Norris's ability to attack the Russians, and the willingness of the Danes to act with him, were apparently assumed. But Admiral Raben had no orders to such effect ; it was with the utmost difficulty that the Danish government was prevailed upon to allow him to remain with Norris at all. We know now that the assurances which Peter gave at Copenhagen were genuine, and that the object of his cruise was to impress the Swedish diplomatists at the Åland Isles. His fleet was

back at Cronslot by the middle of September. And, as the Swedish ships were found to be laying up, and the Danish unable to keep the sea longer, a resolution was taken on October 12 for the latter to depart. Norris, in nearly as bad a plight, followed shortly. Violent storms coming on, his squadron had the barest possible escape from running on Falsterbo reef. No fewer than twenty-four of the merchantmen were cast away on the different coasts.

While Norris and Raben were at sea the diplomatic situation at Copenhagen remained in much the same state as it had done for two years past. Discussions had been endless, but the projected treaties with Great Britain and Hanover were not advanced. The Danes would not identify themselves with George's Hanoverian policy, unless he satisfied their demands upon Great Britain. They had not sufficient confidence in him, especially after the news transpired of Fabrice's mission, to break with Russia and Prussia definitely. They required, till peace was made, a yearly visit of a British squadron to the Baltic and an annual subsidy of 300,000 crowns; in their expectations from peace they included the recovery of part of their former possessions in Sweden and the abolition of the exemption of Swedish ships from the Sound tolls. Such pretensions were received with marked coldness. Towards the end of October fresh proposals were forwarded to England. The draft set forth particularly in its preamble the danger threatening from the Åland conferences. Besides the subsidy of 300,000 crowns and the despatch of squadrons a loan of a million crowns was asked for on the security of Danish Pomerania, to put fleet and army into proper condition, and further a guarantee of the king of Denmark's German provinces and Jutland against invasion, while his army was in Norway, and assistance in carrying a part of that army by sea into the diocese of Trondhjem, which the Swedes had invaded. In return the king of Denmark would supply eight regiments of cavalry for the defence of Hanover, and would hold sixteen ships of the line always ready to assist Great Britain in case of need, and

in particular to prevent any fleet from passing the Sound into the North Sea.

The Danes, in fact, no more than the Swedes comprehended that George was not master of British ships and money, but depended for them upon annual grants by parliament. He could not give the undertakings asked, at least in writing. Hanoverian money he was always loth to part with, and Danish Pomerania he did not want. He offered, indeed, to take Oldenburg in pledge, as he already held Delmenhorst, but that was not an offer which the king of Denmark could accept. The new proposals shared the fate of former ones.

When it appeared that an accommodation between Sweden and Russia was probable, and when there was a certain strain in Anglo-French relations, as above said, the prescriptions to De la Marck in Sweden were modified. He was accorded the difficult task of so conducting himself that neither should the king of England have reason to suppose that other interests were being preferred to his nor the other allies of the north that theirs would be sacrificed thereto. He was to temporise ; to endeavour to preserve the confidence of all, and to persuade the king of Sweden that the principal motive of French action was friendship for him. He was to hint at the renewal of the French subsidy treaty, lapsing in April, and to insist upon the harm which a want of understanding with Prussia and Denmark would do to Swedish interests in Germany. During the summer of 1718 all communication with him was interrupted by the Danes stopping the passage of letters. But in October he learnt afresh that the regent would not enter into engagements to King George's prejudice. The scheme, which he recommended, of a quadruple alliance between France, Sweden, Russia, and Prussia was condemned. Although it was thought, he was informed, that a league of the northern Powers, which should keep employed the large forces which the emperor had on foot, would be to the advantage of France and the general good of Europe, yet the king could not enter into engage-

ments which would impose fresh burdens on his people, nor any that were not purely defensive. De la Marck must continue to temporise, limiting himself to expressions of good-will.

There was, of course, good ground for the expectation of an accord between Sweden and Russia, seeing that Peter the Great on September 6 actually signed a form of treaty with Sweden, under which he was to march 80,000 men into Poland to restore Stanislas, while Charles XII. led another large army into Germany. I need not refer further to the Åland conferences, except to recount the dramatic ending of Goertz's work. When Charles had brushed away his edifice of Augus above mentioned he came back to Sweden, and of necessity began to turn to Müllern's plans for a reconciliation with King George through the mediation of the emperor. In November, obliged by the pressing instances of the impatient Russians, he journeyed a fourth time to the Åland Isles, very unwillingly, and mainly with the object of influencing the new negotiation by an apparent resumption of the old. He found pretexts for further delay, and was back in Sweden before the end of the month. Meanwhile Peter had become distrustful, and had made new overtures in England. They were frankly responded to, and it was decided to send Norris to St. Petersburg, 'either,' as Stanhope expressed it, 'to beget a real good understanding between us, which is on this side very sincerely and heartily desired, or, if the Czar means only to amuse the King, whilst he is concerting with other Powers measures pernicious to the King and to the Baltick tranquillity, plainly to discover these things and make it notorious to the world that it doth not lye at our door if there be not a good understanding between us.' Goertz, informed of these overtures, saw that the ground of his policy of playing off England and Russia against each other was cut from under his feet. He decided that peace must be concluded with King George at once, and the Russian negotiation be abandoned. But on the day, December 11, that he wrote to Müllern to that effect Charles XII. was killed. He himself was hurried to prison, and only left it for the scaffold.

George meanwhile, at the same time that he was sending an envoy to St. Petersburg—Captain Jefferyes went in place of Norris, who evaded the mission—was taking measures to strengthen his Continental position against a possible hostile combination of Russia, Sweden, and Prussia. Negotiations with the emperor and the king of Poland resulted in a treaty, nominally defensive, concluded at Vienna between Austria, Hanover, and Saxony on January 5, 1719, before the news of Charles's death arrived there. The three princes agreed to send troops to each other's aid in case their German dominions or the Circles in which they lay were troubled by war, and to exert their remaining strength in making diversions into such countries of the enemy as adjoined their borders. The defence of Hungary and of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with their dependencies was included, but George was not required to send troops into those countries. Augustus obliged himself and the republic of Poland to prevent the passage of troops through that country into the empire or into the lands of the allies, including Hungary. And if the emperor or the king of England were attacked the republic was to make a diversion out of Poland in their favour, or to send troops to their assistance. In the case of a general war in the north the allies were to help each other mutually with their whole strength, until peace was made. In that peace nothing was to be allowed contrary to the object of the treaty. Other Powers, especially German princes and States and the republic of Holland, and by the sixth secret article Denmark, were to be invited to join.

The treaty was clearly aimed in the first place at Russia, and in the second at Prussia, a strange change from the alliance with those Powers in 1715! Its leading objects were to preserve the integrity of Poland as a barrier between Russia and Germany and to prevent combination between Russia and Prussia. The undertaking to make diversions into neighbouring lands of the enemy could, in the case of Hanover, or even of Saxony, only apply to Prussia. Frederick William and his minister Ilgen, when the treaty became

known to them, construed it as directed against their country. In Poland they read Ermeland and Elbing, well known objects of Prussian desire; in the dependencies Courland, the hand of whose duchess had been offered to the markgrave of Brandenburg-Schwedt. To prevent the passage of troops through Poland was to deprive them, they remarked truly, of Russian co-operation.

The English ministers were not informed of the treaty till it had been signed. A declaration attached to it, by which George, as king, undertook to send a British fleet to the defence of Dantzig and Elbing, if they were threatened, caused great difficulty, as it required an English countersignature; and it was never executed. We have here a good instance of the dependence of George I. upon his parliament. Nor did the whole treaty mature. Under the sixth declaration it was to remain in suspense until the republic of Poland acceded to it, and this never took place. But the preliminary signature was as powerful for its purpose as the completion could have been.[1]

The withdrawal of the Russian troops from Poland, which took place early in 1719, was claimed as the first effect of the treaty. Really the request for their withdrawal had been consented to before its signature,[2] the apparent fact being that Peter required all his forces to prosecute the war with Sweden, now that his terms of peace had been rejected. The immediate result was to isolate the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the execution upon whom, specified as the 'exordium' of the new allies, took place in February. The ulterior effect was to strengthen George's position when he came to negotiate with Prussia.

So great was the apprehension in England of the aid which Charles XII. might give to the Spanish invasion, now imminent, that when the news of his death arrived

[1] See on this treaty Droysen, IV. ii. 247 foll., and his essay 'Die Wiener Allianz,' in his *Abhandlungen zur neueren Geschichte*, and Michael, *Hist. Zeitschrift*, LXXVIII. i. 58. Droysen is, as usual, ultra-Prussian.

[2] Daniel Moore from Dresden, January 11, 1719, Record Office, Poland 25.

it was hailed as the intervention of God in favour of a just cause.[1] George found himself now in that position in regard to Sweden which he had expected to occupy upon Charles's submission or death in 1715. Only, instead of being allied, as then, with Prussia and Russia, he was now allied, and closely, with France and Austria. Clearly a stronger situation, both positively and because, in arranging with Sweden, he need not consider Russian interests. The greater the shame that he should proceed to a course of action which, had he been a private person, would have earned for him the epithets of robber and cheat.

But this censure is hardly merited by his action at the earlier date, for reasons previously advanced. Nor, having gained occupation of the duchies, could he well have retired from them while the war went on. To make terms with Charles was impossible. What he might have done after Charles's death was to hold the duchies in mortgage until the sums expended upon them should be repaid. He preferred, in the plenitude of his power, to extort from Sweden's last necessity cessions to Hanover and Prussia, the counter-obligations for which he was unable to perform.

The gain to Hanover from the settlement is clear enough —large extension of territory in the direction most desired, resumption of friendship with Prussia, repression of Denmark. But to the credit of Great Britain there was only the renewal of alliance with exhausted Sweden; on the other side the ledger, open rupture with Russia. Did then, as pamphleteers of a later date protested, Great Britain suffer in the interests of Hanover? George stands accused of embroiling his kingdom, through his greed for Bremen and Verden, with Sweden, with Russia, and with Spain; even the loss of the American colonies sixty years later has been ascribed to this original cause. In regard to Spain it may be allowed that the war followed from the Treaty of Westminster, but hardly that that treaty was made in order to assure to George

[1] Craggs to Stair, December 29, 1718, o.s., Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 30.

imperial confirmation of the duchies; it resulted from larger political needs. As to Sweden, no doubt Great Britain in the years 1716 to 1718 suffered great expense and anxiety from the belief that Charles XII. intended a descent on Scotland in the interest of the Pretender in reprisal for George's attack on him. It was felt that such a measure would be justified. In the Baltic expeditions of those years the duty of protecting trade was made secondary to that of preventing the invasion apprehended. But the earlier cause of action was purely commercial. And the anxiety was unfounded. I can find no proof that Charles ever seriously contemplated a descent upon Great Britain; the evidence is the other way. He was exceedingly embittered, certainly, against the king, but refused to take offence against the kingdom. He had settled his policy before Hanover declared war upon him, and did not swerve from it. And in any case the hostility was short-lived and ended with his death. Then, in the case of Russia, Peter the Great consented to the acquisition of the duchies by Hanover. It is true that in 1719 the cession of them by Sweden was made conditional upon an attack on him, but such an attack had been contemplated in the previous year, and now the opportunity of destroying his fleet was claimed by Stanhope and Sunderland and Craggs as the best service which could be done to Great Britain, not to Hanover. British hostility to Russia arose from fears for the safety of the Baltic commerce, should Peter the Great make himself master of that sea. Apprehensions on this score had grounds in the oppression and extortion practised upon British merchants in Russia, and in the persistent failure to conclude a commercial treaty. I think we may hold that British action in the north in the years 1715 to 1718, while it served the electoral ambitions of the sovereign, was undertaken and pursued in the interests of Great Britain.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ALLIANCE

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THE beginnings of the alliance between England and Portugal are to be sought almost at the beginning of the latter's history as an independent kingdom. Though the distance between these two countries must have seemed greater in the Middle Ages than it does now, they were very soon brought into friendly relationship through the crusading energy of England in the twelfth century, and the convenient position of Portugal as a stopping-place for ships sailing to the Holy Land, which made it possible for the English to help the early Portuguese kings in their long struggle with the Moors.

The history of Portugal may be said to begin in 1095,[1] when Alfonso VI. of Castile, making an effort to resist a revival of the Moorish power, granted the counties of Oporto and Coimbra as a fief to Count Henry of Burgundy, who married his daughter Theresa. In 1140 Count Henry's son Alfonso, who was already famous for his victories over the Moors, assumed the title of King of Portugal, of which title he wrung a grudging acknowledgment from Castile. Henceforth, working south of Coimbra towards the Tagus and Lisbon, he devoted his energies to further conflicts with the Moors, and at length, in March 1147, he took the great city of Santarem, more than halfway between Coimbra and Lisbon.

[1] Morse Stephens, *Portugal*, chaps. ii., iii.

Just at this time extensive preparations were being made in the west of Europe for another crusade against the Saracens in Palestine, and in April 1147 a large fleet of crusaders sailed from England for the Holy Land. Flemish, German, and French companies were on board, but a great part of the expedition was composed of Englishmen. As usual they touched at Oporto for water, and thus it came about that while Alfonso, having taken Santarem, was still in doubt whether or not to go on to Lisbon, he received the welcome news that the Bishop of Oporto had enlisted in his service the whole body of the crusaders, to whom an encounter with the infidel Moors of Spain was highly congenial. As soon as the crusaders could reach him, therefore, Alfonso organised an attack on Lisbon, which city he entered with their help on October 24, 1147, and within a few months the Moors evacuated almost the whole of Portugal north of the Tagus.

The mutual satisfaction resulting from a favour given and received led to Alfonso's remaining on friendly terms with England, as also with Flanders, during the rest of his reign. He appointed an Englishman, Gilbert of Hastings, as the first Bishop of Lisbon, who spent some time in England trying to raise recruits for Alfonso's never-ending wars with the Moors. Though his efforts met with small success, there was no lack of friendliness towards Portugal on the part of the king of England, for when in 1184 Alfonso was induced to marry his daughter to Count Philip of Flanders she was met at Rochelle by special ambassadors[1] from Henry II., who treated her with all honour and provided her with necessaries for the rest of her journey.

In 1185 Alfonso was succeeded by his son Sancho, a king of a different stamp, under whom at first the new kingdom enjoyed a badly needed rest. It so happened, however, that a fresh incursion of the Moors in 1188 was followed very closely by the news of the coming of a new crusading fleet, which offered an irresistible temptation. Dutch Frisian,

[1] Ralph de Diceto (Rolls Series), ii. 28, 29.

Danish, and French crusaders arrived by degrees at Lisbon and were stopped as they came by Sancho. Finally a fleet of Londoners put in for water, and with all these reinforcements Sancho was able to subdue the greater part of the district south of the Tagus, even going so far as to besiege Silves, capital of the little kingdom of Algarves in the south. This city surrendered [1] in September 1189, but the English were again of use in a short time, to foil an attempt on the part of the Moors to reconquer it.

As soon as the crusaders had left Portugal Sancho made a treaty with the Moors, and during the remainder of his reign he tried to improve the position at home and abroad of his little kingdom, in which he succeeded so well that his sons and daughters married into some of the most important families in the west of Europe. Among others King John of England sent an embassy in 1199 to ask for the hand of one of the Portuguese princesses; Sancho refused the request, but already in an English despatch of the same year the king of Portugal appears as 'dearest brother and friend' of the English king,[2] and one of Sancho's sons, who married Joanna Countess of Flanders, led the Flemish troops in alliance with England at the Battle of Bouvines, 1214. Yet another fleet of crusaders arrived at Lisbon in July 1217, during the reign of Sancho's successor, Alfonso II. (1211–1223). By the exertions of the Bishop of Lisbon the English contingent was persuaded to remain for a short time, while an attempt was made once more to subdue the district south of the Tagus.[3]

The crusades, then, brought the English to Portugal on several notable occasions; it was for purposes of commerce, on the other hand, that the Portuguese first came to England. The Patent Rolls for the early years of John's reign contain grants [4] which show that the merchants of Portugal were well known in England at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and there is evidence which shows that by that time

[1] Hoveden, *Chronica* (Rolls Series), iii. 18, 43.
[2] Rymer (Hague ed.), I. i. 36. [3] Morse Stephens, *Portugal*, p. 72.
[4] *Rot. Litt. Pat.* (ed. Hardy), 1201–16, pp. 20, 44.

they had already begun to settle in English towns. A list of the inhabitants of Dublin, supposed to belong to the end of the twelfth century, contains the name of a native of Portugal[1] already established in that important centre of trade; while in 1220 a certain Bartholomew of Portugal is mentioned as one of four citizens of London trading together.[2] This evidence is borne out by two further entries,[3] in the Patent Roll for 1226, granting a year's safe-conduct respectively to forty-two and to sixty-three Portuguese merchants, with permission for them to come to England with their goods and merchandise, to sojourn there unmolested, and to depart again in safety, paying only the right and due customs.

Considering the distressed condition of Portugal at this time, the vines and olive-trees having in many cases been destroyed by the Moors, and the country-side laid waste, this early activity on the part of her merchants is the more remarkable, and it would be interesting to know what commodities they could find to export. Probably these would be confined to wax, of which large quantities came to England from Portugal during the whole mediæval period, and different kinds of skins, of animals which required little care. Certainly the Portuguese merchants were already in many cases wealthy and important. When they came to his dominions in Gascony, probably in quest of wine, Henry III. of England was glad to deal with them himself, and did not hesitate to borrow large sums of money from them on occasion.[4] A curious law of Alfonso III. of Portugal, dated 1252, which assigns a price to every kind of merchandise sold in that country, mentions among the small number of foreign products several articles of London make and a certain English cloth, showing that the Portuguese came to England not only to sell but also to buy.[5]

[1] Cal. Hist. Doc. Ireland (Rolls Series), p. 3.
[2] *Rot. Litt. Claus.* i. 419.
[3] Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1225–32, pp. 42, 52.
[4] F. Michel, *Commerce et Navigation à Bordeaux*, i. 155.
[5] J. F. Ribeiro, *Dissertaçoes Chronologicas*, iii. 59–72.

The English were glad to see them on either account, for they were not yet at all fond of the sea themselves, and still looked upon foreign merchants as convenient people, who relieved them from all the risks of sea-going commerce, while at the same time bringing them all its advantages in the shape of foreign goods for themselves and a foreign market for their wares. To encourage the Portuguese merchants to continue their visits, which became every year more important as the economic condition of Portugal improved, Henry III. in 1258 issued fresh letters patent[1] of safe-conduct and protection: this time not only for the small number mentioned as before by name, but also for all other merchants belonging to the king of Portugal and coming to England with their merchandise, as long as peace should be maintained between the king of England and the said king of Portugal. Almost immediately after this, two Portuguese merchants received another sign of royal favour, in the payment of the remainder of a sum of 67 marks 3*s.* 10*d.* owing to them for 3535 lbs. of wax bought from them by the king of England for his own use.[2]

In 1279 Alfonso III. was succeeded by his son Diniz, whose accession seems to mark a general awakening of the national faculties of the Portuguese. The independence of their nation was no longer threatened either by the Moors or by their Spanish neighbours, who had at length accepted Portugal as a new and separate kingdom. Diniz and his people could therefore turn their attention to the internal development of the country, and the results of this activity were soon seen in every direction. Diniz saw at once the importance of seafaring for Portugal, and its favourable position for trade with foreign countries; he sought to attract a larger population to the coast, and to this end improved several of the ports, while the fleet received his special attention. Under such circumstances foreign trade began to develop rapidly. An ordinance of 1293,[3] as to the dues to be

[1] Patent Roll, 42 Henry III., m. 13. [2] *Ibid.* m. 3.
[3] Ribeiro, *Dissert. Chron.* iii. 170.

paid by ships laden in Portuguese ports, shows that England, Flanders, Normandy, and Brittany were the foreign countries most frequented by the Portuguese merchants at this time. It seems likely that they generally made a round, exchanging Portuguese products in England for wool, which they then carried to Flanders for an exchange in cloth, which would be of far greater use in Portugal.

Diniz was fully aware of the importance for his merchants of keeping on good terms with England, and the first two Edwards both received several letters from him, all worded in the most friendly way. Unfortunately for his amicable intentions, the ports of Portugal at this time harboured an inordinate number of pirates; hence foreign ships carrying valuable cargoes were liable to attack and spoliation in Portuguese waters, and though this did not greatly concern the English merchants, who were hardly yet embarking in foreign commerce, there were other subjects of Edward I., the natives of Bayonne and Bordeaux in Gascony, who already carried on an active trade with Portugal, and who suffered great inconvenience from the Portuguese pirates. According to the custom of the times, they retaliated upon the Portuguese merchants wherever they were to be found, and after much annoyance given and received matters came to a crisis in 1293, when the peace between Portugal and the English possessions in France seems to have been seriously endangered.

Considering the number of wars which have been brought about in modern times by trade disputes, it stands to the honour of Diniz and Edward in the thirteenth century that war was in this case averted by referring the matter to arbitration. Two commissioners on each side received full powers to inquire into the alleged robberies and acts of violence, and to award due compensation as might seem to them just. If the four could not agree a fifth arbitrator was to be chosen, of acknowledged impartiality, and the decision of the majority was to be binding.[1]

[1] Rymer, I. iii. 128.

As the discussion was expected to prove a long one, the kings of England and Portugal issued new safe-conducts for each other's subjects (April 1294); and in due course two ambassadors arrived in England from Portugal to act on behalf of King Diniz, and the merchants and citizens of Lisbon. As soon as the matter was happily settled, Edward wrote to Diniz announcing the result, and at the same time he sent a letter [1] to his subjects in Bayonne, acquainting them with the new form of peace and concord with Portugal, and begging them to observe it strictly.

It was nearly two hundred years before any other serious dispute arose between England and Portugal, and these two countries from this time onwards became firm allies, while the friendly accord of 1294 was soon made the basis of more important agreements. Edward and Diniz from time to time renewed the safe-conducts then issued, and there are many indications of Portuguese merchants trading peacefully in England, and of Edward's Gascon subjects profiting by the peace to renew their trade with Lisbon and Oporto. Diniz seems to have placed unbounded faith in Edward I.; he wrote to him several times on commercial matters, and just before his death the English king received a last proof of his friendship in a letter stating that, entirely through the great affection he had for Edward and his people, Diniz had taken charge of a ship rescued by his subjects from certain pirates, under the belief that it belonged to England, and was now waiting for its English owners to come and claim it.[2] This letter was accompanied by one of friendly purport to the Prince of Wales, and the death of Edward I. made no difference in the relations existing between England and Portugal. In July 1308, Diniz wrote Edward II. a long and important letter, incidentally noticing, with much satisfaction, the peace and friendliness which had already long existed between the subjects of their two realms.[3] Edward replied in terms equally friendly, and expressed a hope that this

[1] Miscell. Rolls (Chancery), Bdle. 14, No. 8.

[2] *Anc. Corresp.* xx. 19.

[3] *Ibid.* xxxiv. 160.

concord now so happily existing might remain ever unaltered.[1]

In the history of the relations between England and Portugal, it is an important point that during the years when Portugal was rising so greatly in her own estimation and in that of the world she should have been governed by a man as anxious as Diniz was to improve the friendship with England. The time had not yet come for the system of more or less permanent alliances which before the end of the century united England, Portugal, and Flanders, against France, Castile, and Scotland, but in his policy towards England Diniz took one of the first steps in this direction, and his example was followed more or less closely by each one of his successors in turn. Alfonso IV., who became king in 1325, went further even than Diniz, and sent ambassadors [2] to England to arrange a marriage between his daughter and the Prince of Wales. But symptoms of the confusion in which Edward's reign was to end were already apparent ; the envoys were sent back with a message that they were not of high enough rank, and though Alfonso then sent the admiral himself, Manuel de Pessaigne, he met with little better success. This time a very polite explanation was sent, to the effect that, desirable as was the Portuguese marriage, it was unfortunately out of the question just now.[3]

Edward III. thus missed the chance of a Portuguese wife, but he showed from the beginning an unmistakeable desire to keep up the connection already established, and during his reign England entered for the first time into formal alliance with Portugal. One reason for his policy in this respect was doubtless the importance to England of the Portuguese commerce, which was by this time in a flourishing condition. The visits of the Portuguese merchants not only supplied England now with a large number of valuable commodities, such as wax, fruit, leather, salt, and cork, but in addition they helped considerably to swell the royal revenue by the customs

[1] Rymer, I. iv. 129.
[2] *Ibid.* II. ii. 138.
[3] *Ibid.* II. ii. 155.

paid on these goods at the English ports. Though, in spite of his wishes, it was not alway possible to secure the safety and well-being of Portuguese merchants in England, yet after many trials they recognised a staunch friend in the English king, who honestly exerted himself on their behalf and at one time issued a series of five proclamations[1] in less than six weeks in favour of the merchants of Portugal, Spain, and other friendly lands, insisting that all wrongly forfeited goods belonging to them should be restored, and that all needful steps should be taken to prevent further molestation of these merchants.

Important as were commercial considerations in Edward III.'s eyes, he had yet another reason for keeping on good terms with Portugal at this time. He was just embarking on a long and hard struggle with France, and it behoved him to attach as many as possible of the smaller states to the English interests, not only to prevent their allying with the enemy, but also to allow of his borrowing from them, if need arose, ships and men to fight in his battles. After the first few years of the Hundred Years' War, Edward seems to have made up his mind that circumstances required something more than an indefinite friendship with the peninsular kingdoms, for in 1344 two ambassadors were sent with powers[2] to treat of alliances with Portugal and also with Castile and Aragon. Late in the following year ambassadors were again sent 'on secret business' to Spain and Portugal with a letter[3] to Alfonso IV., in which Edward expressed himself most desirous of an alliance with Portugal, for which purpose he proposed a marriage between his son, Edward, or any of his other sons, and one of the daughters of Alfonso, promising to agree to whatever should be settled as to the dowry and other necessary matters. Alfonso was evidently not averse to the proposition, for in March 1346 Edward wrote again, and at the same time took pains to show his

[1] Cal. Close Rolls, 1337–39, pp. 229, 303. Brit. Mus. Bibl. Harl. 6702, f. 162.

[2] Rymer, II. iv. 161.

[3] *Ibid.* iv. 188.

consideration for fresh wrongs suffered by Portuguese merchants at the hands of his subjects.[1] The negotiations dragged on till 1347; eventually the marriage was agreed upon, and the English ambassadors arrived in Portugal to fix the day, and superintend the departure of the Infanta, when to their amazement they were informed that, after all these discussions, the wedding would not take place. Alfonso's daughter married King Pedro of Aragon, and the discomfited English king could only protest that the failure of the scheme was in no way his doing.

But Edward's consistent protection of Portuguese merchants and their trade, which had failed to move Alfonso, now bore fruit in another quarter. It would seem as though the merchants of Lisbon and Oporto, disappointed that the expected alliance between England and Portugal should have come to nothing, determined to take the matter into their own hands, and to secure for themselves, at any rate, a satisfactory arrangement with the king of England.

In July 1352, two Portuguese merchants came to England with letters from Alfonso IV., containing a general safe-conduct for all Edward's subjects, coming to Portugal by land or sea, and asking for a similar grant for Portuguese subjects in England. But, more than this, the two merchants informed Edward that certain envoys of the king of Portugal were coming to England about Christmas time, with full power for carrying through a treaty of closer mutual friendship between the two royal houses.[2] Edward gladly issued special letters of protection for these envoys, but when they eventually came, it was found that the king of Portugal had no hand in the matter; the envoys, in fact, had their powers, not from him, but from the merchants, mariners, and commonalties of the Portuguese sea-coast, and the cities of Lisbon and Oporto.

The Portuguese merchants had not miscalculated; Edward would probably have preferred a political alliance with Alfonso himself, but, failing this, he was very willing to treat

[1] Gascon Roll, 20 Edward III., m. 2.

[2] Rymer, III. i. 79.

on commercial matters only with his enterprising subjects. Thus came about the interesting commercial treaty of 1353,[1] signed by the king of England on behalf of his people, and Alfonso Martin Alho on behalf of the merchants of Lisbon and Oporto. The articles fall into two groups: those concerned with securing the merchants belonging to either party from any kind of injury at the hands of the other party, and those dealing with disputed ownership in the case of goods captured in sieges or other hostile encounters. The treaty was to hold good for fifty years, and among Edward's subjects are included the natives of England, Gascony, Ireland and Wales. Though Alfonso had held aloof from the negotiations, he evidently accepted the treaty with a very good grace, for shortly afterwards he used it as his authority in asking for the restoration of some Portuguese merchandise which had come into English hands.[2]

In 1357 Alfonso was succeeded by his son Pedro, in whose reign began the civil war in Castile, during which England and Portugal became firmly allied in common enmity against France and Castile. Pedro reigned only ten years, and in 1367 his son Fernando came to the throne. Under the new king's capricious rule, Portugal became hopelessly involved in the Castilian struggle. On the death of Pedro the Cruel, of Castile, in 1369, his rival was proclaimed king as Henry II. and Fernando set himself to oppose him. But in a short time, finding that the French meant to support Henry II., and remembering that the Black Prince had led his English adherents to the help of Pedro the Cruel, Fernando turned to the English for assistance. The Black Prince had lately returned to England in broken health, but it happened that his brother, John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, had claims of his own to Castile through his wife,[3] so he willingly sent ambassadors to adjust an alliance with the king of Portugal; and having made sure of this friend at court, Fernando then

[1] Rymer, III. i. 88. [2] *Ibid.* III. i. 138.
[3] Constance, daughter of Pedro the Cruel.

sent ambassadors to Edward III. himself, with full powers to treat of an alliance and confederation between England and Portugal.

The proposal came at a fortunate moment for Fernando. The war between England and France had lately been going very much against England, so the idea of an alliance with any other foreign power was not to be despised; and as France was supporting Henry II., an alliance with Portugal against the king of Castile seemed an effectual way of embarrassing the French. Moreover, Edward had already been glad to hire the assistance of Portuguese men and ships in the summer of 1372, when the French were besieging Thouars in Poitou, and he no doubt foresaw future occasions when Portguese help might prove useful. Thus the two Portuguese ambassadors easily persuaded Edward III. to listen to the advice of John of Gaunt, and sign this the first political alliance between England and Portugal, on June 16, 1373.[1] Both kings undertook in the most solemn terms to assist each other against all enemies whatsoever, and to make no alliances without each other's knowledge; but, inconstant as ever, the next year Fernando was hand-and-glove once more with the king of Castile, to whom in 1379 he even lent five galleys to help France against England.

Before the galleys had sailed, however, Fernando received news of the death of Henry of Castile, whereupon he recalled his ships and took steps for a renewal of the alliance with England, in the hope of a successful invasion of Castile. Fernando promised that if the Earl of Cambridge, one of the sons of Edward III., would come to Portugal with 1000 men-at-arms and 1000 archers, he would help him to wage war against Castile in favour of John of Gaunt and his wife, the daughter of Pedro the Cruel; also, if the earl would bring with him his eldest son, Fernando would marry him to Beatrice his daughter, heiress to the kingdom of Portugal.[2]

[1] Rymer, III. iii. 8.

[2] *Ibid.* III. iii. 103.

Fernando had already given proofs of his uncertain character, and such fair promises should have roused the suspicions of the English king, but Richard II., who had succeeded his grandfather in 1377, was young and inclined to listen to the advice of his uncle, John of Gaunt, who had already set his heart on the crown of Castile. The result was the departure in 1381 of a preliminary expedition under the Earl of Cambridge, who arrived in Lisbon in July, and whose son was immediately betrothed to Fernando's daughter, Beatrice; while John of Gaunt used his utmost powers of persuasion with the English Parliament to induce them to supply him with men and money for his own departure to Portugal.

But by the time they had reluctantly consented, Fernando, taking advantage of the effect produced on Castile by the arrival of the Earl of Cambridge, had already come to terms with the new king, Juan, whereupon the amazed English troops were sent home again without striking a blow, Castile even supplying the necessary transport ships to hasten their going.[1] Fernando refused to let his daughter cross the sea with her betrothed husband, and as the Earl of Cambridge, rightly suspecting treachery, refused to leave his son behind in Portugal, the match was broken off and Beatrice eventually married the king of Castile, who was solemnly recognised as heir to the Portuguese throne.[2]

John of Gaunt bore his disappointment as best he could, and waited for a new opportunity to make good his claim to Castile. In October 1383 Fernando died, and his widow, Leonora, immediately assumed the regency for her daughter Beatrice and Juan, king of Castile. It had apparently not occurred to Juan or Fernando that the Portuguese nation would not watch quietly while the country, after its long fight for independence, passed under the rule of a Castilian, but no sooner was Fernando dead than fearful disorder

[1] Walsingham, *Hist. Angl.* (Rolls Series), p. 83.

[2] For the expedition of the Earl of Cambridge and the events leading up to the Treaty of Windsor, see S. Armitage Smith, *John of Gaunt*, chap. xii.

arose in Lisbon and other important cities; Leonora was forced to retire to Alemquer, and the people sought about for a man to lead them against Juan when he should enter Portugal. They turned at length to João, Master of the Order of Aviz, and half-brother of Fernando, who had won their respect and incurred the bitter hatred of Leonora by his determined opposition to her schemes. He was on the point of escaping to England in fear for his life,[1] but after much persuasion he consented to remain in Portugal, and was induced by the envoys of the people to assume the regency instead of Leonora, who fled to Santarem. The popular and nationalist party, henceforth under João's leadership, was gradually reinforced by many of the chief Portuguese nobles, including the Constable of Portugal; and in the spring of 1384 João took up arms against the invading army of Castile.

The Portuguese people had chosen well in taking as their leader the Master of Aviz: a comparatively young man, he had in him all the makings of a great ruler, and it is due in no small degree to his guidance during this crisis that the independence of Portugal was preserved for future achievements of which any nation might well be proud. But his party, however ardent, were few in number as compared with Juan's advancing army, and João debated with his council as to means for increasing his strength by help from abroad. England was obviously the first country to which appeal should be made, as the traditional friend of Portugal and the enemy of Castile and France; but an alliance with England after Fernando's behaviour, and under the present circumstances, was more than João could allow himself to hope for, so the result of the deliberations was that two envoys were sent to Richard II. to ask only for permission for his subjects to come as hired volunteers to help João against Castile.[2] The envoys promised that when by this means Portugal should be out of danger, all the help afforded by the English, in ships as in men, should be willingly paid

[1] F. Lopes, *Chron. João I.* cap. 18–23. [2] *Ibid.* cap. 48.

back, and that then if the Duke of Lancaster cared to urge his claim to Castile, all Portugal would help him to do so.

When the necessary consent was given numbers of English subjects came forward as volunteers from all parts of the country.[1] In addition, many of the London merchants showed their approval of the cause by advancing large sums of money[2] to pay the wages of the volunteers, and the rest was made up by the seizure of all Portuguese ships and merchandise found in English ports.[3] A great deal of time was lost making arrangements for the departure of the English volunteers, and meanwhile João used every effort to strengthen himself. The city of Lisbon gave him constant support, but was besieged by Castile, and soon reduced to terrible straits; at the critical moment, however, plague broke out among the besiegers, and the king of Castile was forced to retire. Many other Portuguese towns by degrees declared for João, and the encouraging news which arrived from England helped to cheer his faithful adherents.

But to their dismay, in the early months of 1385, they learnt that Juan was collecting a large number of ships and stores for a fresh attack upon Lisbon, and to confirm these tidings ten Castilian galleys took up a position outside Lisbon harbour to waylay all vessels bound thither with provisions. Things were at their very worst, when on Easter Sunday, April 2, the anxious citizens of Lisbon suddenly sighted two English ships, which were bringing corn and men-at-arms to their assistance. In painful excitement they watched while a sharp encounter with the ten Castilian galleys took place, in which the latter were fortunately driven off, and the English came safely into harbour. They had on board 200 lances and 200 archers, also 400 measures of wheat, and flour and bacon; and they brought news of other English ships which had put in at Setubal and Oporto.[4]

[1] Rymer, III. iii. 175, 176.
[2] Lopes, cap. 48; Diplomatic Document 1279, at the Public Record Office.
[3] Rymer, III. iii. 177.
[4] Lopes, *João I.*, Part II. cap. 4 etc.

With the coming of the English the tide had turned, and for João the worst was well over. Three days later he accepted the title of King of Portugal, and on April 15 he sent royal authority to his ambassadors in England, to negotiate a treaty of peace and confederation with Richard II., and to make a special arrangement with John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, and 'King of Castile.' Meanwhile the Castilian army once more invaded Portugal, but the arrival of the English archers put fresh heart into the Portuguese, who won a decisive victory over the enemy at Aljubarrota in August, 1385. As soon as the good news reached England, John of Gaunt sent word to João that he was now quite determined to go to Castile and make good his rights there, if only Portugal would supply him with ships for the purpose; and meanwhile negotiations for the proposed alliance between England and Portugal went actively forward, till on May 9, 1386, the Treaty of Windsor was signed.[1]

The provisions include a perpetual league between the two countries, so that one shall be obliged to assist the other against all enemies; a lasting safe-conduct for all prelates, dukes, barons, knights, merchants, and other subjects of one of the contracting parties coming and going, for commercial or other purposes, in the dominions of the other; a solemn undertaking by each king to repudiate the enemies of the other sovereign; and a stipulation that all future kings shall confirm the alliance within a year from their coronation. A convention was signed on the same day whereby the king of Portugal promised to lend Richard ten galleys for six months, or longer if necessary, as part of the promised help to John of Gaunt.[2]

Richard II. was glad enough to help John of Gaunt in his preparations for the journey; his uncle was an element of unrest at home, but on the throne of Castile he would be a useful ally against France; even if he failed, the expedition was not costing England a great deal, and he would, at any rate, be safely out of the country for some time. So at length

[1] Rymer, III. iii. 200. [2] *Ibid.* iii. 203.

John of Gaunt arrived in Portugal and had his first interview with João, with whom he made a formal compact, offering him as wife his daughter Catherine, who would inherit the claim to Castile. João, however, wisely put aside the claim to Castile, choosing as his wife instead Philippa, daughter of John of Gaunt by his first wife, Blanche of Lancaster, and the marriage was celebrated with all possible ceremony in February 1387.

But, after all, the long-planned joint invasion of Castile by the Duke of Lancaster and the king of Portugal failed hopelessly.[1] As in 1383 the Portuguese had fought for their independence against Castile, so now in 1387, the Castilians rose indignantly against the ruler whom the Portuguese wished to thrust upon them, and after a short struggle the invaders returned to Portugal, where John of Gaunt came to terms with the king of Castile. His daughter Catherine married her second cousin, the Infant Henry of Castile, and shortly afterwards the Duke of Lancaster went back to England, while a momentary truce was concluded between Castile and Portugal.

This was the end of John of Gaunt's long cherished hopes for the possession of Castile; but, in spite of the poor result of the joint undertaking, the events of the last few years had drawn England and Portugal together as nothing else could have done. The king of England had recognised João's position in Portugal when his fortunes were almost at their lowest; English support had helped him to secure his kingdom, and in the eyes of the world as well as in those of the two countries concerned the alliance between England and Portugal was henceforth an established thing. In May 1389, a truce was concluded between Richard II. and Charles VI. of France, in which Portugal was included as an ally of England;[2] and six months later England entered as an ally of Portugal into a new truce concluded by that country with Castile. Moreover, when in 1397 João's crown was in danger owing to an insurrection in Portugal it was to

[1] Armitage-Smith, *John of Gaunt*, chap. xiii.

[2] Morse Stephens, *Portugal*, p. 117.

England that he sent for archers and men-at-arms to increase his strength, exporting at the same time 500 lances with which to arm his own soldiers.[1]

With the accession in England of Henry IV., the son of John of Gaunt and therefore the brother-in-law of the king of Portugal, there was naturally a great increase of this friendship between the two countries whose sovereigns were now so closely related. As soon as possible Henry renewed and confirmed the treaty of 1386, and at the same time sent João his formal consent for England to be included as an ally in a fresh truce with Castile made in 1400.[2] In 1405 he gave a similar permission, and in this year the bond between the two courts was strengthened by the marriage of João's natural daughter, Beatrice, to Thomas Earl of Arundel, one of the foremost English nobles at this time.[3]

As soon as Henry V. came to the throne his uncle the king of Portugal sent one of his favourite ministers to England to treat of the confirmation of the alliance of 1386, and during the following years the two countries were able to be of great assistance to each other. Henry IV. and his brother-in-law João were both peacefully inclined, but their sons in each case no sooner grew to manhood than they showed an inveterate taste for warlike excitement. Thus Henry V. very soon after his accession renewed the old war with France, which had languished since the death of Edward III.; while João and his sons undertook an attack on Portugal's old enemy, the Moorish power. An expedition to Ceuta in North Africa was accordingly planned, for the equipment of which João sent to England again for lances and other kinds of armour. Henry not only allowed him to export these custom free, but in spite of the French war sent a fleet of well-armed ships to help him against the infidel.[4] In return for this João supported Henry valiantly against

[1] Rymer, III. iv. 141, 145.

[2] *Ibid.* IV. i. 64.

[3] An account of the marriage is contained in the Transcripts from Foreign Records (at the Public Record Office), Series II. No. 153.

[4] Mathew de Pisano, *Guerra da Ceuta*, i. 35.

France; Portuguese cross-bowmen fought in the English army, and in 1435 a Portuguese envoy attended the Congress of Arras.[1]

More interesting than this is the assistance given by his cousins of England to the famous Prince Henry the Navigator, third son of João and Philippa, and therefore grandson of our John of Gaunt. It would be difficult to overrate the value of the life-work of this prince, who after the capture of Ceuta in 1415 gave himself up entirely to the direction of voyages of exploration, and prepared the way for the great discoveries of the end of the century by breaking down the veil of terror and superstition through which mediaeval civilisation looked at the unknown parts of the world. Thus when Prince Henry's sailors had shown that Europeans could live in the torrid zone without immediately turning black the first great step was taken towards the discovery of the sea route to India, which so greatly altered the aspect of the commercial world. We may be proud to know that Henry V. of England had the opportunity of helping his illustrious cousin by allowing him to receive custom free supplies of lances, staves, horses and other goods to be used from time to time in his enterprises.[2] In the words of the chronicler 'the valour of the English acclaimed the Infant's work,' and one of our kings—probably Henry VI.—when informed of his great virtues, begged him to be captain of his armies;[3] but, fortunately for Portugal and for Europe, the invitation was declined.

The treaty of 1386 was confirmed by João's successor, Duarte, and after his premature death in 1438 it was again confirmed, in the name of his infant son, by the regent Don Pedro.[4] Soon after the young king, Alfonso V., had attained his majority the House of Lancaster was overthrown in England, but in spite of his near relationship to Henry VI.

[1] Waurin, *Chroniques de la Grant Bretagne* (Rolls Series), iii. 371, 385; iv. 78.
[2] Rymer, IV. iii. 5.
[3] Azurara, *Conquest of Guinea* (ed. Beazley and Prestage), ii. 236.
[4] Rymer, V. i. 13, 65.

Alfonso willingly recognised Edward IV. as king of England, and the change of rulers made no change in the relations between the English and Portuguese kingdoms. At one point, indeed, the disturbed condition of England very nearly led to a breach of the long peace. The Earl of Warwick, acting for Henry VI., had ordered his captain, Fauconberg, to plunder any vessels he could seize near the English coast, especially those from Flanders, because of the help given to Edward IV. by the Duke of Burgundy. Fauconberg happened to seize twelve large Portuguese ships, returning with rich cargoes from Flanders, which so enraged Alfonso that he meditated the instant despatch against England of an Armada prepared for Africa. But when all was ready he received news of the deaths of the Earl and Henry VI., and was induced to content himself with sending an embassy to the new English king for compensation.[1] When this had been obtained, peace was re-established between the two countries, and in 1475 Portugal appears once more in a treaty as an ally of England.[2]

This close political union between England and Portugal seems to have had important effects on the commercial relations of the two countries. Even before João's accession many English ships sailed each year between Lisbon and the west of England, but after the Treaty of Windsor this trade increased enormously. It was part of João's policy to encourage the visits of the English merchants, who were now beginning to take over their cloth to the foreign markets themselves; he protected them and gave them equal privileges with the Genoese and Pisantine traders,[3] hitherto the most favoured nations, while the great advance of the Portuguese in prosperity after his accession gave an extra inducement in the shape of increased profits. As Portugal gave herself up more and more to the cultivation of the vine she began to import large quantities of English corn, wheat

[1] Ruy de Pina, *Chron. Alf. V.* cap. 162.
[2] Santarem, *Quadro Elementar das Relações* &c., iii. 125.
[3] Transcpts. For. Records. Series II. No. 154.

and barley, which with the different kinds of cloth, and armour, tin, lead, and pewter, formed the cargoes of most of the ships laden in English ports for Portugal. The list of commodities coming to England from Portugal is a large one, including at the beginning of the fifteenth century, besides wine, several kinds of fruit, honey, wax, oil, salt, sugar, cork, and grain ; and as the Portuguese mariners sailed far and wide, following the instructions of Prince Henry the Navigator, it was gradually increased by the addition of various spices, soap, alum and other articles not of Portuguese production.

João's successors showed equal favour to the merchants of England,[1] some of whom began to keep their agents permanently in Lisbon, and before the end of the fifteenth century many English merchants seem to have been established there. They had their own chapel,[2] a chosen Portuguese procurator to watch over their mercantile rights,[3] and a number of special privileges with regard to their taxation and the carrying on of their trade. The merchants of Portugal at the same time frequently came to England, and the writer of the 'Libelle of English Policie,' has graphically described the flourishing condition of their trade, which he attributes to the firm alliance existing between England and Portugal.[4]

It is difficult to discover whether many of these Portuguese merchants settled in England, though there are several instances during the fifteenth century of natives of Portugal living in London and other parts of the country. Just as the marriage of John of Gaunt's daughter Philippa to João brought over to Portugal a number of English men and women who married into Portuguese families, so the marriage of Beatrice, daughter of João, to the Earl of Arundel, led many Portuguese subjects to settle in and about her English estates.

[1] *Ibid.* See also Schanz, *Englische Handelspolitik*, ii. 497–524.

[2] Transcpts. For. Rec. Series II. No. 154. Mentioned in a grant dated 5th Dec. 1471.

[3] *Ibid.* No. 153. Grant dated 30th May, 1439.

[4] Wright, *Political Songs* (Rolls Series), ii. 162.

This marriage was specially arranged by Philippa, who used all her influence successfully to bring about a great increase of the existing cordiality in the social relations of the two courts. During her lifetime, French, as the language of the English court, began to be spoken by the courtiers of João, who also adopted from England the French dress, French customs, and French devices or mottoes.[1] Philippa's husband was the first foreign sovereign to be made a Knight of the Garter[2] in England, but three of her sons, and afterwards each king of Portugal in succession received this honour. Her children were given alternately English and Portuguese names, and as the young princes grew up they discarded the Portuguese title of 'Infanto' for the English 'Duke.'

Henry IV. took a great interest in his Portuguese nephews and nieces, of whose welfare he was from time to time informed by his sister, and during the reign of their cousin, Henry VI., two of them came to England for a short time. Prince Pedro, Duke of Coimbra, and afterwards regent for Alfonso V., came in 1424[3] and received as a present from the king of England two very costly gold cups; while his sister Isabel came on her way to Flanders in 1429 to marry the Duke of Burgundy. This princess kept up her friendship with England,[4] and in the name of her husband negotiated many commercial agreements between that country and Flanders. When her brother Pedro was killed in Portugal at the disastrous battle of Alfarrobeira, she took under her protection his two young sons, James and John, and it was upon the kindness of her English cousin Henry VI. that she relied for the patronage necessary to start them in life.

It has been already mentioned that the deposition of Henry VI. caused no slackening of the bonds of union between the two countries, and when Alfonso V. was succeeded

[1] F. da Fonseca Benevides, *Rainhas de Portugal*, p. 247.

[2] Beltz, *Memorials of the Garter*, liv.

[3] Mon. Franciscana (Rolls Series), ii. 68. See also Devon, *Issue Roll of the Exchequer*, p. 394.

[4] Rymer, IV. iv. 151; V. ii. 30, 40.

by his son João II., Edward IV. received the ambassadors of the new king of Portugal with all possible honour. The treaty of 1386 was confirmed once more, and Edward won João's heart by recognising his claim to the sole lordship of Guinea, the new Portuguese land on the West Coast of Africa, and forbidding for the future all private trading expeditions thither on the part of English merchants.[1] Some years later it happened that Edward's brother-in-law, Lord Scales, came to Portugal with a large retinue, on his way to fight the infidels in Spain; when João, glad of the opportunity to show his friendship for England, loaded him with honours and kept him at his side for a month, quartering his English followers in the houses of the highest Portuguese families and fitting out for his homeward journey a ship richly laden with everything he could possibly require.[2] On the death of Edward IV., João transferred his friendship to Richard III.; as soon as possible he confirmed the Treaty of Windsor, now almost a hundred years old, and proposed that his only sister, Joanna, should marry the English king, a proposal, however, to which the Portuguese princess could not bring herself to agree.

It was probably João's known devotion to the interests of the House of York which in 1492 led Margaret Duchess of Burgundy to send Perkin Warbeck to Portugal[3] before his attempt in Ireland; but, though the Portuguese monarch received him, he was too wise to give him any support against Henry VII. The latter, soon after his accession, had sent ambassadors to Portugal, informing João of his reception into the Order of the Garter,[4] an honour he had not obtained from Edward IV. or Richard III., and João willingly confirmed the old alliance with the new Tudor sovereign.

This was almost the last occasion on which the Treaty of Windsor was confirmed, but there is no reason to suppose

[1] Garcia de Resende, *Chron. João II.* cap. 33.

[2] Ruy de Pina, *Chron. João II.* cap. 21.

[3] Bacon, *Life of Henry VII.* p. 108 (Pitt Press).

[4] Journal of Roger Machado in Bern. Andrea's *Life of Henry VII.* (ed. Gairdner), p. 157 &c. See also Rymer, V. iii. 194, iv. 4, 5.

that the friendship between England and Portugal suffered on that account. It has been claimed that Portugal was England's first foreign ally, and it would be difficult to name an alliance which, beginning so early and lasting so long, was marked with greater cordiality throughout, and survived political changes of greater importance. As the years passed by, Portugal had grown from a small duchy, dependent on Castile, to an important European power, with the foundations of a great colonial empire; while in England the century following the Treaty of Windsor, saw no less than four different royal Houses in possession of the throne: but the traditional friendship of the two nations still remained, and the sense of mutual advantage resulting from their close intercourse bound England and Portugal together till the transformation of the mediæval world swept away all landmarks and replaced the old convenient system of lasting alliances by the modern theory of the balance of power.

THE STUDY OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY HISTORY

By PERCY ASHLEY, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.

Read January 18, 1906

I.

In an Annual Address delivered two years ago the late President of this Society took occasion to lament the neglect in Great Britain of the serious and scientific study of the history of Europe since the close of the Napoleonic wars ;[1] and unfortunately there cannot be any doubt as to the full justice of his complaint. It applies in some measure to the history of our own country, but it is especially true of the development of the States of Continental Europe. To this neglect many facts bear witness. There is first the paucity of textbooks ; we have as yet in English no good general history of the period, or even of a part of it, on any comprehensive plan ; the only large work is that by Fyffe, which is incomplete in many respects, and has other defects ; and the various smaller books, though some of them have real merit, are all very far from adequate.[2] Both Fyffe and the lesser books, for example, are extremely weak in regard to those economic forces and policies which have been of such vast importance throughout the century : to take only a single illustration, none of the writers seem to have had any conception of the true relation of the economic policy of the Zollverein to the political problem of the positions of Prussia and the Austrian

[1] *Transactions*, NS. vol. xviii. p. 12.

[2] The final volumes of the *Cambridge Modern History* may do something to remedy this, though collections of monographs by various authors are rarely quite satisfactory.

Empire in the Germanic Confederation, or of the extent to which that policy was manipulated for political purposes. This tendency to ignore or underestimate the play of economic forces is indeed characteristic of most that has been written in English on Continental history since 1815, though in face of the great amount of work done in this field by foreign investigators, particularly in Germany, the attitude of the English writers is scarcely excusable.

Further, we have hardly any good histories, written by British students, of particular European countries; the elaborate volumes of Bolton King upon Italy stand almost alone, though some of the works in the Cambridge Historical Series are good within their somewhat narrow limits. On the other hand both general and special histories (of the kind which I have in mind) of various degrees of merit are abundant in French and German, to name only the two languages with which we may reasonably expect any historical student to be well acquainted; in fact, one of the most striking features of Continental historical study at the present time is the energy expended upon the last century. It is true that the century was for most Continental peoples a creative epoch, in which some of them attained for the first time to a *national* history, and that therefore they are particularly interested in it; but the century has brought equally vital changes to us: yet we can scarcely offer as an excuse for our neglect of the Continent the plea that we have been engaged in studying and writing the history of our own country during the period. For even in that respect we are still lamentably weak.

This absence of textbooks is notoriously due, to a large extent, to the scarcity of the opportunities provided, both for ordinary students and for investigators, for the study of the years since 1815, by our academic institutions. The position in this matter in Great Britain, as compared with the chief countries of Continental Europe and with the United States, was so fully expounded by Dr. Prothero in the address already mentioned, that it is unnecessary for me to do more

than remark that since that address was delivered there has not been any substantial improvement. But as a further illustration of the general indifference it may be pointed out that the two institutions representative of historical study in this country are the Royal Historical Society and the 'English Historical Review'; and alike in the 'Transactions' of this Society and in the 'Review' the history of Europe and even of Great Britain since 1815 is almost entirely unrepresented. It is, I trust, unnecessary for me to say that I am not accusing the directors of either of these organs of putting the subject deliberately aside; I mention the facts only to show that among the Fellows of the Society and the contributors and readers of the Review there appears to be a lack of interest in the serious study of this particular period.

Yet surely no century in the whole history of the world calls for careful and scientific study more than the nineteenth, marked as it is on the one side by changes in material civilisation greater than those witnessed in any previous period, and on the other side by the three tremendous movements which we call the struggle for constitutional liberties and parliamentary government, the revival and partial triumph of nationalism, and the expansion of Europe. No previous century is so full of picturesque movement and dramatic interest as the times which witnessed the struggles for the liberation of the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula from the Ottoman yoke, the attainment of freedom by the Republics of South America and by Belgium, the stirring stories of the unification of Italy and Germany, the struggles of Hungary and Poland, the Civil War in the United States, the exploration of Africa, and the growth of European dominion in Asia. The rapidity and vastness of the movements, the rise of the new nations and the shiftings of the 'balance of power,' the reaction upon the policy of governments of the growth of democracy and of representative institutions, the ever-increasing interdependence of politics and economics, the development of colonial enterprise as the outcome at once of victorious nationalism and of

economic changes, the effect upon political organisation of the improved means of transit and communication, and the complexity of the issues involved—all these combine to present a subject of study whose difficulty is exceeded only by its interest and value. It is admittedly a hard task, but thorough investigation of the history of Europe during these years, and of the relation of our own national history to it, is, I submit, of the utmost importance to this nation at the present time.

For what, after all, is the ultimate purpose of historical study? We may seek in it simply mental training and the means of cultivating a particular frame of mind; and undoubtedly the reading of the best historians of various countries and of different ages, combined with some grasp of the 'historical method' and some initiation into research—these can give a good, though incomplete mental discipline. Or our interest in history may be merely antiquarian, arising from a general desire to know something of the social and political environment in which our ancestors lived, and of the events which affected them, without any wish that the information so acquired shall be employed for any practical purpose. Or, finally, our object in historical research may be, and in my judgment should be, to obtain a record of the social and political experiments of the past, and of the conditions under which those experiments were worked out, in order that we may have some sort of guidance for the experiments which we have to make in the present; and to acquire an understanding, as complete as possible, of the historical origins and developments of the problems with which we are called upon to deal to-day.

But if this is the case—if history is to be something more than a shallow tale, if it is to be of any use as a guide to political action, if it is to enable us to obtain an intelligent comprehension of the complicated political problems of Europe and the world at the commencement of the twentieth century—it is surely evident that we cannot bring our studies or our teaching to a close with the year 1815, or 1848, or even 1878; we must carry them on to the very latest date possible; and

to the historian who holds this view the events of 1905 must be as important and deserving of study as those of even 1815, or at least he cannot afford to neglect them. And further, it is precisely in the consideration of these recent phenomena, with whose immediate consequences we are now confronted, that there is a most pressing need for sane observation, for the trained impartiality of the historian, and for the ability which he should possess to disentangle movements from events, and to make clear the abiding forces whose manifestations are so often apparently unintelligible and contradictory. Unfortunately the neglect by the professional British historians of what I personally must regard as their main duty has given the informing and guidance of public opinion over to the newspaper writer, the party pamphleteer, and, what is worst of all, the historical journalist. What help has been given to the British public—or that by no means inconsiderable portion of it which really desires to know something of the higher politics and to form a reasoned judgment about foreign affairs—what help has been given to it by serious British historians in regard to such matters as the relations between Sweden and Norway, the grave problems of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (fraught with so much danger to the peace of Europe and the balance of power), the Russian advance towards the Far East, the Moroccan controversy, or the difficult matters—on the border line of politics and economics—connected with the colonial aspirations of the Powers of Continental Europe and their tariff policies? To take only this last instance, so far as I know there did not exist, until less than a couple of years ago, any serious attempt to give to British readers an unbiassed sketch, however brief, of the tariff history of France and Germany, though that history has seriously affected us and other European nations, and is not a subject merely for the economist, since it is inextricably involved with the political history of Europe.

If, then, the history of the nineteenth century is of such substantial value and importance, what are the causes of its comparative neglect by students and teachers alike in this

country? In addition to the attitude of the academic authorities there is, of course, the further partial explanation that British students have been kept away from the study of Continental history by the idea that Great Britain has played during this period a relatively smaller part in foreign politics than in some previous centuries, and that the events in foreign States have not exercised, except in occasional instances, any considerable influence upon our own national history. This opinion, which foreign nations do not share, obviously represents both a very superficial view of the facts and a very narrow understanding of the relations between the European States, and the interdependence of their political and economic history; and in any case it does not apply to the absence of investigation and instruction in the history of Great Britain since 1832 or 1837. But in the main the neglect seems to be due to a feeling, which certainly exists among our academic authorities, that this period is one rather for the political student than for the serious historian, and does not lend itself to scientific study; and this for reasons connected partly with the materials available, and partly with the standpoint of the investigator.

II.

First, then, as to the materials. The real difficulty lies as a rule not in their absence but in their superabundance; for no other period have we so vast and varied a supply. This very wealth of material is itself, according to one distinguished French historian, a cause of the neglect. M. Seignobos writes, "Le plus gros obstacle qui décourage d'écrire l'histoire du dix-neuvième siècle est l'abondance écrasante des documents. La méthode historique rigoureuse exige l'étude directe des sources; or la vie d'un homme ne suffirait pas—je ne dis pas à étudier et à critiquer—mais à *lire* les documents officiels même d'un seul pays de l'Europe. Il est donc matériellement impossible d'écrire une histoire contemporaine de l'Europe conforme aux principes de la critique.

Aussi les historiens de profession, jugeant leur méthode inapplicable à l'étude du dix-neuvième siècle, ont-ils préféré abstenir de toucher à cette période. Et ainsi le public ignorent l'histoire contemporaine, parce que les savants ont trop de moyens de la savoir.'[1]

And a recent English historian has remarked, on the other hand, that 'as students of our own times we are labouring largely in darkness. Even were all the chancelleries to yield up their jealously guarded secrets, and all private portfolios opened to students, a scientific history of modern Europe would still be an impossibility, for a hundred lives of mortal men would not suffice for the collation and comparison of the stupendous mass of documents. And so the historian, collecting his materials with misgiving at second, third, and fourth hand, can often at best only make a compromise with truth.'[2]

Both these writers adopt a view of scientific history which seems to be somewhat exaggerated, and the objection generally urged as to the materials appears to be based less upon their quantity than upon their quality; it is founded chiefly on doubts as to their completeness and reliability. Lord Acton wrote that 'the contemporary differs from the modern in this, that many of its facts cannot by us be definitely ascertained. The living do not give up their secrets with the candour of the dead; one key is always excepted, and a generation passes before we can ensure accuracy. Common report and outward seeming are bad copies of the reality, as the initiated know it. Even of a thing so memorable as the war of 1870 the true cause is still obscure; much that we believed has been scattered to the winds in the last six months' (Lord Acton was writing in 1895), 'and further revelations by important witnesses are soon to appear.'[3] Or, as Dr. Prothero put it, 'the secrets of European chanceries, which will ultimately clear up the diplomatic and international history of the last half-century, are not yet unlocked. The secret

[1] *Histoire Politique de l'Europe Contemporaine*, pp. v–vi.
[2] Alison Phillips, *Modern Europe*, p. v.
[3] *The Study of History*, p. 4.

springs of policy are not exposed; we can see apparent reasons for wars and treaties, but not the real reasons.'[1] But this, as both writers indicate, becomes less and less true the further we go back in the century, and it is only very partially true even of comparatively recent years.

The materials available fall into several groups, and it is perhaps desirable to enumerate these briefly, especially as some of them originate in the century. (A) There are the 'State Papers,' including first those published as the 'Parliamentary Papers.' These, which contain a vast mass of materials for the whole of the period, are a peculiar product of the last century; they are, of course, oldest in Great Britain, the United States, and France, and in the other countries of Europe they date from the establishment of responsible or representative government. The Parliamentary Papers of the European States differ greatly in character and in value to the historian, and this is particularly the case in regard to foreign affairs; the amount and completeness of the information which they give varies according to the positions of the governments in the scale from democracy to autocracy. In the case of the United States we may safely assume that almost nothing is hidden, while in Germany (where the government still regards the interference of the Reichstag in the conduct of foreign affairs almost as an impertinence) diplomatic correspondence has hitherto been kept secret, and a departure from this traditional policy has been made for the first time only in this present year.[2] As to Great Britain, referring in his Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the volumes of 'Eastern Papers, 1853,' Lane Poole remarks, 'Comparing the printed papers with the *brouillons*, or drafts, I find that very few of Lord Stratford's despatches of any importance are omitted, and that in those that are published the excisions are trifling, and usually dictated by the well known rule of the Foreign Office that sentences reflecting upon the sovereigns and ministers of

[1] *Loc. cit.* p. 19.

[2] White Paper on the Affairs of Morocco.

friendly Powers must be cancelled.'[1] But he adds (what is, of course, obvious) that 'the ostensible despatches of an ambassador, however, are not necessarily the fullest commentaries on his conduct. Sometimes the really vital motive of a transaction is suppressed from prudential reasons. I have never found this to be the case with Lord Stratford's reports; but, having a future Blue Book before his eyes, it was necessary that he should write more cautiously and reservedly in a paper intended to be laid before Parliament than in private letters. His despatches contain the truth, and nothing but the truth; but sometimes one has to look further to be sure that it is the whole truth.' This whole truth must be sought partly by a comparison with the Parliamentary Papers of other countries concerned, but chiefly by the help of two other groups of materials. The first of these is the unpublished State Papers, carefully guarded in the Foreign Offices of Europe, but more or less accessible to the investigator; the Papers of our own Foreign Office are available (with, however, very considerable limitations) up to 1850, and those of Continental governments (much more freely) to dates ranging up to the year 1852.[2]

After those dates some State Papers are to be found, and much information upon the whole period is to be obtained from the second group of materials, and that is the copious supply of (B) Memoirs, Autobiographies, and Reminiscences, which again are a peculiar product of the last century. I of course do not mean that such documents do not exist for the previous periods of history; but in the last century it became the fashion for memoirs and autobiographies to be written not merely by the secondary men, but also by statesmen of first-rate importance—Metternich, Guizot, Peel, Mazzini, Beust, Bismarck, to mention only a few examples. All these are primary authorities; they give an account of the actions, aims, and intentions of the men who really did the work; and they raise questions of criticism as difficult and delicate,

[1] *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*, ii. 230.
[2] Prothero, *loc. cit.* pp. 26–8.

though not so technical, as those presented by the documents of any previous period. The correspondence, memoranda, extracts from diaries, and other documents which they commonly contain are naturally much more reliable than the record of events and the account of the narrator's aims and actions, since these are often affected unconsciously by the disturbing and distorting influence of time, and more or less consciously by vanity or the desire to make out a good case. Sir George Cornwall Lewis has remarked that 'letters and despatches, like journals entered day by day, have this advantage over memoirs, that they exhibit faithfully the impressions of the moment, and are written without knowledge of the ultimate result. They are, therefore, more trustworthy than any narrative composed after the whole series of events has been worked out, at a time when the narrator is tempted to suppress, or has learnt to forget, the proofs of his own want of foresight.'[1] But this applies to the productions of all ages: the most recent French historian of the Revolution of 1789 observes of the memoirs of that period that 'les mémoires n'ont pas seulement cet inconvénient, qu'il en est fort peu dont on puisse affirmer la parfaite authenticité, qu'il en est moins encore dont les auteurs n'aient pas préféré le souci de leur propre apologie à celui de la vérité. Ecrits après les événements, pour la plupart sous la Restauration, ils ont un vice commun très grave: je veux parler de la déformation des souvenirs, qui en gâte presque toutes les pages. . . . Pour que le témoignage soit croyable il ne suffit pas qu'il émane d'un contemporaine: il faut encore qu'il ait été émis au moment même où a eu lieu l'événement auquel il se rapporte, ou peu après, dans la plénitude du souvenir.'[2] In many cases, owing to these disturbing causes, the memoirs of acute observers, even when not entirely disinterested, of the actors may be more reliable than those of the actors themselves. But in any case we can check the statements contained in the memoirs by means of our other materials—letters, speeches, &c., and in

[1] Quoted in Gardiner and Mullinger, *Introd. to English History*, p. 384.
[2] Aulard, *Hist. Politique de la Révolution Française*, p. xi.

many instances by comparing the accounts of various persons engaged in the same series of events. And when all the defects are fully admitted the fact remains that we have in these memoirs a mine of information of an especial character and importance, such as historians do not possess on anything like the same scale for any earlier period.

(C) Next come Collections of Letters and Despatches, valuable, again, both for facts and for ideas, and occasionally in many respects (as already pointed out) much more reliable.

(D) Collections of Speeches and the volumes of the Parliamentary Debates are the outcome of the growth of representative and responsible government, and the consequent obligation laid upon the ministers, even of the countries where their responsibility to the Parliament is of the slightest, of giving some kind of explanation even of their foreign policy to the elected representatives of the nation. The Parliamentary Debates, again an especial product of last century, are of great use as showing the movement of public opinion, and what ministers professed, or were willing to admit openly; and their very silences are full of instruction.

(E) The Biographies are very numerous and of all degrees of value. They are primary authorities only in so far as they contain original authenticated materials, as is not unfrequently the case, or are the work of writers who enjoyed close intercourse with their subjects, and had their confidence. On the whole I think it may fairly be said that the standard of biographical writing is steadily rising throughout Europe, and is becoming more and more scientific. Every year now witnesses the publication of biographies which in the abundance of the material which they give, and in their cautious, careful, and unpartisan treatment are substantial contributions to history.

(F) There is the vast group of materials contained in the Newspapers and Reviews, which are of great importance as giving facts which often do not find their way into official reports, and also as records of contemporary opinions. It is

true that newspaper correspondents do not enjoy the best of reputations for accuracy; but Dr. Holland Rose seems to believe that they are quite as good authorities as some at least of those upon whom we depend for previous periods. 'The number of memoir-writers and newspaper correspondents,' he writes, 'is legion; and I have come to the conclusion that they are fully as trustworthy as similar witnesses have been in any age. The very keenness of their rivalry is some guarantee for truth. Doubtless competition for good 'copy' occasionally leads to artful embroidering on humdrum actuality; but, after spending much time in scanning similar embroidery in the literature of the Napoleonic era, I unhesitatingly place the work of Archibald Forbes, and that of several knights of the pen still living, far above the delusive tinsel of Marbot, Thiebault, and Ségur."[1] To this group we must add the extensive pamphlet literature of Continental Europe.

(G) Finally, there is a large group of miscellaneous works of various kinds, including surveys of political conditions, such as Bryce's 'American Commonwealth,' Wallace and Leroy-Beaulieu's works on Russia, Bodley's 'France;' such books as Grote's 'Letters on Switzerland in 1847,' Lawrence Oliphant's 'Episodes in a Life of Adventure,' and Napoleon III.'s early essay on 'Napoleonic Ideas;' the miscellaneous writings of political leaders; contemporary novels which are studies of political and social conditions by acute observers (like Disraeli's, or, to take a much more recent instance, Barrès's 'L'Appel au Soldat'); and books of travel, which are especially important for the opening up of Africa and for the conditions and politics of Asia.

It results from this brief and very imperfect survey that the materials available for the student of nineteenth-century history are very extensive and varied, and that they contain several groups peculiar to the epoch. It may be asserted with some confidence that we have at hand all the information really necessary for a thoroughly adequate appreciation of events up

[1] *Development of the European Nations*, 1870–1900, Preface.

to 1878; further discoveries may add to our knowledge of details, and may affect our judgments upon small points, but not, I think, seriously. This line of time, up to which we have sufficient material, is steadily advancing; and even for later years a careful collection and examination of the evidence already available would go far towards providing us with a sound working basis.

Much of this material has, of course, already been collected, or worked over, in histories of countries, periods, and persons; and this simplifies the task of the teacher, since without undue trouble he can obtain access to the documents, or many of them, and to other sources of information, and can thereby check the textbook which he uses, show to his class the authorities from which the narrative has been constructed, and obtain abundant materials wherewith to supplement it. The great need, alike for investigators and for teachers, is a classified and critical bibliography; there is none for the last century which is at all comprehensive, or in fact of any value. A general European bibliography might conceivably be possible only as the result of the co-operation of the historical societies of Europe, and possibly a series of national bibliographies is the only practical policy. In any case the task of the Royal Historical Society is clear; a bibliography of British history in the nineteenth century should be well within the powers of this Society, and would be only a part of that bibliography of Modern England which has been so often advocated, but for which we are still waiting. It would be comparatively easy to keep such a bibliography, once made, up to date; the difficulty is to make the first compilation, but every year of delay only enhances that difficulty.

III.

Secondly, as to the obstacles to the investigation of nineteenth-century history caused by the standpoint of the student. Lord Acton has remarked that 'beyond the question of certainty is the question of detachment. The process by

which principles are discovered and appropriated is other than that by which, in practice, they are applied; and our most sacred and disinterested convictions ought to take shape in the tranquil regions of the air, above the tumult and tempest of actual life.'[1] The historian of his own times, or of times in which political forces still at work took their rise, will find it difficult to refrain from a partisan attitude.

The *tu quoque* argument is admittedly no argument; otherwise it would be easy to show that distance in time from events does not prevent partisan feeling in regard to them. It is clearly the business of the historian not merely to discover events and actions, but to judge them, to interpret as well as to describe; the important thing is the frame of mind in which he approaches his subject. If he gives his scientific conscience full play, if he is properly trained, if he carries on his study of these most recent times 'with a consciousness of its special drawbacks as well as its special advantages,'[2] there is no obvious reason why he should be more partisan in regard to the events of fifty or even twenty-five years ago than in regard to those of the eighteenth century.[3] A detached attitude is rendered still more possible by the rapidity of the world-movement; most of the controversies which stirred our fathers seem to the present generation very far away. And in respect to the internal history of foreign countries detachment is the natural attitude.

And on the other hand there are certain counterbalancing advantages. There is what has been described as 'the quicker insight of the student into the various bearings of the problems presented to him—a readiness inseparable from the greater intensity of the interest excited.'[4] There are some things which only contemporaries can understand. It has been well said that 'if in one sense a statesman's contemporaries,

[1] *Loc. cit.* pp. 4–5.

[2] Ward, in Cambridge *Lectures on Nineteenth-Century History*, p. 3.

[3] 'En politique l'ardeur des passions est en raison inverse de l'éducation scientifique' (Rambaud, *Hist. de la Civilisation Contemporaine en France*, p. viii).

Ward, *loc. cit.* p. 3.

even after death has abated the storm and temper of faction, can scarcely judge him, yet in another sense they who breathe the same air as he breathed, who know at close quarters the problems that faced him, the materials with which he had to work, the limitations of his time, such must be the best, if not the only true memorialists and recorders.'[1] All students of present-day politics know how much public opinion is affected by apparently trivial events, how there are movements of opinion which exercise a potent though indirect influence upon political action, and yet within a few years are forgotten, or unintelligible if remembered.

Finally, then, my plea is for the promotion of the study and teaching of the history of Europe, and of our own country in relation to it, since 1815. If this Society chose to do so, I believe it could accomplish much in this direction; and in taking such a course it would be doing substantial service to the State. Never were the problems of world politics so complex as they are to-day; never was it of more importance that a sound understanding of them should be widespread among our citizens; and yet while we are pouring forth information as to the minutest details of the past, we are leaving the people of this country to grope in darkness, and without guidance, in regard to the living questions of to-day.

[1] Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, i. 1.

SHARP AND THE RESTORATION POLICY IN SCOTLAND

A STUDY IN THE RELATIONS OF CHURCH AND STATE

By the Rev. JOHN WILLCOCK, B.D.

Read May 17, 1906.

THE idea that at the Restoration the Government of Charles II. wantonly attacked a Church that otherwise would have remained at peace and in the enjoyment of hardly-won liberties is not in accordance with facts. The Church was divided into two warring factions—that of the Remonstrants or Protesters and that of the Resolutioners. The former were the extreme Covenant party and had as their symbol the Remonstrance of the Western army after the Battle of Dunbar, in which they refused to fight any longer in the cause of Charles II.[1] The Resolutioners were the more moderate party, which accepted him as a Covenanted King, and they derived their name from their support of certain Resolutions passed in the Parliament and General Assembly for the admission of Royalists to office under certain conditions.[2] The Protesters—who numbered perhaps about a third of the Presbyterian clergy—claimed, probably not without reason, to be more religious than their opponents.[3] They were very eager to purge the Church of all those whose opinions they regarded as unsatisfactory, and to fill up

[1] Carlyle, *Cromwell*, iii. 80: the author's *The Great Marquess*, p. 256. The name Protesters was derived from a Protest handed in at a meeting of the General Assembly at Dundee in July 1651 (*Life of Robert Blair*, p. 277).

[2] *The Great Marquess*, p. 271.

[3] Mackenzie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland*, p. 16.

vacant charges with those who uttered their shibboleths. In their opposition to the King they naturally drew somewhat closely into sympathy with the party of Cromwell, though, with the fatal skill in splitting hairs which has afflicted so many of their nation, they were able to differentiate their political principles from what they called 'English errors.'[1] The Resolutioners, on the other hand, adhered steadily to the cause of Charles II., and came under the disfavour of the Government of the Commonwealth for their sympathy with the insurrection under Glencairn and Middleton which had been so troublesome to the English authorities. The General Assembly, in which they would have had a majority, was dispersed by English soldiers in 1654 before any business was transacted, and no subsequent meeting of that body was allowed to be held. During the rest of the period of the Commonwealth, though the Protesters had considerable liberty in the matter of meeting together and of managing their own affairs, the Resolutioners were kept under very rigid control.[2] The leaders of the latter party accordingly appointed an agent to represent them in London. His business was to act as an intermediary with the English Government, to resist unreasonable proposals and schemes of the Protesters, and in general to watch over the Church's interests, of which the Resolutioners might from their numbers fairly claim to be the guardians. This agent was a James Sharp, minister of Crail, who was afterwards to attain to an unenviable notoriety as an archbishop.[3] His shrewdness and ability extorted the admiration of Cromwell, who said of him: 'That gentleman, after the Scotch way, ought to be called Sharpe of that ilk,' *i.e.* Sharp of Sharp.[4] It is interesting to observe that the English Government during this period strengthened their hold upon Scotland by playing off the one of these factions against the other. Thus Cromwell distinctly favoured the Protesters, while Monck, especially

[1] Baillie, *Letters*, iii. 244–6; *Life of Robert Blair*, p. 362 *n.*
[2] Baillie, *Letters*, iii. 244.
[3] *Life of Robert Blair*, pp. 328, 336.
[4] *True and Impartial Account*, p. 34.

during the later period of the Commonwealth, carefully maintained friendly relations with the Resolutioners.[1]

The two parties were inclined to take the same view of the situation when Charles II. was restored, viz. that the obligations incurred by him and by them, and by their brethren in England in the matter of the Solemn League and Covenant were to be religiously observed. Thus at a meeting of the Protesters at Edinburgh a petition was drawn up to be sent to the King, 'containing,' we are told, 'a congratulation, and putting him in mind of his oath of Covenant, and wishing that what was done contrary thereunto in his chapel and family at London might be redressed.'[2] Baillie may be accounted a favourable specimen of the Resolutioner party, and his feelings at this crisis may be taken as representing theirs. 'Are we to sitt dumb,' he exclaims, 'and never open our mouth, neither to King nor Parliament, nor our brethren the ministers of England, to request them to adhere to their Covenant and Petition against Books [Liturgy] and Bishops? I was sore afflicted when it was told me by my neighbour that Lauderdaill went to the chapell to hear Bishops preach and say Amen to all the service, as much as any about Court and defended his practice by conscience. I hope this must be false.'[3] Alas! Lauderdale was in this reign to commit such weighty crimes both in his public and private life that compared with them the sin of listening to bishops preaching and of saying Amen to their liturgical prayers was but as the fine dust of the balance.

The Rev. Robert Blair of St. Andrews was 'reckoned one of the wisest men in the nation,'[4] and, as belonging neither to the party of the Protesters nor to that of the Resolutioners, had tried to mediate between them, with the result that he

[1] Mackenzie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland*, p. 15.

[2] *Life of Robert Blair*, p. 357; Wodrow, *History*, i. 57; Kirkton, *History*, p. 72; *Lauderdale Papers*, i. 59.

[3] *Letters*, iii. 409. See also *Lauderdale Papers*, i. 58, from which it appears that Lauderdale's guilt was aggravated by the loud voice in which he repeated the responses.

[4] Wodrow, *Analecta*, iii. 92.

had, as he said, been 'cuffed upon both haffits [cheeks] by them'; [1] but even he shared the fears that now agitated them both. 'Matters in England,' he says, 'are thus all going wrong, the sworn Covenant forgotten by prince and people, the covenanted reformation defaced, national and personal perjury not regarded nor laid to heart as a horrible provocation and land-destroying abomination.' [2] To us who are divided by centuries from these events and to whom the Covenants are as much out of date as old almanacks the thought of the guilt of perjury being incurred by their being repudiated may seem almost grotesque; but there can be no doubt that to multitudes in that age whose consciences were operative it was a matter of real anxiety.[3]

We should not form an adequate idea of the condition of public feeling in Scotland if we were to overlook the fact that it was affected by that in England, and that just as in the latter country the Restoration was marked by an outburst of long repressed feeling against the domination of Puritanism, so in the former country the younger generation was inclined to chafe against the Covenants which had originated in circumstances with which they were unfamiliar, and that many of them were not averse to a change in ecclesiastical matters. 'The generality of this new upstart generation,' said Robert Douglas, one of the leading Resolutioners, 'have no love for presbyterial government; but are wearied of that yoke, feeding themselves with the fancy of episcopacy or moderate episcopacy.' [4] In the north of the country the zeal manifested in favour of the Covenant had been, even when at its height, somewhat lukewarm. It was now so far diminished that one may say that in the region beyond the Tay no resistance or even remonstrance was likely to be aroused by a return to Episcopacy.[5] In this highly complicated condition of matters, the government of

[1] *Life*, p. 343. [2] *Life of Robert Blair*, p. 370.
[3] Wodrow, *History*, i. 22: *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, vol. i. sect. 99.
[4] Wodrow, *History*, i. 21: a letter written to Sharp.
[5] Grub, *Ecclesiastical History of Scotland*, iii. 181.

Charles II. had no easy task in coming to a decision as to what should be done in the way of settling the ecclesiastical affairs of the northern kingdom. In order that we may fully understand the effect produced on the country by the overthrow of Presbyterianism and the re-establishment of Episcopacy, it is necessary to recapitulate the manner in which the change was wrought, and the parts played by some of the chief agents in accomplishing it. Among these must be reckoned the James Sharp to whom we have recently referred. In dealing with him we are anxious to be scrupulously fair, and to place before our readers an exact narrative of his procedure before expressing any opinion as to its character. Much odium has attached to his name on the ground of his supposed treachery to the cause of which he was a prominent guardian. But the mere fact that he saw fit to change sides in ecclesiastical politics is not necessarily discreditable to him. In cases of this kind charges of hypocrisy should not be lightly made:

> 'For neither man nor angel can discern
> Hypocrisy, the only evil that walks
> Invisible, except to God alone,
> By His permissive will, through heaven and earth.'[1]

Before and since his time men have with a good conscience seen fit to burn what they had adored, and to adore what they had burned. The question has therefore to be decided as to whether he can be reckoned in this class. This we can do without imputing motives to him, as, fortunately for us, if not altogether fortunately for his own reputation, he has left abundant material for settling the matter.[2]

We have, then, to bear in mind the fact that Sharp was sent up to London in a somewhat informal way to watch over the interests of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, and that he received his commission from a knot of the more prominent members of that section of the Church which from

[1] Milton, *Paradise Lost*, iii. 680.

[2] This is found in the documents incorporated in Wodrow's *History*, and in the *Lauderdale Papers* (3 vols.: Camden Society).

its numbers and from its pursuing a national rather than a sectarian line of policy was well entitled to speak in the name of the whole. We refer, of course, to the Resolutioners. He was supported by money raised, not without difficulty, by them,[1] and he enjoyed their fullest confidence. Baillie says that he was 'a very worthie, pious, wise, and diligent young man,' whom 'we trusted as our own souls.'[2] It has been said in favour of Sharp that, 'so long as he was entrusted with a commission for a specific purpose he discharged his task with faithfulness and ability.'[3] This is perfectly true, but at the same time we cannot fail to observe that all through his correspondence with those whose agent he was he gives them to understand that he is in fullest sympathy with their opinions and aspirations. Thus on March 4, 1660, he says of matters in England: 'The great fear is that the King will come in and that with him moderate episcopacy at the least will take place here. The good party are doing what they can to keep the covenant interest on foot, but I fear there will be much ado to have it so.'[4] Later on in the same month he remarks in a letter that he is very generally thought of, both in England and in Brussels (where Charles II. then was), as 'a Scottish rigid presbyterian,' and, with a touch of sanctimoniousness, he adds: 'This nation [*i.e.* the English] is not fitted to bear that yoke of Christ'[5]—a phrase which we hope expressed his feelings at the time, and was not merely meant for consumption in Scotland. The same benevolent hope may be cherished with regard to passages like the following, which are strewn through the correspondence with judicious hand: 'Petitions come up from counties for episcopacy and Liturgy. The Lord's anger is not turned away. The generality of the people are doting after prelacy and the Service-book.'[6]

[1] *Life of Robert Blair*, p. 344.
[2] *Letters*, iii. 352, 460.
[3] Grub, *Ecclesiastical History of Scotland*, iii. 192.
[4] Wodrow, *History*, i. 8.
[5] *Ibid.* i. 17.
[6] *Ibid.* i. 44.

In the beginning of May 1660, he went as an envoy from Monck to Breda to give Charles II. an account of the general's procedure and to suggest the line of policy towards parties in England which the King should adopt.[1] Sharp took occasion to speak also as a representative of the Church of Scotland. 'I find the King very affectionate to Scotland,' he says, 'and resolved not to wrong the settled government of our Church. . . . I was most kindly entertained and the king had a great affection for our country and kirk.'[2] Later on, when Charles had returned to England, Sharp formally presented to him an address from those whose agent he was, containing assurances of the loyalty of the King's Presbyterian subjects in Scotland, and of their trust that he would be constant to the engagements into which he had entered with them. He was also instructed to remind the King that whatever it might be necessary to do in England in the matter of introducing Episcopacy, there was no call to interfere with the settled government of the Church of Scotland, to which the nation was attached.[3] Though no formal reply was given apparently to this address, there was no reason to believe that Charles disapproved of its contents. Sharp says that 'a high loose spirit' appeared in some of the nobles and others from Scotland who were in London. 'I hear,' he says, 'they talk of bringing in Episcopacy into Scotland; which, I trust, they will never be able to effect. I am much saddened and wearied out with what I hear and see.'[4] The upshot of matters was that the Resolutioners, while they saw with regret that the Presbyterian cause in England was lost, believed that their interests in Scotland were safe, and awaited with perhaps occasional twinges of anxiety the ratification of the King's verbal promises by the Parliament which was soon to meet, and by the General Assembly which they hoped would soon be summoned. The Protesters, however, were not kept in any suspense with regard to the

[1] *Lauderdale Papers*, i. 26 *n.*
[2] Wodrow, *History*, i. 29.
[3] *Ibid.* i. 22, 31.
[4] *Ibid.* i. 39.

treatment which they were to expect. For little time was lost in apprehending their leaders on charges of treason.[1]

In a letter which Sharp brought down to Scotland addressed by the King to the Robert Douglas to whom we have recently referred and who was a minister in Edinburgh, a message was sent to the Edinburgh Presbytery to be communicated by them to the whole Church, in which any hostile procedure against the existing order of things seemed to be definitely abjured. In it Charles expressed his satisfaction with the loyalty manifested by the majority of the Presbyterian clergy in Scotland during the years of trial through which they had passed; and then, in words the insincerity of which was so soon to be placed beyond doubt, he said: 'We resolve to protect and preserve the government of the Church of Scotland as it is settled by law, without violation.' Some directions are added as to the measures to be taken in dealing with ministers who sowed seeds of disaffection, by which the Protesters were not obscurely indicated, and the document concludes with some very pious phrases regarding 'earnestness in prayer' and fresh and constant supplies of Divine grace' which have a certain piquancy as having been probably composed by Sharp, as having been uttered by Charles II. and written out by Lauderdale, who signs the letter as Secretary for Scotland.[2] The letter was received by the Presbytery with great joy, and orders were at once given for a silver casket in which to enshrine it. The incident reveals the Church in a humiliating position—apart altogether from the fraud of which she was to discover that she was the victim—and it suggests that the privilege of Churches having 'Kings for nursing-fathers'[3] may be a very expensive luxury. The hint as to dealing with the Protesters was acted upon and a number of the more extreme members of that party were deposed from the ministry.[4]

[1] Wodrow, *History*, i. 71; Kirkton, *History*, p. 74; Lamont, *Diary*, p. 158; Baillie, *Letters*, iii. 446.

[2] Wodrow, *History*, i. 80; Nicoll, *Diary*, p. 299.

[3] *Isaiah*, xlix. *v.* 23.

[4] Grub, *Ecclesiastical History of Scotland*, iii. 174.

The union of Scotland with England, which had been forcibly effected by Cromwell, and which had resulted in many national advantages, so far as the northern kingdom was concerned, was now dissolved, and until the meeting of Parliament the management of affairs there was entrusted to the Committee of Estates nominated by Charles II. and the Scotch Parliament of 1651. The Earl of Glencairn was made Lord Chancellor, and the Earl of Lauderdale Secretary of State, while General Middleton—now raised to the peerage as the Earl of Middleton—was appointed to preside as Royal Commissioner in the Parliament which was summoned to meet on December 12, 1660.[1] No Parliament having been held in Scotland for nearly ten years past, the proceedings in connection with the opening of that now called were conducted with special magnificence. A thousand horsemen met the Royal Commissioner at Musselburgh to escort him to Edinburgh. Few of the nobility were absent from the riding in state from Holyrood to the Parliament-House on the opening day.[2] The rich apparel, the gold and silver lace, silk, satin, and velvet, which adorned those who took part in the cavalcade dazzled the eyes of spectators unfamiliar with such gorgeous pageantry, and made them think they were looking on a procession of princes rather than of subjects.[3] The conduct, however, of many, if not indeed of the great majority, of those now installed in power soon made it evident even to the most charitable or credulous witnesses that, after all, these were very ordinary mortals; for the idea that loyalty and debauchery were closely allied duties, and that decency and rebellion were kindred vices, seemed to be a ruling principle with them.[4] The widespread dissoluteness of manners which accompanied the Restoration both in England and Scotland, and which was so serious as to call for the publication of Royal edicts to restrain it threatened

[1] Lamont, *Diary*, p. 157; Nicoll, *Diary*, p. 325. The Parliament was afterwards postponed till Jan. 1, 1661.

[2] Baillie, *Letters*, iii. 462.

[3] Kirkton, *History*, p. 87; Nicoll, *Diary*, p. 315.

[4] Kirkton, *History*, p. 114; Burnet, *History of My Own Times*, i. 114.

to become a hindrance even to the transaction of public business.[1] Thus it is recorded of Middleton that he 'was sometimes so disordered [with wine] that when he hade appeared upon the throne in full parliament, the president upon the whisper of the principal members would be necessitate to adjourn'; and the Assembly in which he represented the majesty of the Crown was known as 'the drinking Parliament.'[2] The matter deserves attention not only as an illustration of the condition of public morals at that time, but also as casting some light upon the character and mood of those who took it upon themselves to change the constitution of the national Church.

The secret instructions given by Charles II. to Middleton with regard to the matters to be transacted in Parliament indicate, naturally enough, a desire to revert to the condition of things in Scotland before the Royal prerogative had been diminished and reduced to the shadow of a name by armed resistance. In forming a judgment of their character we have to remember that from Charles's point of view Scotland had for nearly a quarter of a century been seething with revolution, and that his first task was to establish in it something like constitutional government. Accordingly the Royal Commissioner was instructed to see that the proceedings of the Parliament of 1643, which had met without the sanction of Charles I., and that of 1649, which though nominally summoned by him had been controlled by the faction hostile to him, were declared null and void. Some ground of reason might doubtless be shown to exist for this requirement, though the proposed measure was an extreme one. Charles, however, went on to say that in Parliaments duly called and authorised by his father Acts had been passed which infringed on the Royal prerogative, such as that, *e.g.*, which took the appointment of Officers of State, Privy Councillors

[1] Wodrow, *History*, i. 81; Nicoll, *Diary*, p. 291; McCrie, *Memoirs of Veitch*, p. 80 *n*. A similar state of what may be called 'unstable equilibrium' is described by Renan as characteristic of Ephesus: 'La vie publique dégénérait en bacchanale' (*S. Paul*, p. 338).

[2] Kirkton, *History*, p. 114.

and Judges, out of the hands of the King and placed it in those of Parliament, and that the Royal Commissioner was to endeavour to get such Acts rescinded.[1] The monstrous character of this recommendation scarcely needs to be pointed out. It proposed to annul statutes and laws which had been decided upon by Parliaments duly summoned, and which had been solemnly accepted and ratified by Royal authority. To overthrow such Acts was to destroy all security for law and order; and to do this under the guise of legislative enactment was surely a refinement of absurdity. For what could be more ridiculous than to introduce a law that would for ever deprive laws of the security which gives them vigour? The proposal excited strong opposition even in the Parliament which in so many respects was after the King's own heart, and in which, by the restoration of the old method of conducting business through the Lords of the Articles nominated by the Crown, the Royal power was so predominant.[2] Endless controversy seemed likely to arise out of discussions as to whether this or that measure limited the Royal prerogative and therefore called for rescission: and accordingly it was proposed, at first apparently in jest, that the easier plan would be to annul all the Parliaments that had been held during the period from 1640 to 1648.[3] As it was not possible for even the most servile courtier to propose such a measure without the colour of a reason, the excuse was alleged that Charles I. had been coerced by his rebellious subjects into making concessions which infringed upon the Royal prerogative. The Act Rescissory, as it was called, though strenuously opposed by some, as we have said, was carried by a large majority, and was instantly confirmed by the Royal Commissioner;[4] and thus in a day all that had been gained by lavish expenditure of blood and treasure was swept away, and Scotland stood where she was when

[1] *Lauderdale Papers*, i. 39.

[2] Mackenzie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland*, p. 53; *The Great Marquess*, p. 93; Burnet, *History of My Own Times*, i. 118.

[3] *Ibid.* i. 117; *Lauderdale Papers*, i. 76.

[4] Burnet, *History of My Own Times*, i. 119; *Life of Robert Blair*, p. 381.

Charles I. and Laud first menaced her liberties, except that now she was too weak and impoverished to offer effective resistance to the new schemes which had been formed for her enslavement. The anxious doubts concerning the peace and prosperity of the Church which had begun to move in the hearts of many were replaced by a certain conviction of approaching disaster, for with the Act Rescissory all the legislative enactments by which her constitution was fixed fell to the ground.

It is necessary for the completeness of our narrative to relate the part which Sharp played in the new turn of public affairs: but our reference to the matter will be very brief. The quarter from which our information is derived is a series of letters written by Sharp to the Rev. Patrick Drummond, a Presbyterian minister in London, who was in communication with Lauderdale. In these letters, which cover the period from January 12, 1661, to April 15 of the same year, Sharp appears in the character of a zealous Presbyterian who dreads and resents any possible change of the kind which many thought was at hand. Soon after Middleton came to Scotland as Royal Commissioner, he had summoned Sharp to act as his chaplain, but the latter is careful to let his correspondent know that he has no relish for his employment, and that he had not gone near the Court until sent for.[1] During the month of January of the period above referred to, he declares that he has no reason to believe that there is any 'design to alter our Church government'—certainly he is not privy to it—and he does not see how any such design could be carried out.[2] He complains sadly of the suspicions which are afloat concerning himself and take such a definite shape as to represent him as 'an apostate covenanter,' and he sees no other resource than 'patience under the hand of God who sees fit to subject him to this trial.'[3] Early in February he says, 'I now begin to foresee a tryall coming upon this Church, the Lord fitt us for it.'[4] 'Believe it,' he assures his

[1] *Lauderdale Papers*, i. 61, 66.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 66.
[3] *Ibid.* i. 67.
[4] *Ibid.* i. 72.

correspondent, 'our leading honest men are fixed in their way.'[1] And again; 'I tell you my apprehension that endeavairs will be usit to bring innovations upon us, but I am confident they will not take effect; honest men are resolved to stick together, and what can they [*i.e.* the enemy] then do?'[2] In March he expresses his amazement at the proposal to rescind Acts of Parliament against Episcopacy and for Presbytery. 'What matter of fear and grief,' he exclaims, 'this surprisal hath caused to ministers and people you may judge!'[3] 'If the Lord interpose not in a way we know not of, I see not how we can escape trouble.'[4] He informs Drummond that he is in constant intercourse with Robert Douglas, whose zealous championship of the cause now in danger was known to all, and he refers to this fact of intimacy as a testimony to his own sincerity. 'Sure,' he says, 'if he did distrust me he would not use me as he does: there is nothing of publick matters I can learne which I do not impart to him.'[5] In company with Douglas he has a long interview with the Royal Commissioner in reference to Church matters, and they entreat that the Presbyterian form of ecclesiastical government may at least be kept inviolate for two or three years as 'a tryall and experiment.'[6] Time after time he expresses a desire to abandon political entanglements, and like the Psalmist he sighs for some haven of rest for his weary soul, where he might escape the noise of coming confusions which he would rather hear of than witness.[7] And finally, on Mar. 21, he says: 'I have not stept awry . . . I declare to you I have not acted directly or indirectly for a change amongst us, nor have I touched upon Church Government in sermon or conferences at our court or elsewhere.'[8] His meaning, of course, is that he has had no private interview with Middleton for the discussion of ecclesiastical affairs. He adds in his last letter to Drummond: 'My inocensy I hope will answeare for me in a time

[1] *Lauderdale Papers*, i. 74. [2] *Ibid.* i. 75.
[3] *Ibid.* i. 77. [4] *Ibid.* i. 78. [5] *Ibid.* i. 85.
[6] *Ibid.* i. 85. [7] *Ibid.* i. 86, 87. [8] *Ibid.* i. 87, 89.

of more composure than this is. I doe appeal to the continued tenor of my actions, which witness for me in the judgement of all impartiall and unbyassed observers, and I can with patience and hope committ myselfe, my credit, conscience into the hands of my faithfull Creator, who knowes my way and will bring my integrity to light.'[1]

These words were written on April 15, and three weeks later Sharp was in London in confidential intercourse with Clarendon, planning with him the restoration of Episcopacy in Scotland and rejoicing in the more favourable opinion which the Lord Chancellor was now inclined to form of him. From Clarendon he learned what the King's purpose was with regard to the Church of Scotland, and he says in a letter to Middleton from which these facts are drawn, 'by what he did communicat to me I found that which your Grace was pleased often to tell me was not without ground.'[2] What can this mean but that he had had many conversations with Middleton in Scotland about Church matters and the proposed restoration of Episcopacy? We may leave it to those who still think that Sharp's character for honesty or integrity or anything else that is creditable is capable of rehabilitation to reconcile this last statement with what he said on March 21, as to his never having touched on Church government 'in conferences at court or elsewhere.' In collaboration with Lauderdale he prepared a quibbling proclamation, to which we shall refer later on, which the King was to issue to prepare the way for the coming change. With a disgusting servility which contrasts strangely with his previous utterances he says: 'I should think the time for our setling will be more seasonable and proper after that your Grace hath come hither [*i.e.* to London], and so ordered the way of it, as that the perfecting of the work may be upon your hand from whom it had its beginning and under whose countenance and protection it must thrive and take rooting. Your Grace knowes the work is of great consequence and will not want

[1] *Lauderdale Papers*, i. 94. [2] *Ibid.* vol. ii. App. p. lxxix.

its difficulties: which can be only overcome by your prudence and resolution.' [1]

Burnet says that when Sharp went to Breda he took a letter of introduction from the Earl of Glencairn to Hyde, afterwards Earl of Clarendon, recommending him as the only person capable of managing the design of setting up Episcopacy in Scotland; [2] and Robert Douglas was also of opinion that Sharp's determination to take the course which afterwards brought so much discredit upon him was of that early date (May 1660).[3] But in the absence of proof positive we find it impossible to believe that Sharp, whose cleverness is beyond all question, would have committed himself to a scheme of this kind when Presbyterianism was still so strong both in Scotland and in England. The deliverance of England from the yoke of the Covenant was a matter of more immediate importance to Hyde and his associates than that of embroiling Scotland in new discords. Nor can we believe that Sharp would have continued openly to champion the cause of the Church of Scotland as he did down to the time when he brought Charles II.'s letter to Edinburgh, if he had had a definite scheme of the kind attributed to him lying in his mind. It was the utterly unexpected and startling success of the proposal to rescind the Acts of Parliament on which the establishment of Presbyterianism rested that opened the way for the introduction of its rival. Charles II. and Hyde doubtless wished the extinction of the religious system which they hated so bitterly, and, as we have seen, Sharp says that Middleton often spoke to him about it, but it was the Act Rescissory that transformed the object of their pious wishes—if the phrase be permitted—into a matter of practical politics. The contemporary historian to whom we have already referred is of the opinion that Sharp, after seeing the success of Monck in protesting against the King and in favour of a Commonwealth down to the very moment of

[1] *Lauderdale Papers*, vol. ii. App. p. lxxix.
[2] *History of My Own Times*, i. 92.
[3] Wodrow, *History*, i. 28.

restoring Charles,[1] resolved upon an imitation of it on a humbler scale in dealing with the Church of Scotland. But, as this is a matter of conjecture, our readers may if they choose believe that the similarity of their methods was a mere coincidence. More interest attaches to his narrative of what Sharp alleged in defence of his procedure immediately after he became an archbishop. 'He said to some,' says Burnet, 'from whom I had it that when he saw that the King was resolved on the change and that some hot men were like to be advanced whose violence would ruin the country he had submitted to that post on design to moderate matters and to cover some good men from a storm that might otherwise break upon them. So deeply did he still dissemble; for now he talked of nothing so much as of love and moderation.'[2] Sharp may have had some of the love for good men which he professed to have, and which the historian so roundly refuses to believe in; but we can say, without fear of contradiction, that if he had it the history of his administration in Scotland shows that he 'dissembled' it very successfully. Some have thought that simultaneously with his advent to power there was a 'loosing of Satan' like that in apocalyptic vision to work his wicked will in the land. But if it were so, perhaps this also was a mere coincidence. Our readers, we think, will now have a clear idea of some of the leading characteristics of the man whose tyrannous rule and tragic death form such a striking chapter in the history of his native country.

All things having been thrown into confusion by the Act Rescissory, a proclamation composed by Sharp[3] was issued, in which the King declared his resolution to preserve the true Protestant religion, and after taking due advice to settle the government of the Church in such a manner as might be 'most agreeable to the word of God, most suitable to monarchical government, and most complying with the public

[1] Whitelocke, *Memorialls*, p. 684; Welwood, *Memoirs*, pp. 122, 366.
[2] *History of My Own Times*, i. 133.
[3] *Lauderdale Papers*, vol. ii, App. p. lxxix.

peace and quiet of the kingdom.[1] In the meantime the administration of affairs by Sessions, Presbyters and Synods was authorised. None of the officials of the Church except Sharp were consulted with regard to the changes thus indicated as at hand, and there seemed every probability that the arbitrary procedure of 1637 by which the Church's organisation and mode of worship were altered and settled by a mere royal warrant was likely to be repeated.[2]

Yet though the government of the Church by Sessions, Presbyteries, and Synods was in the meantime authorised, steps were promptly taken to hinder the Church from attempting to ward off coming evils. At various Synods held during April and May, strong expressions of loyalty to the existing order of things, and protests against innovations, were uttered. In several instances proceedings were interfered with and the Synods forcibly dissolved by persons sent by the Royal Commissioner to watch over matters. In the case of the Synod of Dumfries, it is specially recorded that the Earl of Queensberry and the Earl of Hartfield, who perpetrated this outrage at it, were both 'miserably drunk' when they came in to discharge their invidious task.[3] The Westminster Divines had maintained the right of the civil magistrate to be present at Synods and 'to provide that whatever was transacted at them should be according to the mind of God.'[4] They had prescribed that if the civil magistrate were a heathen, Synods might be held independently of him,[5] but they had not legislated for the case in which he was nominally Christian and was present in a state of intoxication and hostility. The Synod of Aberdeen was the only one which welcomed the prospect of the re-establishment of Episcopacy, and even this alluded to the matter in covert and ambiguous terms. Twenty-four years before they had been coerced into accepting the Covenant and Presbyterianism. They now lamented the weakness which had been their misfortune, if not indeed their fault: and with

[1] Wodrow, *History*, i. 151.
[2] Baillie, *Letters*, iii. 459.
[3] Wodrow, *History*, i. 123; Kirkton, *History*, p. 118.
[4] *Confession of Faith*, chap. xxiii.
[5] *Ibid*, chap. xxxi.

that fervid penitence which often accompanies acknowledgment of the sins of others, they deplored the rebellion against the royal authority in the previous reign which had had such wide-reaching results.[1]

The matter of settling the government of the Church had been formally entrusted to the King by the decision of Parliament, and it was carefully considered by him and his leading councillors in Scotch affairs. The statutes which established Presbyterianism in Scotland had been blotted out, and that form of Church government now only existed as a temporary arrangement, but it was by no means a matter of course that it should be abolished. The Cavalier party in England, with which Middleton and Glencairn were in full sympathy, was eager for the policy of abolition, but Charles himself, though behind none of them in his hatred of Presbyterianism, was inclined to doubt the wisdom of the proposal. On every account it was a matter of great moment to him that Scotland should be well affected to his government.[2] It cannot be doubted that he was anxious to increase greatly the power of the Crown, and the experience of his father had shown what serious obstacles in the way of such a scheme a disaffected party in Scotland might raise. He openly declared that he well remembered the great aversion of many in Scotland to the rule of cleric over cleric involved in Episcopal government.[3] He was strongly supported by the Earl of Lauderdale and the Earl of Crawford, who assured him that the national dislike to that form of ecclesiastical rule was strong and that the opposition to it would be both fierce and obstinate. They recommended either that a General Assembly in Scotland should be summoned to consider the matter, or that the ablest Divines on both sides should be consulted regarding it.[4] Some very plain statements were made by the Duke of Hamilton which must have grated harshly upon the ears of Charles. He reminded the King that the Acts of Assembly

[1] Grub, *Ecclesiastical History of Scotland*, iii. 181.
[2] Burnet, *History of My Own Times*, i. 107.
[3] *Ibid.* i. 131.
[4] Mackenzie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland*, p. 54.

which had fixed the present constitution of the Church in Scotland and had been approved by Royal Commissioners were yet unrepealed,[1] and he roundly declared that the Act Rescissory would not have passed so smoothly as it did but for the letter of His Majesty to the ministers of Edinburgh promising to continue and protect Presbytery.[2] On the other hand, Middleton and Sharp asserted that no serious opposition to the change was likely to be encountered. The Protesters, as being both insignificant in numbers and in danger of suppression on account of their disloyalty, might be left out of account, while the Resolutioners with but few exceptions would, they said, acquiesce in the change. The King was told that public feeling in Scotland had altered very much during the ten years which had elapsed since he was there, and that the Presbyterian party had been discredited in the estimation of the people at large by their high-handed procedure when in power. The Duke of Ormond urged the consideration that it would be difficult to maintain Episcopacy in Ireland, if Presbyterianism were continued in Scotland, as the northern counties of Ireland, in consequence of the strong Scotch element in the population there, were very much affected by what took place in Scotland. All were agreed that if the change were to be made it should be made at once, while the loyal feelings with which the Restoration had been welcomed were still warm, and before an Act of Indemnity had been passed in Scotland. This last-mentioned circumstance was quite worth taking into account, for legislating is rendered a distinctly easier task when the bowstring is round the necks of political opponents. These various arguments weighed with Charles, and he consented, though 'with visible reluctancy,' to the change of Church government in Scotland of which a majority of his councillors approved.[3]

The new order of things was ushered in by a royal

[1] These Acts were rescinded by Parliament on Sept. 5, 1662.

[2] Mackenzie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland*, p. 55.

[3] Burnet, *History of My Own Times*, i. 131; Wodrow, *History*, i. 224; *Life of Robert Blair*, p. 395; Mackenzie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland*, p. 52. Kirkton, *History*, pp. 128, 131.

proclamation made with great pomp at the Market-Cross of Edinburgh on Sept. 6, 1661.[1] In this it was declared that the King having promised to maintain the Church of Scotland settled by law, and the Parliament having rescinded all Acts passed since the late troubles began, the system he was now bound to maintain was that government by bishops which had been abolished twenty-three years before. Apart from the fact that this step was in flagrant violation both of earlier oaths and of recent promises to protect the Presbyterian establishment, the cynical shamelessness of the terms in which the change was announced was nothing less than revolting. Even the zealous Episcopalian historian, Dr. Grub, is at one with us in this opinion. 'The manner,' he says, 'in which the re-establishment of episcopal government was announced admits of no defence. To justify the changes by an express reference to the letter of August 1660, and to pretend that the repeal of the various statutes in favour of Presbyterianism, which was effected by the influence of the Crown, made Episcopacy the form of church government settled by law which he was now bound in terms of that letter to maintain, was a fraud and delusion. This proceeding shook all confidence in the King's sincerity, and excited a strong dislike to the episcopal polity, at the very time when it was most important to conciliate the national feeling in its favour.'[2]

That Charles was subjected to a certain amount of pressure in entering on this line of policy we have seen, but neither that nor any other consideration should have moved him to present himself to his subjects in the character of a perjurer and a cheat. The political party which was now dominant in England were 'Highfliers' in the matter of Episcopacy and ascribed the King's willingness to leave Presbyterianism undisturbed to religious indifference.[3] To

[1] Nicoll, *Diary*, p. 340; Mackenzie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland*, p. 57.

[2] *Ecclesiastical History of Scotland*, iii. 185.

[3] Burnet, *History of My Own Times*, i. 131; Wodrow, *History*, i. 224.

their religious zeal was added the political consideration that by means of the Bishops in Parliament the Crown would recover the complete control over the transaction of affairs there which had been wrested from it twenty years before.[1] Bishops, too, were generally credited with holding the doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of commending to subjects the duty of passive obedience in all circumstances.[2] These were ideas which the Cavalier statesmen of the Restoration deemed it desirable to implant in Scotland, though the political climate there was somewhat unpromising for their growth in anything like luxuriance. Not many years were to pass before even in the region where these ideas were indigenous Bishops would welcome an armed invader of the territory of the Lord's Anointed ; but by that time the *reductio ad absurdum* of their principles and of the House of Stewart was quite complete.[3]

[1] *The Great Marquess*, p. 93. [2] Kirkton, *History*, p. 131.
[3] Henson, *English Religion in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 149.

THE REBELLION OF THE EARLS, 1569

The Alexander Prize, 1905

By Miss R. R. REID, M.A. (Lond.)

PREFACE

A POPULAR movement like the Rebellion of the Earls can always be treated from two distinct standpoints, the national and the local. Hitherto, the Rebellion has always been treated from the national standpoint, with the result that, so far as I am aware, there is no book dealing with the Rebellion alone. All accounts of it must be sought in general histories such as those named below. I would specially mention the chapter in the 'Cambridge Modern History' in which Mr. Law has anticipated all the conclusions which I have been able to draw from my own examination of the sources. The local point of view, on the other hand, has been almost wholly ignored, and affords more opportunity for investigation; to it, therefore, I have confined myself. I cannot pretend that the essay is exhaustive, as circumstances have prevented me from investigating the local sources, such as Corporation and Town Records, Parish Registers and the like. Nevertheless, this contribution may not be wholly without value, since it is based on a careful study of the material preserved at the Public Record Office and in the British Museum.

The printed Collections of most value are:—the Calendar of the State Papers Domestic, Addenda VII., which covers the years 1566 to 1579, half the volume being devoted to the years 1569-70; the Hatfield MSS.; Sharpe's Memorials of the Rebellion of 1569; and the Sadler Letters.

Of MSS., the Lansdowne Collection contains many interesting papers which have not been printed; those in the Cotton and Harleian Collections have for the most part been printed or at least fully calendared in the Calendar of Scottish Papers, the important exception being Calig. B. ix. 6, more fully referred to in the Notes. At the Record Office is Humberston's Survey, the report of the Commissioners sent to deal with the rebels' lands in 1570; it throws much interesting light on the life of the tenants in the North.

The Surtees Collections do not contain much matter dealing directly with the Rebellion, but they serve to show the close relationship of the families of Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland, as well as the strength of Catholicism.

I cannot conclude without an acknowledgement of gratitude for the assistance given to me by Professor Pollard and by Mr. Hall and his colleagues at the Record Office in directing my attention to possible sources of information.

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THE REBELLION OF THE EARLS

THE Rebellion of the Earls in 1569 was not only the last baronial rising in England but also the one attempt made by the Catholics to undo by armed force the Church settlement of Elizabeth and Cecil. As such, it has always attracted the attention of historians of the Reformation in England. Camden, Stow, and Holinshed have devoted considerable space to it in their Annals and Chronicles; modern writers, from Froude to the investigators to whom we owe the 'Cambridge Modern History,' have made the main outline and the importance of the Rebellion so clear that another attempt to go over the familiar ground seems wholly superfluous. Closer examination, however, reveals the fact that the episode has hitherto been treated only from the standpoint of national or ecclesiastical politics; the local conditions which in the last resort gave the Earls so large a following among the yeomen and gentry of the North have been almost entirely neglected. Yet, in these latter days we have come to see that the clue to popular movements must often be sought elsewhere than in Courts and Council Chambers, and that the silent working of economic and social changes is of more effect than the decree of a statesman or the despatch of an ambassador.

In this essay, therefore, no attempt will be made to recount a familiar tale; a knowledge of the main outline of the Rebellion will be assumed; and stress will be laid rather on some of the less-known and particularly local aspects of the movement. Let me add that, as the aim of the essay is to show why the Earls and their followers rebelled, their case will be presented entirely from their point of view, so far as it can be ascertained.

The great upland, rising steeply to heights of 1,000 and 1,500 feet, which forms the Northern counties of Yorkshire, Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland, and Westmoreland, was in the sixteenth century a natural refuge for lost causes.

In the long dales scored deep in the sides of the upland by streams which in winter are foaming torrents, were grouped in lonely hamlets the homesteads of the hardy peasants whose sheep and cattle were pastured on moorland wastes,[1] over which the red deer still roamed.[2] Below, where the dales opened on to the lowland of the vales and of the plains flanking the upland, rose the strong castles whence the feudal lords who ruled the land rode out to punish raiding Scots and thieving outlaws. South of the Border country, the castles were replaced by little towns where busy workers wove the dalesmen's wool into cloth for the merchants of Newcastle and Hull. In the broad vales and on the plain beyond lay the manor houses of the nobles and gentry, surrounded by rich meadow and corn-land, with here and there a park, a wood, the remains of ancient forest. Four such districts there were, each dominated by a fortified cathedral city. On the west, Chester guarded the entrance to the plain of Lancashire; on the east, York rose over against the junction of the Vales of York and Pickering; northwards, Newcastle, the outpost of Durham, guarded the eastern, as Carlisle did the western, end of the Tyne Gap, through which ran the only road across the upland.

Politically, the isolation of Lancashire was marked by the separate administration of the Duchy, as that of the dales was reflected in the numerous liberties and franchises which effectually checked the growth of royal authority in the North.[3] Here, under the constant menace of a Scottish inroad, feudalism flourished long after it had fallen into decay in the peaceful South. Here, men lived secluded, unaffected by the slow advance of that doubtful blessing which we call Progress.

[1] Humberston's Survey, in Public Record Office, K. R. Miscellaneous Books, 37 and 38 (henceforth referred to as Humberston).

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *E.g.*, Gargrave writes to Cecil in Feb. 1570 that in Yorkshire 'the sheriff has small force, the liberties are so many and so great.' *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 219, cf 27 Henry VIII. c. 24. Humberston also gives a good deal of information on the numerous Courts Leet in the North.

A critical period in the history of the North was the year 1536. In that year Henry VIII. deprived all lords of liberties and franchises of their criminal jurisdiction, and of their right of appointing Justices.[1] Immediately afterwards, the Pilgrimage of Grace and the death of the Earl of Northumberland placed in his hands many of the strongest Border fortresses, as well as great estates. In the following year the Council of the North was established as the supreme judicial and administrative authority north of the Trent.[2]

The extension of royal control over the outlying parts of the kingdom was essential to the growth of national unity; but under Elizabeth every class found reason to regret its advance in the North. Hitherto these changes, important as they were, had made little difference to the gentry or to the earls and barons of the North, who continued to exercise, as royal officials, the power no longer theirs as feudal lords. Elizabeth, however, distrusting the ancient nobility and gentry, who were strongly Catholic, gave her confidence to Cecil and Leicester, and in civil administration preferred 'new men' and Protestants, to the exclusion of the local gentry.

The resentment excited was shared by the whole people. Although Henry could destroy the feudal power of the great Border families, he could not uproot 'the olde good-wyll of the people, deepe-graftyd in their harts, to their nobles and gentlemen,'[3] and in Northumberland at least, 'they knew no other Prince but a Percy.'[4] In truth, the Percies, the Dacres, and the Nevilles were lords after the hearts of the North-country men. Ever they kept open house, with meat and

[1] 27 Henry VIII. c. 24, 'An Act concerning Power of Pardon for Treasons.' Aimed specially at the County Palatine of Durham, the Act was not without effect in other liberties, *e.g.* Hexhamshire. The prominent part taken in the Rebellion by Durham men is striking. Dr. Lapsley has shown how tenacious of their semi-independence the St. Cuthbert's men were. (Lapsley, *The County Palatine of Durham.*)

[2] Letters and Papers of Henry VIII., especially No. 595 under the year 1537.

[3] Sharpe, *Memorials of the Rebellion of 1569*, p. x (henceforth referred to as Sharpe).

[4] Hunsdon to the Privy Council, Dec. 31, 1569. Foreign Calendar, El. ix. No. 568.

drink for all who came;[1] they rode always with a noble company of servants, and orderly apparel;[2] their amusement they sought, not in dicing, but in pastimes of hawking and hunting.[3] Far other were the men to whom the Queen entrusted her castles: absentee keepers, who kept few retainers and suffered the buildings to fall into ruins.[4] The leaseholders of the Crown lands, too, were men who did not live in the country, but, seeking their own profits, fined the tenants and enclosed the lands to the great grief of the farmers.[5]

As the chief of the Percies, it would have been only prudent for Elizabeth to conciliate the Earl of Northumberland.[6] On the contrary, he was forced by a series of petty slights and insults to resign his Wardenship of the East and Middle Marches, within a year of her accession,[7] when he had the mortification of seeing the Middle March entrusted to his enemy, Sir John Forster. As Steward of Richmondshire, he urged upon the Queen the justice of her tenants' claim to the

[1] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. pp. 255, 257. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] *S. P.* Dom. Add. El. xii. 68, and *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. pp. 74, 81.

[4] *S. P.* Dom. Add. Mary, viii. 55, 71, 83; *S. P.* Dom. Add. El. xii. 68; Hatfield MSS. part i., No. 1211; Cotton MSS. Calig. B. ix. 6. This paper is entitled 'Causes of the decay of servitors [*i.e.* retainers and tenants bound to military service] of the borders chefely in the Middle Marches of England.' These are given as: '(1) The long peace; (2) Exactions of owners and possessioners; (3) Her Majesty's possessions there leased to inland men [*i.e.* not belonging to the Borders]; (4) Absence of captains and keepers of castles, fortes, and houses of defence; (5) Private quarrels among the gentlemen; (6) The dearth and scarcity of horses; (7) The sale of horses into Scotland.' The paper is undated and placed among those of Mary's reign, but internal evidence would transfer it to Elizabeth's reign, and a comparison with Hunsdon's Instructions in 1568 (*Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 778) would seem to fix its date in that year. The paper is a decidedly interesting one. The other references are to particular illustrations of the general statement.

[5] Cotton MSS. Calig. B. ix. 6; and *S. P.* Dom. Add. Mary, viii. 55; Foreign Calendar, (1563) No. 1280.

[6] Influenced by his wife Anne, daughter of the Earl of Worcester, he opposed Elizabeth's ecclesiastical legislation (Spanish Calendar, i. No. 294) and ultimately made a profession of the Catholic faith. (Sharpe, Northumberland's confession.)

[7] Sadler Letters, ii. 58, 79, 108. Elizabeth seems to have suspected that Northumberland was intriguing with the French on behalf of Mary Queen of Scots. A little later he certainly offended the Scottish Queen by claiming and keeping as treasure trove a sum of money on its way to her from Spain.

establishment of their custom;[1] his reward was a sharp reprimand for not considering the Queen's interests alone,[2] and the Commission subsequently sent down was instructed to ignore him altogether.[3]

Matters were not improved by the arrangements made for the custody of Mary, Queen of Scots, on her arrival in England. As she landed at Workington, a town belonging to the Earl, he claimed that by feudal law he alone could be her host. Armed with an order obtained from the Council of the North, he hurried to Carlisle in order to remove the fugitive to one of his own castles. The Deputy Warden refused to surrender her; and the Queen, forbidding the Earl to interfere with Scrope and Knollys, summoned him to Court.[4]

To insult, injury had been added. Elizabeth, seeking gold and silver for her coinage, copper for her new artillery,[5] had, by Letters Patent, appointed commissioners to seek for and work mines of those metals wherever found in the northern counties.[6] The lords of the soil refused to confirm the Letters by Act of Parliament;[7] but the Queen asserted her right to the metals in virtue of her royal prerogative, and her contention was upheld by the Exchequer Court as against the Earl of Northumberland, who thereby lost a fine copper mine in Cumberland.[8]

Wronged and insulted, there was nothing but a reluctance to enter on civil war, to hold back a great feudal baron like Northumberland from seeking to play in England the part played by Condé in France. Elizabeth, having done her best to rouse the Earl's resentment, constantly suspected him of being led by it into correspondence with the French and Scottish Courts.[9] The suspicion was quite unjust, for the

[1] *S. P.* Dom. Add. El. xii. 24, 25. [2] *Ibid.* 10, 24, 25. [3] *Ibid.* 23.
[4] *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 665, 670, 671.
[5] Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry.*
[6] Lansdowne MSS. 5. 47.
[7] *Journal of the House of Lords.* The bill was read a first time Dec. 4, and a second time Dec. 5, but not a third time.
[8] See Appendix. [9] Teulet, *Papiers d'état*, tome ii. p. 83.

Earl, a simple soul and an ardent sportsman, had no skill in intrigue.

Equally popular, equally injured, the three Dacre brothers, Leonard, Edward, and Francis, became equally dangerous to the Government. When their brother Thomas, Lord Dacre, died in 1566, they tried in vain to secure a portion of their father's lands, but all was given to their nephew George, fifth Lord Dacre.[1] Their widowed sister-in-law, with whom they had quarrelled, married in 1567 the Duke of Norfolk, who used his influence at Court to obtain the guardianship of the boy and his sisters.[2] The Duke abused his position, and at the instance of his new wife treated the tenants with harshness and oppression;[3] so that we find a servant of Leonard Dacre writing to him in 1569, that 'the poor people, who favour you and your house, cry and call for you and your blood to rule them.'[4]

If the nobles and gentry suffered from Elizabeth's administration, the tenants and farmers fared no better.

So long as the relations of England and Scotland were unfriendly, the utmost vigilance had been exercised on the Borders; but the long peace which followed the overthrow of Catholicism in Scotland discouraged active interest in the northern counties, and it was not till Mary's arrival in the North drew Elizabeth's attention thither, that any inquiry into the state of the Borders was made. The reports then sent in by Hunsdon,[5] Drury,[6] and Knollys,[7] show that the decay of the Borders, which had called for the Tillage Act for the Northern Counties in 1555,[8] was steadily progressing.

This decay was marked by the disappearance of the well-armed horsemen who had in former days defended the Borders against the Scots, and by the decay of castles, houses and tillage.[9] As revealed by the special inquiries[10]

[1] *S. P.* Dom. El. xl. 86.
[2] Sharpe, 'Leonard Dacre'; *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 257.
[3] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. pp. 35–38.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 257. [5] Foreign Calendar, El. viii. p. 540. [6] *Ibid.* p. 541.
[7] *Ibid.* pp. 549–50. [8] 2 & 3 Ph. and Mary, c. I.
[9] Cotton MSS. Calig. B. ix. 6. [10] *Ibid.*

and by the instructions to the Commissioners appointed under the Tillage Act,[1] the causes fall into two classes: those for which the Government was directly responsible, and those which arose from the economic changes characteristic of the sixteenth century.

To the first class belong the granting of castles to non-resident captains and the leasing of the Crown lands to inland men, already mentioned. To these must be added the negligence of the Wardens, especially of Sir John Forster,[2] who permitted the rank-riders of Tynedale and Redesdale to raid and harry the Borders at will, until the unhappy farmers of Northumberland and Durham, who were 'able to keep no greater number of cattle of any kind than might lie in house at night,'[3] feared the English thieves more than the Scots.[4] The disorder was increased by the factions among the gentlemen, whose retainers could hardly meet without fighting, one of the worst offenders being the Warden of the Middle March himself.[5] The Council of the North seems to have been powerless to check the prevailing disorder, while the practice, peculiar to Elizabeth's reign, of holding all its sessions at York greatly impoverished the Borders, by reason of the heavy charges incident to travel.[6]

The economic changes responsible for the second class of causes—the substitution of profitable sheep and cattle for unprofitable horses,[7] and the increase of fines and gressoms exacted from the tenants[8]—did not affect the North till the second half of the century. Then the sharp rise in the price

[1] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 66; and *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. p. 487. There were several of these Commissions: in 1557 (*S. P.* Dom. Add. Mary, viii. 55, 71), in Nov. 1568 (*Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 65), and in July 1569 (*Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 78), but unfortunately their reports seem to have perished with the other records of the Council of the North.

[2] Foreign Calendar, El. viii. 540, 541. [3] Humberston. [4] *Ibid.*

[5] Calig. B. ix. 6; *S. P.* Dom. Add. Mary, viii. 92, 106; Hatfield MSS., part i. 1212, 1213; *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 225. It is in the quarrel between Sir John Forster and the Percies that we doubtless find the explanation of the continuance of Forster in his Wardenship. He was evidently quite unfit for the position, but he was useful as a check on Northumberland.

[6] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 60.

[7] Calig. B. ix. 6. [8] *Ibid.*

of wool between 1540 and 1550 caused a great demand for sheep farms.[1] A good deal of poor arable land was converted into pasture, and the new demand induced the gentlemen to let their demesnes by indenture. The rents demanded from the leaseholders were very heavy, 'so that no land in England is dearer';[2] and at the same time the decrease in the value of money and the general rise of prices characteristic of the century led to an increase in the amount and frequency of the fines exacted from the copyholders.[3] The distress caused by the rise in rents and fines was only aggravated by the Statute of Artificers (1563), which checked the development of cloth-weaving as a domestic industry in the country districts

For the enclosures which in the South had caused so much bitterness there was little need or scope in the North. The country was essentially pastoral and therefore little affected by the economic problems peculiar to the agricultural and industrial regions. On the one hand, the high pasture most suitable for sheep was useless for tillage and had always been common;[5] on the other, so much of the land as was not demesne was generally held by copy of the Court Roll after the custom of the Honour of Cockermouth.[6] Only on the

[1] Rogers, *Hist. of Agr. and Prices*, iv. 305-6.

[2] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 308. [3] Humberston.

[4] Cunningham, ii. p. 24.

[5] Humberston. These remarks, like the evidence, apply only to Cumberland, Westmorland, Northumberland, Durham, and the North Riding. In the West and East Ridings, which were specially concerned in the Pilgrimage of Grace, the conditions were quite different, most of the land being arable, not pasture. These two Ridings so closely resemble the Midlands that Yorkshire was naturally included with the country south of the Trent in the agrarian legislation of 1517 and succeeding years, while the counties north of the Tees had to wait till 1555 for similar legislation. Even then, the Tillage Act seems to be more concerned with the decay of houses and castles, and with the disappearance of the horsemen, than with the progress of enclosure. The most important enclosure, apart from those on the Crown lands referred to in the text, was that of the Forest of Westward, near Carlisle, in 1569 (*Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. Eliz. vii. pp. 82, 367). The Earl of Northumberland, however, seems to have been moved only by a desire to preserve the fallow deer, which were disturbed by the cattle driven into the forest by the farmers, who thus saved them from the Scots.

[6] *Ibid.* Humberston writes thus: 'To the honor [of Cockermouth] belong many customary tenants who hold their land by copy of the Court Roll to them

Crown lands in Richmondshire, Durham (Barnard Castle), Cumberland and Northumberland were there many customary tenants. Characteristically enough, Elizabeth, seeking higher profits from the Crown lands, sent down Commissioners in 1564 and 1565 to let the parks and farms on these estates.[1] The Earl of Northumberland as Steward of Richmondshire remonstrated, with the results already noted;[2] and next year the Commissioners returned to let all the Queen's lands in the above mentioned counties on condition of military service and of 'enclosure by quickset hedge.'[3] It is significant that Richmondshire alone sent the Earls over 1,200 men during the Rebellion.[4]

While the prosperity of the North was thus declining, partly through misgovernment, partly through economic changes which no one understood, the hostility to Elizabeth's religious policy was steadily growing.

Accepted as the only refuge from civil war, Elizabeth's accession had been allowed rather than welcomed by the Catholics, who felt some doubt as to her religious policy. The doubt was justified by the event; and the passage of the Act of Uniformity in spite of the opposition of the spiritual and temporal peers, was followed by an exodus of the more

and their heirs doing suit to the lord's court, service by himself and all his family to the Borders when necessity shall require, and paying his fine at the lord's will after the death, alienation, or exchange of any lord and tenant; which custom hath heretofore been by the lords of that honor so reasonably used as all the most of the customary tenants of the Earls in all the counties of Cumberland, Northumberland, York, and the Bishopric of Durham, have in all their ancient grants and copies, to hold to them and their heirs according to the custom of the honor of Cockermouth. The like grants have been made by the lords of manors within the county of Cumberland, wherewith the tenants thought themselves well pleased and in good estate.'

[1] *S. P.* Dom. Add. El. xii. 23.

[2] As far back as 1562 it had been suggested that the tenants should be deprived of their custom, and they sent to Northumberland a petition that he would intercede for them. Lansdowne MSS. 5, 43.

[3] *S. P.* Dom. Add. El. xii. 69, 70, It is interesting to note that in 1568 Hunsdon is instructed to reassure the tenants at Etell, &c., who feared the loss of their custom (*Cal. Sc. P.* 778).

[4] Sharpe, p. 143.

fervent Catholics, who went into voluntary exile.[1] Elizabeth, however, moved cautiously in demanding conformity, especially in the Northern Province, where the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, although they deprived many of the clergy, refrained from administering the oath to the laity.[2] Not until 1563 was the first 'Test'[3] Act passed, and inquiries made through the bishops in the following year,[4] revealed the fact that, as Cecil wrote in 1565, 'hardly a third of the whole number of Justices was fully assured to be trusted in the matter of religion.'[5] In fact, more than half of the gentlemen of England, including 'the judges and most of the lawyers, both of the common law and the civil,'[6] were unfavourable to the policy of the Government.

The same inquiries showed that, as was to be expected, the hostility to the alterations was strongest in the North and West. The Diocese of Chester was notoriously Catholic, and the churches were empty. In Richmondshire were many churches where, owing to the ignorance of the pastors, there had been no sermons since the beginning of the reign.[7] Everywhere, the people gladly hired for small wages the many Scottish priests who had fled from Knox's Reformation.[8] According to Bishop Pilkington, these men did 'more harm than any other would or could in dissuading the people.'[9] Add the influence of the books and letters sent in by the scholars living at Louvain, who were maintained by

[1] *E.g.* Sir Francis Englefield, Sir Nicholas and Dr. Morton, Thomas Markenfeld.

[2] Gee, *The Elizabethan Clergy*, p. 169.

[3] 5 Eliz. c. 1. Test Act, in the sense that the oath of supremacy was made the condition of office, in certain directions.

[4] Hatfield MSS. i. 1024, and *Camden Misc.* ix.

[5] *S. P.* Dom. El. xxxvi. 65. The passage occurs in a memorial on the dangers likely to arise from Mary's marriage with Darnley.

[6] Lansd. MSS. 102, 79. The paper is a summary of the dangers of England, sent from Cecil by Mr. Sampson to the Duke of Norfolk. See also Maitland, *English Law and the Renaissance*, notes, and the Calendar of the Register of the Inns of Court.

[7] *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 529; *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 64.

[8] *Camden Misc.* ix.

[9] *Ibid.*

the Hospital at Newcastle or by their near cousins ;[1] and it is little wonder that 'religion' steadily declined in the North, until Sadler could say in December 1569, 'there be not in all this country ten gentlemen that do favour and allow of Her Majesty's proceedings in religion, and the common people be ignorant, full of superstition, and altogether blinded with tholde Popish doctryne.'[2]

Catholic as the North was, there was no disposition to repeat the Pilgrimage of Grace so long as the laws against recusancy were not enforced. Rebellion without union was certain to fail, and the personal quarrels of the Earls and gentlemen of the North made concerted action impossible.[3]

Certainly, there was no thought of deposing Elizabeth in favour of Mary Stuart, who was, after all, a foreigner and a Scot. The objectionable features of Elizabeth's policy and administration were ascribed to the influence of Cecil, and the Catholics were encouraged to hope that by his removal they would obtain concessions, or at least toleration, in religion, and the settlement of the succession by Mary's recognition as heir-presumptive. Beyond this they did not go.

The encouragement was derived from the knowledge that many of the Protestants were equally anxious for a declaration in Mary's favour, since Elizabeth would not marry. Again, the civil administration was just as unpopular with the Protestant nobles as with the Catholics; and the Duke of Norfolk with the Earls of Sussex and Pembroke and others of the ancient nobility viewed with jealousy and distrust the confidence bestowed on Cecil and Leicester by the Queen. Thus, ambition and revenge urged them to join the Catholic peers in seeking to remove their rivals from the Royal Councils.[4] Their efforts were without avail; but

[1] *Camden Misc.* ix. *E.g.* The sons of Sir Thomas Metham; *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 224.

[2] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 139.

[3] See p. 180, note 5. Francis Norton speaks of his own quarrel with Northumberland, *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 390.

[4] La Mothe Fénelon, *Correspondance*, i. 258.

they fostered an expectation of a change of policy, which was not without effect on the Catholics, both English and foreign.

Mary's arrival in the North (May, 1568) did not change the disposition and aims of the Catholics, but it quickened their hopes; it was when these faded, that the smouldering fire of discontent burst into the flames of revolt.

At first, everything combined to encourage the Catholics in expecting the early fulfilment of their hopes. Honour and interest alike seemed to dictate to Elizabeth a policy of moderation. Recognising that 'one that hath a crown can hardly persuade another to leave her crown, because her subjects will not obey,'[1] she realised to the full the danger of breaking with her rival until it was certain that no one would or could take up arms on her behalf. Aware that most of her subjects regarded Mary as her heir, aware, too, of the just cause of offence she had given to France, she inclined to clear Mary of the charge of murder and restore her to her throne, if in turn, the Queen of Scots would ratify the Treaty of Leith and break the League with France. On the other hand, Cecil and the Protestants urged that Elizabeth should, in virtue of her superiority over Scotland, find Mary judicially guilty of her husband's murder, and keep her in England as a hostage for the neutrality of France. Between these two policies Elizabeth wavered; and as she inclined to the one or to the other, so the hopes of the Catholics rose or fell.

In the Queen's hesitation to adopt Cecil's policy, and in the attitude of his Protestant opponents, who feared the failure of the succession should James's death and her own condemnation leave Mary childless and dishonoured,[2] the Catholics saw their opportunity. The terms of the Tripartite Treaty, as arranged in August,[3] were in accordance with their views,

[1] *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 941.

[2] See Sussex's opinion as expressed to Cecil Oct. 22, 1568 (Hatfield MSS. i. 1201).

[3] *S. P.* Dom. El. xlvii. 36. These notes in Cecil's hand are interesting because they contain a clause omitted from the Treaty offered at York, to the effect that the marriage with Bothwell is to be undone by order of law and Parliament.

and they sought to smooth the way for their acceptance by suggesting that as a guarantee of good faith Mary should marry the Duke of Norfolk.[1] The design had a further advantage, in that it would enlist for the Catholic cause the powerful support of the greatest noble in the country. Mary, knowing that the proposed marriage would be grateful to the English people, perhaps to Elizabeth, and not unpleasing either to her Scottish subjects or to the French Court, assented; and, at her urgent request, the Earl of Northumberland laid the proposal before the Duke soon after his arrival at York to preside at the Conference of October 1568. Approached at the same time by Lethington, who made the same proposal on behalf of the Scots, Norfolk hesitated, inclining to refusal. Suddenly, Elizabeth veered round to Cecil's policy, and summoned the Commissioners to London, intending to delay decision until the upshot of the troubles in France and Flanders was clear,[2] and at the same time to arrange for any alliance with Moray which would give her the guardianship of James.

The transfer of the Conference to London, and the consequent check to the schemes of the Catholics, brought to the fore a small but influential party among them who in their hearts disliked the Norfolk marriage. The leaders were the Earl of Northumberland, Leonard Dacre, and Richard Norton, High Sheriff of Yorkshire.[3]

Northumberland, as a recent convert to Catholicism,[4] was sufficiently enthusiastic to desire Mary's marriage with a Catholic, even if he were a foreign prince, rather than with a Protestant Duke.[5] Quite naturally, Dacre was most unwilling to advance one at whose hands he and his had suffered

[1] Sharpe. Northumberland in his Confession explicitly states that the proposal was made to him by Christopher Lassells, that he disapproved, and that at Mary's instance he broke the matter to Norfolk a week after the latter's arrival at York.

[2] *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 822.

[3] His house, Norton Conyers, was two miles from Ripon (*Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 959).

[4] His reconciliation with the Catholic Church was effected in 1567. (See next note.)

[5] Confession in Sharpe, and *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 403.

so much wrong. Norton belonged to the small minority of extreme Catholics whose later intrigues caused Elizabeth so much anxiety and entailed on their more moderate co-religionists so much hardship. Richard Norton had taken part with his father and brother in the Pilgrimage of Grace; he and his family were staunch Catholics, and they numbered among their friends and relatives the leading Catholic gentry of Durham and the North Riding.[1] One of his sons-in-law, Thomas Markenfeld, whose influence in stirring up the Rebellion was considerable, was a voluntary exile in Rome; there he was familiar with Sir Nicholas and Dr. Morton, to whose family another son-in-law belonged. Most of Richard Norton's sons went with their mother's family, the Nevilles,[2] in desiring Mary's marriage with Norfolk;[3] but Francis, the eldest, and Christopher, the seventh son entered into the plans made by Northumberland and Dacre for Mary's release.[4] As Northumberland said in his confession, they 'hoped by having her to have some reformation in religion, or at least some sufferance for men to use their conscience as they were disposed; and also the liberty of freedome of her whom' they 'accounted the second person, and right heyre apparente';[5] he might have added, 'with liberty to marry whom she would.'

The first attempt to release Mary had been made about three weeks after her arrival at Bolton, when Argyle and Huntly were in arms on the Border.[6] Through Hamlyn, Northumberland's man, and Christopher Norton, an officer of the guard placed over the Scottish Queen, arrangements were made for her escape, after which she would be carried by Dacre's horsemen to the Border,[7] where Ferniehurst was

[1] Surtees Soc., *Testamenta Eboracensia*, and *Wills and Inventories*.

[2] Richard Norton's wife was Susan, d. of Lord Latimer (Sharpe).

[3] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. 403.

[4] *Ibid.* It was probably for this reason that Christopher was executed while his brothers William and Marmaduke were pardoned.

[5] *Ibid.* Sharpe.

[6] Haynes, p. 594.

[7] *S. P.* Dom. El. lxvii. 59. It is true that this evidence is from a tainted source, since Strelly or Stirley was a spy, also that Christopher denied it. Yet

ready to receive her.[1] The plot failed, it is said, through the hesitation, perhaps the treachery, of Norton's superior, Reed, the Captain of Berwick.[2] In any case, Moray defeated Argyle and Huntly, and the Commissioners proceeded to York, where Northumberland yielded to Mary's entreaty and broke the matter of the marriage to Norfolk.

Now (*i.e.* November 1568), Dacre and the Nortons became active again. Northumberland himself was summoned to Hampton Court, and took the opportunity to seek with the Spanish Ambassador a secret interview,[3] during which he hinted at the desire of many of the English Catholics for Mary's acceptance of Philip's offer of a marriage with himself, with the Archduke Charles, or with Don John.[4] Meanwhile, Argyle and Huntly had risen again, and the Nortons were making ready to release Mary, seize Berwick, and capture or kill Moray, Forster and Knollys,[5] when the situation was changed by Elizabeth's high-handed seizure of the treasure destined for Alba. With England on the verge of war with Spain, the Catholics could afford to wait before attempting desperate remedies.

During the next eight months, the efforts of the Catholics were directed to the overthrow of Cecil, and the furtherance of Mary's restoration and marriage with Norfolk; but the intrigues now set on foot assumed international

we know that his brother Francis was concerned in the scheme and the probability is that Christopher *was* the agent.

[1] *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 779. Perhaps the riot caused by the Dacres at Carlisle Assizes in the beginning of August was really an attempt to seize Carlisle. The Government seems to have thought so. (*Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 55 ff.)

[2] At least two other attempts are alleged, but no dates can be fixed, tempting as it is to take a hint from the night attack on the scouts at Berwick on Sept. 3. For. Cal. El. viii. pp. 540, 542.

[3] *Cal. S. P.* Spanish, El. ii. p. 96, 97. Friendship for Spain was no new thing with Northumberland (Sp. Cal. i. p. 565). Nor was he alone in offering it; Norfolk and others did the same from the beginning of the reign (Sp. Cal. i. p. 107).

[4] Made known to Elizabeth through Arundel (*Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 940).

[5] *S. P.* Dom. El. lxvii. 59, and Camden, *Annales* (3rd ed.), p. 112. The disorder of the Border, especially in the Middle March, is shown by the murder of the keeper of Harbottle (Hatfield MSS. i. 1214) and the fight between Forster's men and Northumberland's retainers (*ibid.* 1213).

importance, and are outside the scope of this essay. With Elizabeth's refusal to declare Mary her heir, or restore her to the throne and marry her to an Englishman, the interest shifts back to the North.

During the summer the restlessness and disorder of the North had been steadily growing.[1] This was partly due to the stir made by the musters of able men ordered by the Queen in March[2] and June.[3] There had been threats of war from France,[4] and the attempt to arrest Cecil on a charge of high treason had alarmed Elizabeth, making her look to her defences. The country was hopelessly weak, and orders were given to increase the demands made on the gentry for harquebusiers. To force the men to practise shooting, the statutes against unlawful games were strictly enforced, and even the ordinary summer games were all but prohibited.[5] These musters gave the Catholics an opportunity for inspecting the forces at their disposal, with results more gratifying to them than to the Queen.

Still more serious was the discontent arising from the exclusion of English merchants and goods from Flanders.[6] The Northern towns were absolutely dependent on the sale of their cloth for their prosperity and as the only market was in Flanders, they were badly hit by Alba's action. Already riots had broken out among the Protestant weavers in Norfolk and Suffolk,[7] and at any moment the same thing might occur in the North. In this connection it is noteworthy that the men who came to the Earls from the East Riding were all from the market towns;[8] moreover, when the rebellion broke out it was remarked that a very small show of force would have sufficed to deliver York and Hull to the Earls almost as easily as Durham, Darlington, Richmond and Ripon.[9]

[1] For. Cal. El. 1569–71, no. 412. [2] *S. P.* Dom. El. xlix. 71.

[3] *Ibid.* 83. This order was distinctly unpopular, for it extended the obligation of providing harquebusiers to persons hitherto exempt. Cf. *S. P.* Dom. El. lix. 1.

[4] La Mothe Fénelon, *Correspondance*, i. 218.

[5] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. 79.

[6] Alba had closed the Flemish ports in April 1569.

[7] Spanish Calendar, ii. p. 179. [8] Sharpe, p. 151. [9] *Ibid.* p. 76.

A more potent cause of murmuring and discontent was the increasing severity with which the laws against recusancy were enforced after Mary's arrival. Knollys had written to Cecil in September 1568,[1] that these parts were so full of 'papistry' that there was 'great need of a zealous Bishop of York to be speedily appointed for to pluck up the seeds of disobedience that otherwise may grow up to a greater force and danger than ten times the first fruits shall be able to countervail.' The 'Bishop' was not appointed, but in November the President and Council of the North ordered the preachers in the cathedrals and elsewhere to make arrangements to travel from place to place, preaching the Word of God to the people in all places; and letters were to be written to the justices of the peace to receive, assist and accompany them to the places where they preached, to remain at their sermons, and procure sufficient and orderly audience.[2] What the sermons were like, we may learn from a commendation by Sussex of Barnes, Suffragan of York, who during Lent preached on the Apocalypse. He says, 'though some think him over vehement, he shows great learning, and touches the abuses as deeply as any I have heard, and passes not the bounds of an honest and zealous preacher. He has laboured to understand the particular absurd doings of every Pope, and the causes of introducing their frivolous traditions, which he liberally utters, and has more attentive audience than hitherto.'[3] After this, it is without surprise that we find the Spanish Ambassador informing his master in July, that the heretic ministers were arriving in London, having been driven out by the people of the North.[4]

Any influence which the preachers of such sermons might have was counteracted, not only by the wandering Queen Mary's priests, but by Markenfeld and the famous Doctor Morton, who came to England in the summer of 1569. Travelling up and down the country, they everywhere

[1] *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. 829.
[2] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. 65.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 73.
[4] Spanish Calendar, ii. p. 174.

informed the people of the excommunication which threatened them not only with danger to their souls, but with the loss of their country; they were able to inform the Catholic leaders that the common people would gladly rise if any would lead them.[1]

Then came the reports that Mary was to marry the Duke of Norfolk and that the Council was urging Elizabeth to declare the Scottish Queen her heir, and the excitement of the North, especially in Yorkshire and Durham, rose to fever heat.[2]

The Earls of Northumberland, Westmorland, Cumberland, Derby and Sussex had been consulted privately by the Duke about his marriage with Mary and had returned favourable answers. Now the first hint of the Queen's displeasure forced them to consider how far they were prepared to go, should she refuse her consent.

During September the Earls of Northumberland and Westmorland with Leonard Dacre, the Nortons and many gentlemen of the North Riding and the Bishopric, held frequent consultation, under cover of hunting-parties at Cawood, Topcliff and Brancepeth;[3] and Norfolk was assured that if he could not bring about his purposes with the Queen's goodwill, he should have the Earls' assistance to the uttermost of their powers.[4] When the Duke left the Court, Northumberland sent a messenger to know what he meant to do.[5] Norfolk said that he would stand and abide the venture; but finding that his friends and the chief gentlemen in his country were unwilling to rise, he afterwards sent a message to the Earls, 'that they should not rise, for if they did, it should cost him his head, for he was then going to Court.'[6] A private message was also sent to Westmorland requiring him not to rise, even if Northumberland did. This was communicated to the Earl in the garden at Topcliffe at

[1] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 390; Sharpe, Francis Norton.
[2] Foreign Cal. El. ix. no. 416.
[3] Coram Rege Rolls, 1233; *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 82.
[4] *S. P.* Dom. El. lxxxv. 33. [5] Sharpe, p. 195.
[6] *S. P.* Dom. El. lxxxi. 57.

3 o'clock in the morning.[1] Returning to the house, he told Northumberland and the assembled guests what message the Duke had sent. The dismay with which the news was received was soon lost in a determination to follow Westmorland, who declared his intention of going on with the enterprise. At the last moment, almost as an afterthought, the Earl asked what they were rising for; Markenfeld and Norton answered, 'For religion'; but Westmorland cried 'No; those that seem to take that quarrel in other countries are accompted as rebells; and therefore I will never blot my house which hathe been this longe preserved without stayning.'[2]

Many other Catholics were of the same mind, and Father Copley was consulted. He proved from Scripture that they should not fight against an anointed Prince, unless excommunicated by the Church, and maintained against Markenfeld that the excommunication was insufficient unless it had been published within the realm.[3] His argument was accepted, and the confederates having separated in deep discouragement and mutual distrust, many of them began to arrange for leaving the country.[4]

It was now quite clear that in the very stronghold of English Catholicism, in an age of religious fanaticism, the gentry, true to the profound, because unconscious, Erastianism of the nation, were nearly all 'Politiques.'

On the other hand, it was equally clear that there existed a small but increasingly fanatical minority which now drifted rapidly into alliance with Spain.[5] This, Mary had long since recognised would be fatal to her cause, since the 'Politiques,' while quite willing to take up arms to secure liberty of conscience and her recognition, would never do so to make

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Sharpe, Northumberland's Confession. [3] *Ibid.*

[4] La Mothe Fénelon, *Correspondance*, ii. 339. Many of them were in London in November, seeking from the French Ambassador passports to go to France.

[5] Note the increasing frequency and urgency of the messages sent by Northumberland to the Spanish Ambassador; Span. Cal. El. ii. pp. 199, 201, 211.

England Spanish:[1] an opinion fully justified twenty years later, when her own disregard of it brought her to the scaffold. In October 1569, however, there seemed little prospect of such an alliance; for Alba turned a deaf ear when Northumberland, at the instance of Markenfeld and the Nortons, asked for help, and Mary, when consulted, prudently advised the Earls not to rise.[2] For one thing, she had been thoroughly frightened in September by the attitude that Huntingdon had been allowed to assume towards her;[3] for another, the Huguenots had just been defeated at Moncontour (October 3), and the Queen Mother's letters to herself and Elizabeth had revived her hope of receiving the help she would rather have from France than from Spain.[4]

Both the Catholic movements, in fact, had collapsed, and had Elizabeth been content to leave well alone, there would probably have been no rebellion in 1569.

So far, we have seen that neither discontent arising from misgovernment nor hostility to the alterations in religion was the immediate cause of the Rebellion: that distinction was reserved for an appeal for aid made by the Earls to the instinctive loyalty of the people to the feudal lords.

The frequent meetings of the confederates had already attracted attention, when the news of Norfolk's arrest, and the issue of a proclamation bidding the justices arrest all persons spreading seditious reports, caused persistent rumours in the Bishopric and the North Riding that there would be a Catholic rising on October 6.[5] Several prominent Queen's men had received mysterious but ominous warnings, and common report pointed to the Earls as the leaders of the enterprise. Northumberland and Westmorland, on being summoned to York, denied any knowledge of the designs laid to their charge. They also professed, in the presence of the whole Council, their readiness to do their duty against any

[1] La Mothe Fénelon, *Correspondance*, i. 258 ff., and ii. 215.
[2] Sharpe, Northumberland's Confession.
[3] *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. p. 682.
[4] La Mothe Fénelon, and *Lettres de Catherine de Medici*, Tome iii. 274, 281.
[5] *Cal. Sc. P.* ii. p. 690. *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. 94.

that should rebel, and gave their hands to Sussex in secret as a pledge for performance.[1] The rumours ceased as suddenly as they had begun, and Sussex trusted 'that the fire was spent with the smoke.'[2] Elizabeth, however, was sure that she would be much safer if she had the Earls under lock and key in the Tower;[3] and Sussex was ordered to bid them repair to her Court.[4] Against his better judgment he obeyed so far as to summon the Earls to meet him at York.[5] They wrote excusing their non-attendance,[6] and a second summons[7] brought a direct refusal from Westmorland[8] and a temporising message from Northumberland.[9] Sussex had now no choice but to lay upon the Earls the Queen's commands to 'repair to Court,'[10] and prepare to arrest them should they, as he expected, refuse to obey.[11]

Northumberland was at first disposed to submit; but at midnight an alarm was raised that a band of horsemen under Sir Oswald Wilstrop was coming to Topcliff to arrest the Earl. The bells were rung backward and the townsmen ran to keep the bridge; Northumberland spent the night hidden in a keeper's house, and next day rode north to Brancepeth.[12] Here he found Westmorland and Richard Norton in the same plight,[13] and with them all Norton's sons, Markenfeld, the Earl's uncles, the Tempests, John Swinburne and Sir John Neville.[14]

Long and anxious was the consultation. The time for

[1] *Ibid.* 91. [2] *Ibid.* 86.

[3] Doubt has been thrown on the suggestion that the Earl's arrest was intended from the first. It seems certain, however, that this really was the case; cf. Elizabeth's letter of reproach to Sussex for failing to secure them, and De Guaras' Report of the rooms prepared in the Tower for prisoners of great position (Span. Cal. El. ii. p. 204).

[4] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 89. [5] *Ibid.* p. 90.

[6] *Ibid.* p. 98. [7] *Ibid.* [8] *Ibid.* p. 99.

[9] *Ibid.* [10] *Ibid.* p. 98. [11] *Ibid.* pp. 103, 104.

[12] *Ibid.* pp. 101, 102, 103. Northumberland said he had heard he was to be arrested; cf. Sharpe, p. 22. Bowes writes that it was commonly reported that 'Her Majesty had commanded Sussex to take Northumberland and send him up moffeled. My lady excuseth feare upon intelligence from London, or the Cort, or, as I take it, from both.'

[13] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 103; Cotton MSS. Calig. C. i. 377

[14] *Ibid.* p. 405.

submission was long past and there was now no safety but in flight or defence. For the latter, Westmorland had been preparing for some time. His retainers and tenants had been summoned from Raby, and his freeholders and tenants in the Bishopric and elsewhere had been warned to be ready to rise in his defence at an hour's notice.[1] Every night he exercised his men in skirmishing and mustering in the park at Brancepeth.[2] His men were 'sweeping up all maner of weapons and armor, that could be gotten for money, they boght all the bowes and arrowes in Barnard Castle and at Durham';[3] at Ripon the Nortons bought up all the gunpowder of the merchants.[4] The Riders of Tynedale and Redesdale were sure to come to their assistance;[5] Northumberland could count on 1,200 men from his honor of Cockermouth;[6] Leonard Dacre was on their side, and a word from him would bring to their aid more than 3,000 men;[7] Hume was with them, Buccleugh and Cessford, Herries, Maxwell and Lochinvar.[8] Could they but free Mary and seize York, they could await with confidence the coming of the Spring, and with it Alba's men.

On the other hand, Dacre was in London trying to win from Elizabeth the title and estates of his late nephew as well as the guardianship of his nieces.[9] He had every hope of success since Norfolk had fallen into disgrace, and as his first aim was to recover his ancestral lands, it was not unlikely that he would refuse to imperil his chance by engaging in rebellion. Moray had made it difficult for the Scottish Borderers to send their promised aid, by his late ride through Liddesdale and Teviotdale, whence he had returned with hostages from every Border lord.[10] Artillery they had

[1] Sharpe, p. 10.
[2] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 100.
[3] Sharpe, p. 16.
[4] Lansdowne MSS. 15, 95.
[5] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add El. vii. p. 112.
[6] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 138.
[7] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 237.
[8] *Ibid.* p. 129; Sharpe, p. 125.
[9] The boy had been killed by an accident in May 1569, and Leonard Dacr claimed that the title went to heirs male in general.
[10] See Scottish Calendar.

not,[1] and Berwick, Newcastle and York could no longer be surprised, since Sussex was on the alert. Already he had warned the Justices of the Peace and the principal gentlemen of Yorkshire to levy all the horsemen they could for the 18th, with 1,500 footmen to meet at Darlington on the 21st; similar orders went to Sir George Bowes for the Bishopric and Richmondshire, and to the Wardens for Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland.[2] Help would be long in coming, for a winter of exceptional severity had already set in and the roads were blocked with snow.[3] Worse still, there was no store of provisions,[4] and the bad harvest had left the people with little grain to spare; but worst of all was the lack of money[5] with which to buy food and armour, since they could not live by plundering their friends, and to pay the wages of the footmen, since they were Yorkshiremen, 'who do not serve but for a wage.' Westmorland had wasted his patrimony in riotous living and lavish hospitality. Northumberland was a poor man, for all his great estates; still he did his best, pawning his collar of the George for 60*l.*[6] and afterwards letting the whole of his Yorkshire demesnes on twenty-one years' leases.[7]

After long debate of these arguments on either side, the confederates had decided to depart, every man to provide for himself, when Lady Westmorland[8] cried out, weeping bitterly, 'that they and their country were shamed for ever, and that they must seek holes to creep into.' Moved by his wife's entreaty, Westmorland pledged himself to take up arms, but Northumberland only yielded after long hesitation ended by threats of personal violence.[9] Thus it was fear and

[1] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 135; Teulet, *Relations Politiques*, Tome 5, p. 50.

[2] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. pp. 103, 104; Sharpe, p. 23.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 109, 158, 186, 189, 575; Sharpe, p. 65. [4] Sharpe, p. 35.

[5] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 119.

[6] Sharpe, Northumberland's Confession; Hatfield MSS. part i. p. 502.

[7] Humberston.

[8] Doubtless she was moved by fear for her brother, the Duke of Norfolk.

[9] Sharpe, Northumberland's Confession; Hatfield MSS. part i. 469–71. The whole of this examination of Thomas Bishop is interesting.

fear alone, that at the end caused the Rebellion of the Earls.

The Earls first tried the temper of the people at Durham, on November 13, when they entered the Cathedral in force, threw down the Communion Table and tore up the English Bible and Service Book; having heard Mass and set a watch at the gates, they returned to Brancepeth.[1] Even now the movement might have been one of defence not defiance, but at Ripon on the 16th they finally threw down the gage.[2]

The proclamation[3] then read from the steps of the Market Cross is an admirable summary of the position and aims of the Earls and the Catholic gentry, as well as a skilful appeal to the sympathies of the people. As such it will bear quotation: 'We, Thomas Earl of Northumberland and Charles Earl of Westmorland the Queen's true and faithful subjects, To all the same of the old Catholic religion know ye that we with many other well disposed persons as well of the nobility as others have promised our faith in the furtherance of this our good meaning For as much as divers evil disposed persons about the Queen's Majesty have by their subtle and crafty dealing to advance themselfe overcome in this our realm the true and Catholic religion towards God, and by the same abused the Queen, disordered the realm and now lastly seek and procure the destruction of the nobility We therefore have gathered ourselves together to resist by force and the rather by the help of God and you good people to see redress of those things amiss With restoring of all ancient customs and liberties to God's church and this noble realm Lest if we should not do it ourselfe, we might be reproved by strangers to the great hasard of the State of this our country whereunto we are all bound. God save the Queen.'

So much for the nobles and gentlemen; but what of the common people, the dumb multitude? For answer let a single episode suffice.

[1] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. 107, 108.
[2] Coram Rege, Easter Term, 1570. Indictment of the Nortons at London.
[3] *Ibid.* and Lans. MSS. 52, 2.

It was on Sunday, a week after the altar was set up again in Durham Cathedral, that the Earl of Northumberland and his Lady with the Earl of Westmoreland went in state to a solemn Mass in the Collegiate Church at Ripon.[1] First came the priests: among them was Richard Norton, the grey-haired patriarch, holding aloft the Cross with the fateful banner of the Five Wounds bearing the legend, 'In hoc signo vinces.' Then behind the Earls and the Countess, a long line of gentlemen and retainers wearing corselets and white armour followed the standards once borne before Harry Hotspur and Ralph Neville. Next there came a motley crowd of footmen armed with bows and arrows, bills and spears, and in their midst a banner on which was wrought a Plough, and the words, 'God speed the Plough.' All, priests and soldiers, bore on their shoulders the red cross of the Crusaders.[2] Clear through the frosty air rose the chant of the priests as the procession moved on to the old church defaced and spoiled by King Edward's Commissioners.[3] Then the doors were shut and the Market Place lay silent, empty, under the brief, bright sunshine of a winter day.

The response to the Earls' Appeal was magnificent. Men flocked to their camp;[4] if a gentleman sent ten men to aid the Lord Lieutenant he sent his son with twenty men to the Earls;[5] many hid in the woods rather than fight for the Queen.[6] Soon the Earls were able to ride south to release

[1] *S. P.* Dom. El. lix. 38. [2] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 135.

[3] Surtees Soc., *Memorials of Ripon*, ii. p. 257.

[4] Sharpe, p. 61, Bowes reports, 'Dayley the people flee from theys parts to thErles—nothing avails, for they still steal after them.' *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. 112.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 129.

[6] Sharpe, p. 62; cf. Sadler, ii. 24, 'I learn all Cleveland, Allertonshire, Richmondshire and the Bishopric are all wholly gone unto them such is their affection to the cause of religion, by means whereof they are grown to the force of great numbers, but yet confused, without order, armour, or weapon. . . . The people of this country being so hollow-hearted, and so unwilling to bring victuals to the camp; albeit we use all the means we can, both fair and foul, to enforce them thereunto' (Dec. 15, 1569). Sussex writes (26 Nov.), 'At the beginning of these matters, the people were so affected to the Earls for the cause they had

Mary and seize York; they were checked by the news that the Scottish Queen, again in the hands of her enemy Huntingdon, was being hurried inland to Coventry. This check was fatal. The story of the retreat amid ever-growing discord and discouragement has been told before. A few words will suffice to sum up the local effects of the inevitable failure of a rebellion entered upon so hurriedly and with so much irresolution and hidden dissension.

The flight of the Earls and some of the gentlemen into Scotland left their followers at the Queen's mercy. Of the poorer sort nearly 800 were executed by martial law during the first fortnight of January;[1] the rest saved their lives by composition until a free pardon was extended to them (Feb. 19). Most of them were rendered destitute and, with the disbanded retainers of the Earls and gentlemen, wandered about the country begging, until a whipping campaign was started against them by the Vagrancy Act of 1572.[2]

The gentlemen and yeomen who fell into the Queen's hands were reserved for trial at York and Durham,[3] so that Elizabeth might take their lands.[4] Half-a-dozen perished on the scaffold; the others remained in prison until they died, or were pardoned on composition. By composition, too, many were allowed to redeem their lands. Those who fled with the Earls were attainted by Parliament and all their property was forfeited to the Crown.[5]

A difficulty arose concerning the rebels' lands in Durham. The Bishop claimed them in virtue of his *jura Regalia*, and the law officers of the Crown had to advise the Queen that his claim was good in law. Parliament, however, prejudged the question and 'for this time' gave the forfeiture to the Queen 'since she had spent great mass of treasure in the repressing of the rebels.'[6]

in hand, that what was had for the Queen's services was got out of the flint, and those that came, save a number of gentlemen, liked better the other side.'

[1] Sharpe, *loc. cit.* [2] Cunningham, p. 49.

[3] The most important, *i.e.* the Nortons and Bishop, were taken to London.

[4] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 228. [5] 13 El. c. 16.

[6] *Ibid. Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. p. 257.

Many of the Moderate Catholics who had not joined the Earls were so disheartened by the Queen's proceedings after the excommunication which was published too late, that they went into exile, leaving their estates to the care of trustees who transmitted the profits to them. This was stopped by an Act against Fugitives over the Sea, who were ordered to return within six months or lose the profit of their lands during life, and forfeit all goods to the Queen.[1]

In truth the Rebellion was to Elizabeth what the Dissolution of the Monasteries and the Suppression of the Gilds had been to her father and brother, and though it was a great disappointment to her that she could reap no immediate benefit from the estates which thus came into her hands, as the land was either copy- or leasehold,[2] yet she was able to reward Cecil and Leicester by bestowing her newly acquired manors on their friends and dependents. In the absence of the new owners the manor houses and even the strongholds fell into decay.[3]

Everywhere the widespread ruin was aggravated by destruction and spoliation that marked the track of the Southern army. So great was the loss inflicted on the country, even on the loyal inhabitants, that the Wardens and the Council of the North repeatedly uttered a strong, but vain, protest against the licence permitted to Warwick's soldiers.[4]

The people in the North had by the flight and ruin of the gentry suffered great material loss; spiritual loss followed the passage of the Clergy Act of 1572, compelling all priests and clergy to subscribe to the Articles of Religion agreed on in Convocation (1562) and depriving all who maintained doctrines contrary to the Articles.[5]

[1] 13 El. c. 3.

[2] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. pp. 288, 289, 290, 308; Humberston's *Survey*.

[3] *Camden Misc.* vol. iii. 'Relation of disorders committed against the Commonwealth, 1627'; by that time all the chief castles were in ruins.

[4] *Cal. S. P.* Dom. Add. El. vii. pp. 177, 178, 181, 195, 205. Churches and castles were stripped of their lead roofs and soon fell into decay. The behaviour of this army seems to have been quite disgraceful, and it was to the greed of its leaders that so many wealthy rebels owed their pardons.

[5] 13 El. c. 12.

At the same time the liberty of Hexhamshire, whence the outlaws of Tynedale had harried the North, was taken from the Archbishop of York and incorporated with Northumberland.[1]

The assistance given to the rebels by the Scottish Borderers was punished by a wanton and cruel inroad in which over 500 villages were burned, all the great castles were razed to the ground and the surrounding country reduced to a state of desolation surpassing even that of the Northern Counties.[2]

The movement which culminated in the Rebellion of the Earls and their followers was essentially retrograde. Its aim was the perpetuation of a system of religion, of government, and of rural economy, which the mass of the nation had outgrown; and its failure was necessary to complete the real as opposed to the nominal union of the English kingdom. Nevertheless, recognising that it was well that Elizabeth completed the work of stamping out Feudalism and bringing the North under control which her father had begun, we may still be permitted to regret the cost.

APPENDIX.

The Affair of the Copper Mine.

THE mine was found at Newlands at the end of July 1569.[3] By October Hechstetter was preparing to remove from the mine 600,000 lbs. of ore to be smelted at Keswick, when Northumberland forbade it to be touched, claiming the mine and ore as his in virtue of inherited right and a patent granted by Henry VIII. On November 28 the Attorney-General advised that the ore belonged to Elizabeth in virtue of her prerogative to possession of the royal metals, in which copper was now included because it contained gold and silver. Northumberland was ordered by the Exchequer Court to allow the ore to be removed, and to appear in court on February 3, 1567, and recite his claim. He did so and also wrote to the

[1] 14 El. c. 13.

[2] Holinshed, and *Calendar of Scottish Papers.*

[3] *S. P.* Dom. El. xl. 41.

Treasurer a statement of his claims; still he refused to permit the ore to be touched, and accordingly Pembroke, Leicester and Cecil wrote to him (February 19) urging him to obey the injunction and offering to give him a bond for the value of the ore to be paid if he should prove his claim valid. Northumberland replied (February 26) by a letter in which he repeated his statement of claim already made to the Treasurer. Stronger measures were now taken. On March 1 the Court of Exchequer issued another injunction that Northumberland should permit the removal of the ore under penalty of a 300*l.* fine: further, on March 7, George Nedeham was sent down to take possession of the ore and the Queen wrote personally to Northumberland commanding obedience. After consultation with his counsel Northumberland wrote on March 14 to the Queen declining to yield lest he should prejudice his claims, and to Pembroke, Leicester and Cecil declaring that he is advised by counsel that the workers are trespassers on his land, and refusing to give up the ore without payment. The real reason came out in two interviews with Nedeham, whom he summoned to Topcliff on the 23rd. Nedeham's instructions were to measure the ore and remove it to London, giving Northumberland indentures for the same. Northumberland declared this an unreasonable demand, but since they had written to him he offered to give him 200 buckets of ore, which he considered enough for an assay; Nedeham promptly refused to take less than the whole. Next day Northumberland gave the real reason for his refusal to yield the ore: if he accepted a bond before assaying, how could he be sure that he was receiving the full value? was not the demand merely intended to get the ores out of his hands? Finally Northumberland's counsel, Mr. Vavassor, said that the whole question would be settled in court before the end of next term. Nedeham assured Cecil that Northumberland contemplated working the mines himself with the aid of German workmen. Next day (March 25) Northumberland wrote himself to Pembroke, Leicester and Cecil, saying that he had given Nedeham 200 buckets of ore, but could give no more, and he could accept no bond till he knew the value of the ore. On May 12, Northumberland's commissioners summoned Nedeham and others to meet them at Fawe Park on the 13th and in presence of many tenants read an order forbidding them to touch the ores or to work the mines. Meanwhile an agreement had been arrived at, and on May 12 the Court of Exchequer issued a new order that while the Court is considering the averments on which his claim is based, Northumberland shall allow the work at the mines to go on without hindrance, Thurland or his Attorney giving a full

account in writing of the weight and quantity of copper and copper metal obtained from the ore immediately after it is refined, and allowing the Earl or his representative to see the copper and weigh it, so that the Earl may know what and of whom to claim if the mine is adjudged his. The peace thus established was threatened in August 1567, when Northumberland claimed a new mine, 'The Copper Plate,' as not being in Newlands and therefore not subject to the agreement of May 12; when the Company offered to work 'The Copper Plate' on the same terms as the Newlands Mine, the Earl revoked the restraint. The claim was to come up for trial at the beginning of Trinity Term; but delay arose through a proposal for composition the terms of which are not known, but they must have met with the Earl's approval, for in October 1568 we find him writing very sharply to Cecil, asking for a definite answer, whether he is to have any recompense or composition for the mines or no; if he can get nothing reasonable he must resort back again to his right and title.

Apparently the Earl never regained the mine, for, in the list of his lands compiled at the time of his rebellion in 1569, we find no mention of it, and Camden ('Annales,' 114) says that Northumberland 'was much exasperated with a wrong done to him (as he took it) about a rich vein or mine of copper in his soil, judged from him by virtue of the Queen's right or prerogative in Royal mines.'

The above account is based partly on the State Papers, Domestic, at the Record Office and partly on Exchequer Pleas, Decrees and Orders, I. 3–154 ii, being a memorandum for the injunction of May 12, 1567.

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REPORT OF THE COUNCIL, SESSION 1904–1905.

THE Council of the Royal Historical Society present their Annual Report to the General Meeting of the Fellows.

The following Papers and Communications were read during the past Session:—

'The Beginnings of the King's Council.' By James F. Baldwin, Ph.D.
'The English Occupation of Tangier (1661–1683).' By Miss Enid Routh.
'The Beverley Town Riots (1381–1382).' By Cyril T. Flower, M.A.
'The Enclosure of Common Fields in the Seventeenth Century.' By Miss E. M. Leonard, F.R.Hist.S.
'Bartolus, and the Development of European Political Ideas.' By the Rev. J. Neville Figgis, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.
'The "Denarius Sancti Petri" in England.' Communicated by the Rev. O. Jensen, Ph.D.
'Polydore Vergil in the English Law Courts.' By I. S. Leadam, M.A. F.R.Hist.S.
The Case of Dr. Crome.' Communicated by R. H. Brodie, Joint Editor of the Calendar of Letters and Papers, Henry VIII.
'Bondmen in Surrey under the Tudors.' By H. E. Malden, M.A. F.R.Hist.S.
'English Ships in the Reign of James I.' Communicated by R. G. Marsden, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.

The above have been printed in *Transactions*, New Series, Vol. XIX.

The President, Dr. Prothero, delivered his Annual Address on February 16, 1905; this has been printed in *Transactions*, Vol. XIX.

At the close of his address the President resigned, at the expiration of the statutory term of Office. A vote of thanks was passed unanimously to the President for his eminent services to the Society during that term. As the pressure of other engagements necessarily precluded Dr. Prothero from accepting a second term of office, the election of a new President was rendered necessary. The Council were fortunate in being able to nominate the Rev. William Hunt, M.A., D.Litt., who as Vice-President of the Society, and formerly Member of Council of the Camden Society, was already intimately acquainted with the Society's business, and by his position as an historical scholar well qualified to continue the distinguished list of Presidents of the Royal Historical Society. Dr. Hunt was accordingly elected.

The Alexander Medal for the year 1904 was awarded, on the recommendation of the Examiners, to Mr. W. A. Parker Mason, M.A., for his essay on 'The Beginnings of the Cistercian Order.' The Essay has been printed in *Transactions*, Vol. XIX.

The following subject for the Alexander Medal was announced for the year 1905 :—

'The Rising of the Earls, 1569.'

In addition to the current volume of *Transactions* (N.S. Vol. XIX.) the following volumes of *Publications* have been, or will shortly be, issued to Fellows and Subscribing Libraries :—

Camden, Third Series, Vol. VIII. The Presbyterian Movement in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. By Roland G. Usher, Ph.D. (Harvard).

Camden, Third Series, Vol. IX. State Trials of the Reign of Edward I. 1289–1293. Edited by T. F. Tout, M.A., and Miss Hilda Johnstone, B.A.

Camden, Third Series, Vol. X. The Records of the Eastland Company, preserved at York. Edited by Miss M. Sellers.

Camden, Third Series, Vol. XI. Collectanea Anglo-Premonstratensia, Vol. II. Edited by the Right Rev. Abbot F. A. Gasquet, D.D.

Of the above the last three volumes are ready in the press, and they will be followed during the current Session by a further *Miscellany* volume, containing several interesting seventeenth-century narratives.

The future Publications of the Society already arranged for include the third and concluding volume of Abbot Gasquet's important edition of the Premonstratensian Visitations ; the text of the famous official 'Register of John of Gaunt,' preserved in the Record Office ; the newly discovered manuscripts of Carpini's 'History of the Mongols,' and of the 'Narrative of the French Conquest of the Canaries,' 1404–6 ; Poyntz's 'Relations of the Campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus,' 'The Secret Service of George III.,' and the French Despatches 1784–90 in the Foreign Office Archives.

In order to meet as far as possible the expenses of transcribing, editing, and printing connected with these and other volumes of historical texts, the Council have decided to reduce the dimensions of the *Transactions*. This will also be facilitated by the attempt which the Council is about to make to give a preference to Papers dealing with the modern period and with general historical subjects, especially those on the classical and Oriental sides ; also with Continental history and literature. Such papers will probably prove less costly to print than mediæval research papers and communications dealing largely with economic subjects, which have hitherto been the special feature of the Society's *Transactions*.

During the past year the Society has acquired by exchange fifty volumes of the publications of the *Accademia Reale dei Lincei* of Rome, including Historical and Archæological papers of value, as well as Philological papers. The late President, Dr. Prothero, has generously presented the Society with the publications of the Navy Records Society, and will continue the series as they appear; Abbot Gasquet, Vice-President, has presented the publications of the Catholic Records Society, and will continue the series; Sir Harry Poland, K.C., has presented the volumes of the Selden Society, and will continue the series. The thanks of the Council have been returned for these valuable donations. The question of room in the Library is acutely raised by these and similar acquisitions. The exchanges effected are continually increasing the stock of useful Transactions of other Societies, some of which are hard to find elsewhere in England; but insufficient room renders them less readily available than they should be for the use of Fellows. If the Society were housed as it should be, there is little doubt that the Library could at once be largely increased by official publications and by private gifts of standard works. If no munificent benefactor should arise to offer to the Society room for accommodating the School of Advanced Historical Teaching (practically founded by the Society) and for a serviceable Library, it is to be hoped that the Government may be induced to put rooms at the Society's disposal. In default of such advantages being offered, it may become necessary to endeavour, by raising debentures or otherwise, to make a great effort to house the Society in a way worthy of its exertions in the cause of sound Historical knowledge.

The Librarian reports that during the Session the slip-catalogue of the Library has been almost completed. Two hundred books and pamphlets have been added to the Library. Of the additions twelve were acquired by purchase and 188 by exchange or presentation. During the year ended October 31, 1905, 51 volumes were rebound.

The Council record with the deepest regret the death of Sir M. E. Grant Duff, G.C.S.I., who, as President from 1892 to 1899, gave to the Society services of the highest importance during a difficult period of its career. The amalgamation of the Royal Historical and the Camden Societies was carried out under his Presidency. During the year the Society has had to deplore the loss of a distinguished Honorary Vice-President, Sir R. C. Jebb, D.C.L., LL.D., Litt.D., M.P. The late Professor Montague Burrows was formerly a Member of the Council.

In accordance with By-law XVII. the following Vice-President

retired in rotation: Mr. Frederic Harrison, M.A., who was re-elected; Dr. Hunt also retired, in rotation, from the place of Vice-President. Owing to the election of Dr. Hunt, Vice-President, as President, another vacancy occurred in the list of Vice-Presidents. The retiring President, Dr. Prothero, kindly consented to suspend his statutory acceptance of the place of an Honorary Vice-President, and to serve as an acting Vice-President. He was accordingly elected.

The following Members of the Council retired also under By-law XVII.:—

The Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Gibraltar.
C. Raymond Beazley, M.A., F.R.G.S.
W. H. Stevenson, M.A.
Sidney Lee, Litt.D.

The last three were re-elected. The Bishop of Gibraltar felt obliged to decline re-election, and Mr. Stanley Leathes, M.A., was elected to fill the vacancy.

The Treasurer reports that the total membership of the Society on October 31, 1905, included 502 Honorary, Corresponding, Life, and Ordinary Fellows. Of the above 24 are Honorary Fellows, 21 Corresponding Members, 97 Life Fellows, 57 Ordinary Fellows paying £1. 1*s.* under the old regulations, 254 Ordinary Fellows paying £2. 2*s.* under the new regulations, 49 former Members of the old Camden Society paying £1.

There are also 179 Subscribing Libraries, paying £1. The number of libraries belonging to the Society was largely increased this year. Among the newly-elected libraries the Parliament Libraries at Ottawa and at Melbourne merit special notice. There are 57 British and Foreign Societies which exchange *Transactions* with this Society.

The number of Fellows shows an apparent decrease, but this is due to the fact that the Council found it necessary to remove certain names for nonpayment; a sum of nearly £100, representing overdue subscriptions, was obtained during the year.

The Treasurer thought it desirable that the Society should be made acquainted with its financial position, and with that object has submitted the accounts, which are appended, in a form which shows for the first time the actual income of the year and the expenses chargeable thereon. The Balance-sheet gives a view of the whole of the Assets and Liabilities, and is in fact a Capital Account. Included among the liabilities is a sum of £435 7*s.* 7*d.* due to Messrs. Spottiswoode at the close of the financial year for the

printing of Publications in course of preparation. All the printing accounts of works already issued to the Society are included in the Expenditure for 1904–5 above, in order that as much as possible of the heavy outstanding printing-bills should be paid. This is the reason why the expenditure of the year exceeds the income of the same period by £55 17*s.* 3*d.* The receipts from sales of publications appear as a deduction from the cost.

An effort will be made to wipe out the floating debt due to Messrs. Spottiswoode in the course of the current or the following year, and in future it is hoped that it will be possible to keep the cost of the Publications of each year within each year's income.

Professor Grant has accepted the post of Local Secretary in Leeds. The Society is now represented in Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, and Leeds. It is hoped that the other Universities of Great Britain and Ireland may soon be equally well represented.

The Auditors report that 'The Accounts have been prepared in a revised form by the Honorary Treasurer, and we have compared all the entries with his books, receipts, and vouchers, and certified the same to be correct. The Income and Expenditure Account now shows the income of the year, together with the proper charges upon the same period. The Balance Sheet gives in regular form the Assets and Liabilities of the Society.'

The official Information concerning the Society, the Charter, By-laws, List of Fellows, and Subscribing Libraries, with a catalogue of the Publications of the Society, is printed in *Transactions*, Vol. XIX.

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

I.—Income and Expenditure Account for Year Ending October 31, 1905.

Income.	£	s.	d.
Subscriptions of 1902: 1 at 20*s.* £1 0 0			
1 at 21*s.* 1 1 0			
2 1 0			
,, ,, 1903: 2 at 20*s.* 2 0 0			
3 at 21*s.* 3 3 0			
8 at 42*s.* 16 16 0			
21 19 0			
,, ,, 1904: 8 at 20*s.* 8 0 0			
7 at 21*s.* 7 7 0			
26 at 42*s.* 54 12 0			
69 19 0			
93 19 0			
Amount estimated to be received in last year's accounts for subscriptions in arrear	67	2	0
Amount received for subscriptions in arrear in excess of estimate	26	17	0
Subscriptions of 1905: 212 at 20*s.* £212 0 0			
56 at 21*s.* 58 16 0			
233 at 42*s.* 493 10 0			
764	6	0	
Subscriptions now in arrear estimated to be received	50	2	0
Life subscription 21 0 0			
Less proportion required by By-Law IX. to be invested (see Balance-sheet) 14 0 0			
7	0	0	
Dividends on Russian 4% Bond (Alexander Trust)	3	15	3
,, Consols (included in Deposit Account at Bank)	20	3	8
Interest on Deposit Account at Bank	3	10	2
Miscellaneous Receipts	4	11	
Balance, being excess of Expenditure over Income for the year ending October 31, 1905	55	17	3
£931	16	3	

Expenditure.	£	s.	d.
Publications: Printing and Distributing £513 15 2			
Editing and Indexing 30 12 0			
Sundries 1 4 6			
545 11 8			
Less received from Sales 44 4 11			
501	6	9	
Salaries (of Director and Assistant Secretary and travelling expenses of Hon. Secretary)	192	10	0
Rent of Offices	80	0	0
Coal	2	5	0
Electric Light	2	17	6
Rates	6	2	10
General Printing and Stationery	64	5	3
Library: Books, Periodicals, and Binding	24	3	2
Postages, etc.	25	16	8
Sundries (Petty Cash payments)	27	6	9
Advertising	5	3	6
Insurance	3	18	0
Monthly Meetings (including hire of hall)	18	11	0
Alexander Medal	3	3	0
957	9	5	
Deduct sundry amounts owing by the Society at October 31, 1904, and included in above payments	25	13	2
£931	16	3	

(*Signed*) HENRY R. TEDDER, *Hon. Treasurer.*

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

II.—Balance-sheet of Liabilities and Assets at October 31, 1905.

Liabilities.			
Life Subscriptions required by By-Law IX. to be invested: amount brought forward from last Balance-sheet	£856 0 0		
Proportion of Life Subscriptions received in 1905 (see Income and Expenditure Account)	14 0 0		
		870 0 0	
[Represented by Consols and Cash on Deposit see *contra*]			
Alexander Trust Fund [Russia 4% Bond see *contra*]		98 17 6	
Subscriptions received in advance		12 8 0	
Sundry amounts due by Society at Oct. 31, 1905, included in Income and Expenditure Account above as chargeable to the income of the year		6 6 0	
Amount due to Messrs. Spottiswoode not yet paid		435 7 7	
Balance, being surplus of Assets over Liabilities at date Viz.—Amount brought forward from last year	£2,517 12 11	2,026 8 1	
Less Excess of Expenditure over Income as shown by Income and Expenditure Account	55 17 3		
	£2,461 15 8		
Less Amount due to Messrs. Spottiswoode included in Liabilities above but not taken account of last year	435 7 7		
	£2,026 8 1		
		£3,449 7 2	

Assets.			
		£ s. d.	
Consols 2½% £849 9*s*, 9*d*. at cost		855 5 3	
Russian 4% Bond		98 17 6	
Deposit Account at Bank		213 9 8	
Cash Balance at Bank	£164 16 3		
Petty Cash Balance in hand	6 16 6		
		171 12 9	
Stock of Publications in hand, estimated value		160 0 0	
,, ,, with Messrs. Spottiswoode (value as insured)		500 0 0	
Library (value as insured)		1,000 0 0	
,, Manuscripts (value as insured)		100 0 0	
Furniture, &c. ,, ,,		300 0 0	
Subscriptions in arrear estimated to be received (see Income and Expenditure Account)		50 2 0	
(*Signed*) HENRY R. TEDDER, *Hon. Treasurer.*		£3,449 7 2	

The above Statement of Income and Expenditure and Balance-sheet have been prepared from the Books and Vouchers, and we hereby certify the same to be correct

(*Signed*) J. FOSTER PALMER,
R. DUPPA LLOYD,
WILLIAM J. CORBETT, } *Auditors.*

January 10, 1906.

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